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ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, the world has witnessed an increasing number of wars and conflicts to the extent that 
there is no continent isolated from its consequences. Moreover, their effects have crossed the borders of 
countries and regions and have reached an international level, causing many social, economic, and 
political challenges that threaten stability and peace all over the world. This has urged many scholars in 
the social sciences and urban politics to pay great attention to the concept of conflict resolution in their 
research agendas. In a related context, cities and urban areas are naturally conflict sites, but this is usually 
kept under control via social, economic, and political systems. When these systems begin to collapse as 
a result of the outbreak of violence, the city becomes poorly managed, resulting in poverty, inequality, 
lack of inclusiveness, and conflicts of interests. Therefore, good urban governance holds great 
importance in the mitigation of conflict, enhancement of reconciliation processes, and promoting peace 
and stability, thus transforming the city into a well-managed place of political stability, economic 
prosperity, and social wellbeing. In this regard, this study addresses the dynamics of urban governance 
during conflict, specifically focusing on the Syrian conflict. Having started in the middle of March 2011 
with civil movements towards social and political changes, in the months following, the situation 
quickly escalated to include almost the entire country. By the end of the summer of 2011, the disputation 
started to take control of the dilemma of the civil movement and transform it into armed conflict that 
still has command of the situation in Syria after more than six years. 
For an initial overview, the research starts with exploring the urban governance concept in terms of its 
definitions, key actors, and the methods used to assess and measure it. The study then moves on to 
examine the impact of the conflict on urban governance and the main changes in its norms, as well as 
the roles of the key actors involved. With regard to the case study, this analysis identifies the urban 
governance in Syria before and during the conflict in general, and assesses the urban governance 
performance in Damascus through (i) the Urban Governance Index (UGI), using quantitative and 
qualitative data, and (ii) analyzing the roles of the key actors involved in the governance in Damascus 
(i.e. the state, market, and society).   
The research findings indicate that the central government in Syria still controls decision-making even 
at the local level, despite the tendency towards administrative decentralization prior to the conflict. For 
Damascus, the urban governance rating based on the UGI is 0.4085. Regarding the four elements that 
make up the UGI, Damascus is at the top of the list for “accountability” with a rating of 0.715, and also 
has prevalent scores in “equity” at 0.369, “effectiveness” at 0.277, and “participation” at 0.273. The 
results of the analysis show that accountability takes the lead in the city’s ratings for the various 
elements, with participation coming in last. 
Key words: Conflict, Governance, Urban Governance, Urban Governance Index, Damascus, Syria  
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RESUMO 
Ao longo das últimas décadas, o mundo tem testemunhado um número crescente de guerras e conflitos 
de tal maneira que nenhum continente está isolado das suas consequências. Além disso, os seus efeitos 
ultrapassaram as barreiras de países e regiões e atingiram um nível internacional, causando muitos 
desafios a nível social, económico e político, constituindo uma ameaça à estabilidade e a paz em todo o 
mundo. Esta situação instou muitos académicos das ciências sociais e políticas urbanas a prestarem 
grande atenção ao conceito de resolução de conflitos nos seus trabalhos. Num contexto relacionado, as 
cidades e áreas urbanas são naturalmente locais de conflito, mas geralmente controladas através de 
sistemas sociais, económicos e políticos. Quando esses sistemas começam a colapsar como resultado de 
manifestações de violência, a cidade torna-se mal gerida, o que resulta em pobreza, desigualdade, falta 
de inclusão e conflitos de interesses. Assim, a boa governança urbana tem grande importância na 
mitigação de conflitos, no aprimoramento dos processos de reconciliação e na promoção da paz e da 
estabilidade, transformando, desse modo, a cidade num lugar bem gerido com estabilidade política, 
prosperidade económica e bem-estar social. A este respeito, este estudo aborda a dinâmica da 
governança urbana durante o conflito, especificamente no que se refere ao conflito na Síria. Tendo 
começado em meados de 2011, com movimentos civis para mudanças sociais e políticas, a situação 
agravou-se rapidamente e, nos meses seguintes, incluía praticamente todo o país. No final do verão de 
2011, a disputa começou a assumir o controlo do dilema do movimento civil e a transformá-lo em 
conflito armado que ainda se mantém atualmente na Síria após mais de seis anos. 
Para se ter uma perspetiva geral inicial, a pesquisa começa com a exploração do conceito de governança 
urbana às respetivas definições, principais agentes e quais os métodos utilizados para a avaliar e medir. 
O estudo passa então a examinar o impacto do conflito sobre a governança urbana e as principais 
mudanças relativamente às suas normas, bem como os papéis dos principais agentes envolvidos. No que 
diz respeito ao caso de estudo, esta análise identifica a governança urbana na Síria antes e durante o 
conflito em geral e avalia o desempenho da governança urbana em Damasco através (i) do Índice de 
Governança Urbana (IGU), usando dados quantitativos e qualitativos, e (ii) analisando os papéis dos 
principais agentes envolvidos na governança em Damasco (ou seja, o estado, o mercado e a sociedade). 
Os resultados indicam que o governo central na Síria ainda controla a tomada de decisões, mesmo a 
nível local, apesar da tendência para a descentralização administrativa antes do conflito. No caso de 
Damasco, a classificação de governança urbana com base na IGU é de 0,4085. Em relação aos quatro 
elementos que compõem o IGU, Damasco está no topo da lista de "responsabilização" com uma 
classificação de 0,715, e também tem pontuação predominante em "equidade" com 0,369, "eficácia" 
com 0,277 e "participação" com 0,273. Os resultados da análise mostram que a responsabilização 
assume preponderância nas classificações da cidade para os vários elementos, aparecendo a participação 
em último lugar.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. CONTEXT AND PROBLEM 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has witnessed a remarkable decline in the number 
of wars, with 23 conflicts estimated at the end of 2006 (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007). The discourse 
on the characteristics of wars varied between scholars; some of them pointed out that the notion of "new 
war" refer to the recent wars that occur as a result of multiple factors for different purposes and are 
funded by different parties within and beyond the state borders, while the old war was limited to the 
conflict between states in order to achieve specific political agendas (Kaldor, 1999) (Münkler, 2005). 
However, others preferred to address the differences between these wars because each of them has its 
conditions and factors that must be taken into consideration in dealing with (Luckham, 2004). 
In the last decade, the positive decline in the enumeration of wars began to change with a number of 
conflicts that were taking place around the world. Many countries have been affected by these conflicts 
to the extent that no continent has been isolated from their consequences at multiple levels. Furthermore, 
the nature of the recent conflicts has been changed into prolonged crises that do not stop at a certain 
point, because the roots of the problems that caused the conflict in most cases have not been resolved. 
In addition, there is a complete ignorance of the rules and conventions of war that have been agreed on 
by the international community, so there are no targets excluded from destruction including hospitals, 
schools, civilians and historical and archaeological sites...etc. However, nowadays, most of the conflicts 
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occur in places that already have different challenges such as development, exclusion, poverty, climate 
change...etc., within and outside the city or country. Subsequently, this combination between conflict 
and those challenges make the war- torn context fairly complex (Suri, 2009), and in need to be addressed 
with taking into account the severe destruction of the physical environment, human and social capital, 
institutional capacity, governance and relationship between different parties ( Barakat, 2005a). In talking 
about conflicts, there is a necessity for more realistic thinking about different issues and challenges, as 
these challenges define priorities and strategies for peace-building and reconciliation during and after 
conflict.  
In this regard, the absence of governance, the collapse of institutional capacity, the divisions between 
people according to their political, religious and ethnic affiliations that affect their participation in the 
decision-making, and conflicting interests of actors who have different views in need to convergence. 
All these challenges that face the city during the conflict and beyond, require a set of instruments and 
mechanisms that coordinate the city's response to conflict through capacity-building and restructuring 
of state institutions, as well as resolving conflicts between divergent interests and fostering the 
participation process among different state and non- state actors, with a focus on involving the civil 
society. Consequently, everybody achieves his interests within a strategic framework that meets the 
requirements and objectives of the peace building process. Hence, this study seeks to explore the Good 
Urban Governance as a fundamental factor in conflict mitigation, state-building and reconciliation. 
Whereas, with the framework of good urban governance, decision-making is the result of an interactive 
process between different players with a focus on the pivotal role of citizens in this process. Moreover, 
it plays outstanding role in reinforcing inclusiveness, equity, and social justice as well as resolve 
conflicts between different interests. In other word, urban governance is not only the management of 
urban areas but it also dealing with the ability of those areas to cope with the changes and issues that 
take place within and outside the city (Mathur, 1999). 
In very recent time, the debate on conflicts and urban governance, has emerged conspicuously in the 
agendas of many international platforms which are concerned with sustainable development and 
humanitarian issues (SDGs) Sustainable Development Goals which were presented under the title 
“Transforming Our World - the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". The term SDGs was 
adopted in 2015, including 17 goals. The 16th goal focuses on “promoting peaceful and inclusive 
societies, providing access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions.” 
(United Nations, 2016).The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 has set four 
priorities of actions; the second priority has addressed the disaster risk in different levels of governance 
and emphasized collaborative decision making and partnership (UNISDR, 2015). Habitat III conference 
on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, which was held in Quito, Ecuador, from 17 – 
20 October 2016 was the first UN summit after fostering Post-2015 Development agenda. During the 
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conference, urban governance was one of the challenges brought to the table and discussed intensively. 
World Bank stated in its report (World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law): " Violent 
conflict is the result of three types of breakdowns in governance: the unconstrained power of individuals, 
groups, and governments; failed agreements between participants in the bargaining arena; or the 
exclusion of relevant individuals and groups from this arena” (World Bank, 2017). However, while the 
importance of conflict and urban governance issues are recognized in the contemporary research agenda, 
the link between these two topics is still weak in research literature and needs to be adequately addressed. 
Early in 2011, Syrian crises began and was gradually followed by radical changes in the political, 
economic and social levels. Later, it has escalated dramatically and turned into a political-military 
conflict which naturally led to an economic recession and then to a rapid socio-economic deterioration. 
Most of Syrian cities have been subjected to indiscriminate destruction and became a battlefield for 
many conflicting parties. Subsequently, this has led to the collapse of institutional capacities and the 
decline of the State role in those cities which already suffer from fragility. Moreover, this decline has 
resulted in a governance gap that accompanied with anti-government institutions and actors attempting 
to fill the vacuum as a form of sovereignty. On the other hand, the rest of the cities that have not suffered 
from physical warfare became a haven for displaced people who have fled from the massive devastation 
of their cities. Host cities are fragile as well, and lacking in resilience, thus they are unable to respond 
effectively to this extreme situation. Those radical changes, have brought up tragic consequences which 
have been reflected in increased pressure on institutions and emerging of a socio-economic crisis. In 
this regard, this study explores the urban governance reality in Syria, and identify its key actors of action 
(the state-market-civil society), currently and before the conflict. In addition to the assessment of urban 
governance performance in the capital city Damascus using the Urban Governance Index (UGI) and 
analyzing the changing role of key actors during the conflict.   
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1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the study is to find out the mechanisms of urban governance during the conflict 
in terms of its performance and the changing role of key actors of action.  
1.2.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
• To shed light on the urban governance concept and its implication in the literature and the 
international development context. 
• To identify the norms and indicators of good urban governance that followed to measure its 
performance. 
• To examine the characteristics of urban governance during conflict, and the main shifts of the 
role of decision making actors, in addition to the norms followed in assessing urban governance 
in wartime.  
1.2.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE CASE STUDY  
• Explore the urban governance reality in Syria, and identify its key actors of action, currently 
and before the conflict. 
• Assessment of urban governance performance in the Damascus through: 
- Application of Urban Governance Index (UGI) in Damascus. 
- Analyzing the role of key actors involved in Damascus urban governance.  
  
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study follows quantitative and qualitative methods in studying and analyzing the urban governance. 
In this regard, quantitative methods deal with a set of data that can be measured and figured to address 
the phenomenon during the research. While, qualitative methods aim to address specific facts or social 
issues, and concern with data and information that are not related to figures (Creswell, 2013). 
Quantitative and qualitative methods is commonly used in the field of urban politics and governance. 
Many international organizations that have worked on developing the concept of governance, including 
urban governance, such as the UN-Habitat, the World Bank, and International Transparency, have 
sought to find mechanisms to measure and examine its impact on the ground through quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in assessment. However, understanding governance requires to take into 
consideration ‘how things are done’ and not ‘what the result is’. “Governance is about ‘how things are 
done’ and not ‘what the result is’. Measuring governance implies that one needs to measure the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. It is important to 
measure how decisions are made based on complex relationships among many actors with different 
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priorities and what is the level of progress in decision-making, and implementation”. (UN-HABITAT, 
2004a). 
In this context, this study has two major parts. First, the literature review which explores a series of 
concepts related to the urban governance from the beginning of its inception to the current discourse 
within the global context, including governance, good governance, and key actors of actions. Then, 
examines the urban governance in wartime. Second part, the case study which addresses the urban 
governance in Syria. Where indeed, there is no clear adoption of urban governance in its typical sense 
but rather limited to the classic features of urban management as well as blurred relationships between 
the main actors who involved in urban decision making. In this regard, the assessment of urban 
governance is conducted for the capital city of Syria Damascus through (UN-UGI) Urban Governance 
Index which combines the quantitative and qualitative methods. In addition to analyzing the role of key 
actors during conflict in decision making processes. 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE WORK 
The study includes four chapters as follows: 
• Chapter one presents the introduction of the study which include the context and general 
framework of the conflict and urban governance, and provides the research aims in addition to 
the methodologies used to reach the main objectives. 
• Chapter two provides a theoretical framework of the urban governance concept in terms of its 
definition, development, the main principles, and the main actors of action. The chapter 
concentrates on the major transformations that have taken place in urban governance and the 
position it currently occupies in the contemporary debate at the global level. In addition to the 
methods used in evaluating the good urban governance. 
• Chapter three presents the role of urban governance during conflict through providing a 
conceptual framework about the conflict, the function of urban areas during conflicts and 
addresses the main actors of the urban governance during the conflict in terms of their 
interaction and the nature of the relationship between them.  
• Chapter four addresses the governance in Syria before and during the conflict, in terms of its 
the main actors (state, market, civil society, international actors) that involved in the decision 
making.  
• Chapter five delivers an assessment of the urban governance performance in the capital city of 
Syria Damascus through applying the Urban Governance Index (UGI), and analyzing the role 
of key actors involved in city governance.  
• Chapter six present the main conclusion and recommendations. 
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2 
2. URBAN GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter sheds light on the concept of governance which has been addressed by different 
perspectives, in addition to the historical development of this term. Then, it moves on to demonstrate 
the urban governance definitions, involved actors and elaborates on the norms of good urban governance 
that were established by the UN-HABITAT during its Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 1999. 
Finally, it explains the adopted method to assess good urban governance as well as its implementation.    
1.1. FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE 
“The concept of governance has found a central place in social science debate, focusing in particular 
on the shift from government to governance” (Davoudi, et al., 2008).There is a common confusion 
between government and government terminology as some consider them synonyms. However, two 
trends have been identified in the application of those two terms globally. The first one adopts that the 
responsibility for the administrative and political functions is limited to governmental bodies only. Thus, 
it reinforces Top-down approach in decision making. It is worth mentioning that most of the developing 
countries follow this system, for instance, the Middle East countries, including Syria. The other trend is 
contrary to the model of the central government and considers it one of the actors that involved in leading 
the governance process ( McKinlay, et al., 2011). Hence, Government model adopts centrality in 
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decision-making and framing policies, and it approaches the Top down vertical system, while 
governance model is a network of stakeholders and players who share decision-making, and adopt the 
horizontal collaborative system and decentralized decisions.  
 
Figure 1: comparison between "government" and "governance" (Frahm & Lawrence L, 2009) 
The shift from government to government was in response to the changes in political and administrative 
systems, which led to the inability of the state to take effective steps to unify efforts towards collective 
action and impose its policy on the civil society without their involvement in decision-making processes. 
Therefore, the world has experienced the transition from vertical governance by monopolies and 
government organizations to an integrated horizontal network of public and private actors as well as 
civil society. In other word, governance ( HYSING, 2009) 
1.2. DEFINITION OF GOVERNANCE  
Governance is one of  the most considerable issues that come to the forefront of conflict stakeholders' 
concerns and this was evident in the post-Cold War era, as many donors such as World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have fostered the concept of governance based on their awareness 
of its importance as an effective tool for coordinating between all parties in order to ensure their interests 
through a number of processes, laws, and institutions (UNESC & U.N., 2006).  
Types and forms of governance vary relying on the context and the level at which they are applied, 
whether international, national or local (UNESCAP, 2009). Therefore, there has been no consistent 
conceptualizing of the governance, and different definitions and interpretations have been provided as 
follows: 
• UNDP the United Nations Development Program defined governance in 1997 as “the exercise 
of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. 
It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
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articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences”. (UNDP, 1997) 
• The World Bank states the governance in 1993 as “The exercise of political authority and the 
use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs.” (UNESC & U.N., 
2006). 
• The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) perceive governance 
as “The concept of governance denoted the use of political authority and exercise of control in 
a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. 
This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment 
in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as the 
nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.” (OECD, 1995) 
• Canada’s Institute of Governance in (2002) states the governance as “Governance is the 
process whereby societies or organizations make important decisions, determine whom they 
involve and how they render account”. 
It is clearly shown that the previous interpretations of governance have differences in certain points 
according to the environment in which it is applied and the processes it controls as well as the players 
involved in these processes. There is, however, a set of common ideas that can be summed up as: 
• Governance reflects a network (vertical and horizontal) of multi-actor relationships with 
different interests, based on the principle of partnership. 
• The significant role played by political authority within the governance system. 
1.3. GOOD GOVERNANCE 
While governance reflects a network of multi-player relationships that based on a set of principles, good 
governance is concerned with the effectiveness of these relationships within the framework of the State, 
the private sector and civil society. In this regard, the central issue of good governance is closely linked 
to the role that stakeholders play within the state system, where the government authorities provide 
legislative and legal frameworks, the private sector in cooperation with the public sector contributes to 
economic development and create new job opportunities, and the community participates in the 
decision-making and accounting process. 
The perceptions and implications of good governance are derived from the policies and strategies of the 
system in which it is practiced. Therefore, there is a diversity of perspectives toward the principles by 
which governance can be effective.  
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The World Bank was a pioneer to introduce the good governance concept, in its report on Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 1989, when the former chairman of the bank said in the preface of the report: “public service 
that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public.” 
(Maldonado, 2010). In 1994, the World Bank pointed out the good governance as “… epitomized by 
predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law” (The World Bank, 1994). In addition, five 
components of good governance were identified: 
• Public sector management 
• Competitive private sector 
• Structure of government 
• Civil society participation and voice 
• Political accountability 
These principles reflect the Bank's economic leanings, with terms such as management and 
competitiveness being introduced to ensure its profitability strategies. The role of government and civil 
society has been recognized unless it conflicts with any project that serves its agenda. 
Michel Camdessus, the manager director of the international monetary fund (IMF), stated the good 
governance as “Good governance is important for countries at all stages of development. ... Our 
approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance that are most closely related to our 
surveillance over macroeconomic policies—namely, the transparency of government accounts, the 
effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and 
regulatory environment for private sector activity” (IMF, 1997). 
The key principles of good governance which have been promoted by IMF as a tool to raise the economic 
level and reduce the problems that hinder the development process: 
• Public sector accountability and transparency  
• Institutional reform to maintain private sector confidence 
• Improve efficiency and support the public growth  
• Rule of law  
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) identified the 
good governance in an inclusive conceptualization based on eight characteristics, which are connected 
fairly by interrelations in order to ensure the role of all actors in decision-making, including minorities 
and the most vulnerable segments of society. In this regard, the adoption of good governance fosters 
decision-making that responds to the current and future needs of the society and ensures that these 
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decisions are implemented optimal .Those characteristics have been mentioned in the UNESCP report 
(UNESCAP, 2009) as: 
• Participation 
• Rule of law 
• Transparency 
• Responsiveness  
• Consensus oriented  
• Equity and inclusiveness   
• Effectiveness and efficiency  
• Accountability 
From the perspective of the World Bank and the IMF, the concept of governance reflects the economic 
and financial objectives of these organizations, which revolve around changing the role of the private 
sector through privatization and marketization. While the United Nations defines governance as a form 
of democracy based on collaborative decisions that are made with the involvement of the state, the 
market and civil society 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the intersection between the three previous definitions (UN-WB-IMF) 
demonstrates the inclusiveness of UN conception of good.  
 
 
Figure 2: 8 principles of good governance (UNESCAP, 2009) and intersections with the WB and IMF perception 
(Author) 
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1.4. URBAN GOVERNANCE 
1.4.1.  THE RISE OF URBAN GOVERNANCE  
The 1980s witnessed a significant economic and political changes, notably neoliberal agenda, which 
adopted new economic policies based on reducing the role of the State and enhancing the participation 
of the private sector. In addition, the rise of globalization as a new trend in which the relationship 
between the state-market- societies has changed and followed by transformations in economic and 
social conditions including challenges and problems that cannot be addressed by Top-Down approach 
of state planning (Jessop, 1998). 
In this regard, urban areas have been targeted by the restructuring of policy and decision-making 
organization with the growing of governing beyond the state through an integral network of horizontal 
and vertical including the government, in another word the emerge of governance. Furthermore, urban 
governance during the period between the 1980s and 1990s was manifested in the following aspects 
(McCann, 2017): 
• Broad partnerships between state apparatus, the private sector and semi-governmental 
organizations in the urban development process. 
• Re-articulate the obligations and responsibilities of national governments, especially after the 
emergence of institutions that transcend the borders of the state such as the European Union and 
the World Trade Organization, which played a significant role in the urban governance. In 
parallel with the crystallization of decentralization within state institutions and local 
governments. 
• The growing awareness of the role civil society as a key component in the decision-making 
process and the recognition by the state of its rights and duties, as a result of embracing the 
concept of democracy and its benefits to society and the state. 
• The growing role of cities in entrepreneurship and the adoption of the concept of marketing 
cities by the public sector, which led to the emergence of the concept of ‘entrepreneurial 
governance’ as a new trend in urban policies. 
It is worth to clarify some points of convergence and the difference between urban governance and 
urban management as there is a kind of blurry in the distinction between them. Common characterization 
could be pointed out, since both were put forward a modern ideas of managing cities based on economic 
recovery, improved social status and poverty alleviation (Obeng-Odoom , 2012). Whereas urban 
governance involves multiple stakeholders of different horizontal and vertical levels (local, national, 
regional and international), urban management is limited by a unilateral administration (Kearns & 
Paddison, 2000). In addition to, the differences in the concept of accountability of actors involved in the 
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administration, while in the management confined only to managers, either governance no one is 
excluded from accountability (Newman, 2004). 
The beginning of the third millennium marked a turning point in the path of urban governance, when 
the United Nations launched its campaign, which entitled Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance 
in 2001, On the grounds that good urban governance is an effective solution to many social and 
economic problems. New concepts were introduced to improve the performance and influence of urban 
governance to be more effective through capacity building of all actors that involved in urban 
development (UN-HABITAT, 2002). 
However, the discussion on the characteristics, implications and concentration of power in urban studies 
has become in the center, in addition to its close association with other disciplines such as sociology and 
political science (McCann, 2017). Moreover, urban governance studies have dealt with wide variety of 
actors and their responsibilities in formulating policies and building decisions, as well as define the 
problems, set comprehensive plans, and frame the goals an Opportunities for urban development. 
1.4.2. THE DEFINITION OF URBAN GOVERNANCE  
Managing and governing urbanism have been at the forefront of the challenges facing development in 
the 21st century. Further, the well-managed cities are characterized by the provision of livelihoods from 
health care, security and housing, to the opportunities and potentials of their residents. Beyond that, 
cities play a pivotal role in economic and social development and thus political stability, especially in 
fragile states and post-conflict contexts where cities have a substantial impact on the reconciliation 
process. Hence, the urban governance gained currency in determining discretionary aspects of urban 
growth, disadvantaged benefits of economic growth and whether political and institutional systems, 
processes and mechanisms, regardless if they are formal or informal facilitate inclusive proper decisions 
and outcomes. 
UNESCO construed the urban governance as the group of processes, procedures, and mechanisms that 
address and take into consideration the relationships between local authorities, stakeholders, and 
citizens. It includes top-bottom and bottom-Top approaches which enhance the effective participation 
of all actors, clear decision-making tools, and innovative strategies in management. (Leautier, et al., 
2005 )   
Urban governance is a process by which local, national governments and various actors determines how 
to plan and operate urban regions. It is important to realize that this process is not confined to the formal 
structure of city government, but it includes a set of economic and social powers, formal and informal 
institutions and civil society ( Avis , 2016).  
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One of the clear definitions of urban governance has been reflected in the Global Campaign on Good 
Urban Governance as: “Urban governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through 
which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It 
includes forma institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.” (UN-
HABITAT, 2002). 
As a result of the challenges that facing city governance today such as climate change, effects of 
globalization on economies and societies, population growth associated with rapid urbanization, 
problems of migration and asylum, deterioration of social justice, and global public health...etc. Urban 
governance was one of the most outstanding topics that topped the new urban agenda at the third 
conference of UN- Habitat (Habitat III) which took place in Quito, Ecuador, from 17 – 20 October 2016.  
The most recent definition of urban governance was presented in this conference as “It is the software 
that enables the urban hardware to function, the enabling environment requiring the adequate legal 
frameworks, efficient political, managerial and administrative processes, as well as strong and capable 
local institutions able to respond to the citizen’s needs.” 
The new urban governance aims to create an appropriate atmosphere, in which the right of the city could 
be practiced in order to disseminate equity, fairness, democracy, inclusiveness, and recognition of 
diversity. Right of the city promote tolerance and bring a peaceful coexistence among all inhabitants 
and ensure the right way of stack holder participation in the decision making process.  
Furthermore, new governance should foster sustainable and equitable development that take into 
consideration the environmental issues and keep natural resources from deteriorating.  It should also 
adopt a new economy that preserves the rights of workers, placing the interest of society as a priority. 
Another aspect that new urban governance keen to achieve is the spatial equality, and guarantee the 
accessibility to al public services for both urban and rural inhabitants (Rode & Saiz, 2016). 
The new urban agenda has described New Urban Governance with the following characteristics: 
• Democratic and inclusive: through ensuring the effective participation of all stakeholders in city 
administration and urban development, and finding mechanisms and means to enhance the 
participation of vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
• Long-term and integrated: the new urban governance emphasizes the adoption of a 
comprehensive strategy at all stages of the development process in order to ensure long-term 
policies encompassing the entire territory. 
•  Multi-scale and multi-level:   new urban governance demands a collaborative action between 
the vertical and horizontal levels of government, civil society and private sector.  
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• Territorial: the new urban governance underlines on the urban ecosystem which implicates both 
urban and rural areas without underestimating the natural environment. 
• Proficient: new urban governance is keen to find a segment of individuals and groups prepared 
to deal with new policies and able to make decisions in an effective manner 
• Conscious of the digital age: The rapid pace of technological development in the current era 
requires governments and authorities to embrace these technologies and harness them to 
enhance their participatory policies and make monitoring by citizens easier. In addition to 
employing these techniques in the field of economy and business. (Rode & Saiz ،2016). 
1.4.3. URBAN GOVERNANCE ACTORS 
Urban governance goes beyond merely the formal government at different levels (Local, regional, and 
national) toward engaging the private sector and community to form three dimensional system (State-
Market-Society) in the policy making and implementation (Minnery, 2007). The relationships between 
these three spheres have taken an important position in the urban governance discourse nowadays. 
Thynne characterized this relation as “the state . . . viewed, very generally, as an organized political 
community that both features in, and has interdependent relationships with, the market as an organized 
economic community and civil society as an organized social community” (Thynne, 2000). 
Urban governance was one of the key areas that had been discussed in the Regional High-Level Meeting 
in Preparation for Istanbul+5 for Asia and Pacific which was held from 13-29 October 2000 in 
Hangzhou, China. Furthermore, the key actors of good urban governance have been identified by three 
main stakeholders: the state, civil society and the private sector (Un Habitat & ESCAP, 2000).  
“The State provides the foundation of justice, equity and peace, creating conducive political and legal 
environs for human progress. Civil society provides the foundation of liberty, equality, responsibility 
and self-expression. The Private sector provides the foundations of economic growth and development. 
The three carry out these responsibilities by performing multifarious tasks, as shown in the diagram 
below.” 
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Figure 3: Main actors in good urban governance (Un Habitat & ESCAP, 2000) 
 
1.4.3.1. The State 
The State is characterized by the Legitimate, Executive, and Judiciary branches, all of which should 
support the wellbeing of the nation in every manner. However, governments generally implement rules 
and spending, impose taxes, and offer services. Society reciprocates by following these regulations, 
paying taxes, and utilizing these services. This principle can be used to outline the function that 
governments serve, where they are accountable for supplying and monitoring the happenings in the 
community instead of the reallocation of supplies (Schakel, 2008).  Governments play a more intricate 
part, and their duties are generally described in a wider sense (Streeten, 2007), as follows: 
• Capacity Building: inform, coach, and encourage the proper approaches for a capable public 
service, able to repel self-concerned pressure crowds. 
• Liability: monitor the correct inspections for government, private sector, civil society, and 
domestic households so that governments do not have excessive control over business, private 
businesses do not debase government, and the people do not dismantle society, but rather holds 
the government accountable. 
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• Participatory: offer chances for the people to become involved in choices that affect their value 
of life, influence on authority, and transparency and accountability of those in authority. 
• Integrity: implement property rights; evading inflation, significant unemployment, and 
disparities in the stability of payments. 
• Pro-Poor budgeting: offer chances for the most vulnerable groups so that they can become self-
sufficient, rectifying unjust market victory. This means providing the susceptible populations 
with resources: land, nutrition, healthcare, schooling, training, employment, supplying public 
services, and a social safeguarding. 
• Social accountability: assign more urgency in welfare programs to women and children, the 
poor, the rural regions over the city, and to ignored minority populations that are prejudiced 
against over the more privileged groups. 
The New Urban Agenda has highlighted the role of national and local governments in urban 
governance as follows: 
Local Governments 
Local governments play a pivotal and critical role in the implementation of the new urban agenda, as it 
is the inevitable and certain guarantee for achieving a sustainable and inclusive city where everyone can 
interact in an organized and public-oriented manner (Sorensen & Okata, 2011). 
In the new urban agenda, there is a strong focus on the responsibility of local governments to promote 
accountability and transparency and provide the mechanisms to apply it among all stakeholder including 
the empowerment of citizens to access into public documents in order to make everything accessible 
and available to evaluate. In addition, the New Agenda emphasizes a participatory approach among all 
local stakeholders at all stages of the development process from planning to implementation, ending 
with monitoring, especially when it comes to involving the civil society by supporting its organizations, 
which are concerned with delivering the views and aspirations of the inhabitants (Rode & Saiz, 2016). 
Hence, Local governments are responsible for bringing the language of dialogue among all actors and 
playing the role of mediating between their diverse and conflicting interests in order to achieve the 
principle of inclusiveness (Campbell , 2012). 
Moreover, local governments, through cooperation and coordination with the national government, 
contribute to the formulation and effective monitoring of urban policies within an accounting framework 
that ensures the optimal implementation of all services and needs of citizens, as well as capacity building 
at the local level to achieve more coherent and comprehensive management (UN-HABITAT, 2009). 
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National Government  
National governments are concerned with the formulation of national urban and territorial policies 
within a legal and institutional framework which fosters a participatory process between different 
parties, and thus has a significant impact on shaping the new agenda. In addition, it has the potential to 
apply effective decentralization and ensure that all actors are involved in decision-making at all levels 
of government, as well as strengthen cooperation and coordination with local governments to build 
capacities which contribute effectively in implementing the new agenda goals.  
In the network of horizontal and vertical relations of governments within the State system, the 
identification of roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders at different levels comes within the 
priorities of national governments, while emphasizing the right of national governments to exercise their 
roles and responsibilities autonomously and not contrary to the policy of decentralization. 
National Governments must firmly embrace openness, transparency, and accountability and apply to all 
levels of government, as well as ensuring a reliable database by creating an institutional structure for 
data collection, coordination, and statistics. Most importantly, this data should be available to all to 
ensure a reality-based monitoring and evaluation process. 
1.4.3.2. Private Sector 
The urban governance framework provides the private sector with the chance to renovate itself and its 
obligation to the urban setting. The duty of the private sector is directly associated with the monetary 
supply and demand, where this task can be regulated in the scope of the urban development. Escalating 
the involvement of the private sector in urban governance necessitates a fundamental grasp of how cities 
are governed, by examining factors like the organization of main concerns in the urban scheme and how 
to regulate the involvement of the private sector in order to circumvent having prejudiced governance 
that favors the benefits of investors. Such a duty entails suggesting variables that act in favor of the 
urban poor to be incorporated into the facilitations of services. In addition, use of local labor endorses 
the public’s view of them (Auclair, C & Jackohango, A, 2009) 
This assistive involvement of the private sector towards good urban governance can be accomplished at 
all urban levels. The most popular illustration of the private sector assistances is concentrated on the 
development of organized service in the Private Public Partnerships, e.g. in several sectors such as 
transportation, energy, etc. These organizations on the national level are instigated within an official 
assistive structure, which is founded on conveyance of projects and genuine contractual agreements that 
are able to be examined by the people. 
New Urban Agenda confirmed that the private sector, along with entrepreneurs, developers, contractors, 
industrialists and service providers, includes a wide range of companies, economic alliances and 
corporate foundations. These components provide employment and welfare opportunities and contribute 
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to long-term economic development through three pillars of finance, environment and society (Rode & 
Saiz ،2016) .  
The presence of the private sector in the process of urban development is a key factor in pushing this 
process forward through partnership with the public sector, in which national and local governments 
play an important role in making them effective by creating legal and institutional frameworks that 
ensure long-term public interest (Da Cruz & Marques ،2012). 
New Urban Agenda endorses the Istanbul Declaration which emphasizes the role of “encouraging 
business enterprises to pursue investment and other policies, including non-commercial activities that 
will contribute to human settlements development, especially in relation to the generation of work 
opportunities, basic services, access to productive resources and construction of infrastructures.” (UN-
HABITAT, 1996). In addition, much more focus on innovative policies, financial support and successful 
economic experiences in urban development. 
1.4.3.3. Civil Society  
Discussion over societies’ development has significantly switched its focus since the late 1970s towards 
the formation of a new model, with civil society as its foundation and NGOs as its most dynamic factors 
(Abdelrahman, 2004). Therefore, the lack of success of the state-led advancement models has required 
the households, populations, and external volunteers to participate in enhancing their living and raising 
the quality of the local city circumstances. Civil society organizations manifest in various forms of 
official exemplifications, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which are locally-based 
establishments with the support of self-help alliances from within the actual community (Abdelrahman, 
2004). That being said, the civil society is made up of numerous concerned groups, enables political and 
social collaboration within the urban setting (Banachowicz, B & Danielewicz, J, 2004). Incidentally, 
several of these groups tend to use one or more tactics in the direction of market alignment, welfare 
tactics, raising claims against the State, and offering civil society ambitious options for development 
(Özhabeş, 2013).These methodologies are elaborated on as follows: 
• Welfare tactics: with NGOs supplying help to those who require it, often satisfying a role that 
government organizations should fill, such as facilitating water or waste management. 
• Market alignment: with ingenuities to present and finance better housing, infrastructure, and 
services by means of market-oriented tools and local business owners. Credit is often a 
significant variable involved, since it permits low-income households to pay for the capital 
expenses of enhanced infrastructure or upgrading their own home, as well as to distribute the 
reimbursements over time. 
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• Raising claims on the State: with the NGO playing a dynamic role in the support of human 
rights and in influencing local powers or other state organizations to supply infrastructure or 
amenities to the poor. 
• Alternatives motivated by civil society: through packages which entail a collaboration of 
community and state support to make available or upgrade housing, infrastructure, and services 
in contemporary manners. 
Civil society is characterized by its inclusion, as it includes all members of society irrespective of race, 
religion, culture or political affiliation, taking into account the most marginalized and disadvantaged 
groups such as women, youth and the elderly, indigenous communities, migrants and refugees, ethnic 
and religious minorities, LGBT communities and other vulnerable groups. The interests and attitudes of 
these individuals and groups are reflected in a non-governmental and nonprofit organization called 
CSOs (Civil Society Organizations), which encompass community organizations, charities, trade 
unions, faith-based organizations, indigenous groups and social movements. However, robust urban 
governance requires a strong relationship between government institutions and civil society 
organizations, based on trust and the common goal of serving the common good. (Rode & Saiz, 2016) 
The New Urban Agenda emphasizes that civil society is one of the main pillars of urban governance in 
addition to the state and the market, and endorses the Istanbul Declaration’s statement that “sustainable 
human settlements development requires the active engagement of civil society organizations, as well 
as the broad-based participation of all people.” (UN-HABITAT, 1996). 
However, each of the three pillars of urban governance (State, Civil Society, and Private sector) is 
formed the interaction between set of organizations, bodies, individuals and groups with different roles 
and interest. The variety of actors become more complicated and critical when dealing with the state 
and governmental actors (Minnery, 2007). Moreover, the Nature of involved actors depends on the 
context in which the urban governance is applied. For instance, in the rural area different players and 
decision makers could be distinguished such as landlords, Clerics and religious groups, Peasant 
associations, NGOs, political parties, military leaders, finance institutions, research institutions etc.  
In urban areas, the number of involved actors and complexity of interrelations between them increase, 
due to the intricacy of the factors and implications of urban areas. When dealing with the national level, 
media organizations, lobbyists, international donors, multi-national corporations in addition to the actors 
which mentioned above have a significant role in decision making processes or at least impact in a way 
those processes. In some complicated contexts, it is observed the presence of organized crime groups in 
decision making especially in urban areas. In other word, the informal actors such as "kitchen cabinets", 
informal advisors, and Mafia. The informal decisions have serious consequences because most of them 
come up from illegal background with illegal practices and implementation (UNESCAP, 2009).  
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Figure 4: Urban Actors according to Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2009) 
  
1.5. GOOD URBAN GOVERNANCE 
“If we widen the concept of governance to “good governance,” this will encourage us to reflect more 
systematically on what quality is in the art of administration, opening the door to a rich and diversified 
understanding of administrative value(s). The urban realm is a suitable testing ground for doing so” 
(Hendriks, 2013).  
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Recent discourse on urban governance has focused its efforts on what makes urban governance more or 
less effective, broadly speaking urban governance since to be participatory, transparent and accountable 
as well as equitable and promoting rule of law. Furthermore, discussion of effective urban governance 
associated with normative values. Through good urban governance, political, economic and social 
priorities are guaranteed and based on the consensus that the voice of the poorest and vulnerable groups 
is heard and recognized in decision-making processes ( Avis , 2016).  
However, UN Habitat stated in its report (world cities report 2016) that many urban regions struggle 
with a disparity in political authority and inadequate inclusiveness and participation. Cooperative 
decision-making has not been successful in acknowledging the breach between national developmental 
schemes and community requirements. For instance, women, youth, minorities, the poor, and the 
disabled are frequently omitted from decision-making. Furthermore, exclusion can be subjective to both 
who a person is (such as in regards to race, beliefs, or class) and where they reside (such as in informal 
communities) (UN-Habitat, 2016). 
In urban context, there should be more consideration about the political, financial, and social influences 
of negotiating and distributional clashes between populations over policy, goods, and services (Jones, 
Cummings & Nixon, 2014). Thus, it is imperative to comprehend both the political economy that 
motivates urban governance organizations and how local authority sway the dispersal and sharing of 
resources. 
UN-HABITAT’s personal comprehension of good urban governance is founded on its working 
knowledge and the Habitat Agenda. UN-HABITAT’s working knowledge validates that good 
governance alone defines the difference between an organized and Inclusive City and disorderly and 
exclusive one, rather than finances, technology, or even mastery. Furthermore, it is UN-HABITAT’s 
familiarity that inclusive planning and decision-making processes are crucial components of good 
governance. 
This practical knowledge was verified in the Habitat Agenda’s testimonial of the “enabling approach.” 
This approach is distinguished by numerous tactics: decentralization of duties and resources to civic 
authorities in accordance with values of subsidiarity and accountability; supporting the participation of 
the local community, especially women, in the design, application, and observation of local precedence; 
utilizing a broad range of collaborations, including with the private subdivision, to attain mutual goals; 
constructing aptitude of all stakeholders to completely participate in decision-making and urban 
development procedures; enabling networking on all planes. 
Urban governance is intimately connected with the wellbeing of the people. Good urban governance 
must provide availability of the advantages of urban citizenship to both men and women alike. Good 
urban governance, founded on the value of urban citizenship, asserts that no man, woman, or child can 
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be refused access to the essentials of urban life, including sufficient housing, security of tenure, 
drinkable water, hygiene, unpolluted surroundings, healthcare, schooling, nutrition, work, and 
communal protection and mobility. Through good urban governance, the people are supplied with the 
facilities which will enable them to maximally apply their capabilities to better their social and financial 
circumstances (UN-HABITAT, 2002). 
1.5.1. NORMS OF GOOD URBAN GOVERNANCE 
From its initiation, the campaign must focus on building common standards that can be put into practice. 
These should be founded on experience-based knowledge and exhibit local circumstances. The 
application must be set in the reality of urban development. 
Because of this, the campaign suggests that good urban governance is described by the norms of 
“sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement 
and citizenship, and security”. (UN-HABITAT, 2002). 
1.5.1.1. Sustainability  
Urban environments must have equilibrium between the social, economic, and environmental 
requirements of current and subsequent generations. This must consist of a clear devotion to decreasing 
poverty in urban environments. People who manage all sectors of urban society should have a 
continuing, methodical idea of sustainable human development and the capacity to resolve differing 
interests for the benefit of all. Concrete methods of applying this value include, among others: 
• Conducting consultations with all actors within societies to settle on a universal mission statement 
and continuing methodical idea for the city, utilizing methods including urban development  tactics; 
• Taking part in counseling procedures such as environmental planning and management of Local 
Agenda 21s, that are aimed to achieve consensus on appropriate amounts of resource use, employing 
the preventative value under circumstances in which human interference may negatively impact the 
welfare of current and/or subsequent generations; 
• Implementing methods to decrease urban poverty into local planning strategies; 
• Enhancing green cover and maintaining traditional and ethnic culture; 
• Guaranteeing economic sustainability by encouraging financial doings through the involvement of 
all inhabitants in the financial activity of the city; 
• Endorsing the allocation of proper equipment. 
1.5.1.2. Subsidiarity  
Responsibility for amenity facility should be assigned on the foundation of the value of subsidiarity, 
that is, at the nearest proper level in line with resourceful and affordable distribution of amenities. This 
will make the most of the likelihood for involvement of the people in the procedure of urban governance. 
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Decentralization should enhance the receptiveness of rules and resourcefulness to the urgencies and 
requirements of citizens. Cities should be strengthened with adequate resources and self-government to 
meet their necessities. Concrete methods of applying this value include, among others: 
• consultation with local administrators, come up with straightforward constitutional outlines for 
allocating and entrusting duties and corresponding authorities and supplies from the national to the 
local level and/or from the local level to the community level. 
• Implement local statutes to convey constitutional amendments in accordance with subsidiarity into 
concrete methods to allow civil society to become successfully involved in city issues and which 
support the receptiveness of local administrators to their communities. 
• Constructing apparent and foreseeable intergovernmental monetary transfers and central 
administrative support for the development  of governmental, practical, and administrative abilities 
at the local level; 
• Preserving economically inferior local governors through schemes of vertical and horizontal 
economic equalization settled on in complete counsel with local government and all actors. 
• Encouraging decentralized collaboration and interpersonal thinking. 
1.5.1.3. Equity  
The distribution of authority results in equity in the acquiring and implementation of resources. Women 
and men alike must partake as equals in all urban decision-making, prioritizing, and distribution of 
resources. All-encompassing cities give equitable availability of nutrition, schooling, work and income, 
housing, healthcare, drinkable water, hygiene, and other essential services to all citizens, including the 
poor, the young, the old, the handicapped, and religious and ethnic minorities. Concrete methods of 
applying this value include, among others: 
• Guaranteeing that women and men have the same influence in decision-making procedures and 
availability of supplies, and essential amenities and that this availability is delegated through gender-
combined information; 
• Implementing minimum numbers for women advocates in local administration and support their 
growth to higher managerial statuses within cities. 
• Guaranteeing that regulations and financial development  strategies are in accordance with the 
informal actors; 
• Founding equitable values for ordering organization development  and appraising city services; 
• Eliminating needless inhibitors to instate occupancy and to the provision of finance; 
• Constructing nondiscriminatory and foreseeable governing agendas. 
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1.5.1.4. Efficiency  
Cities must be economically stable and affordable in their organization of income sources and costs, the 
management and distribution of amenities, and in the allowance, founded on relative benefit, of 
authority, the private sector and civil society to subsidize officially or unofficially to the urban economy. 
A main factor in accomplishing efficiency is to define and facilitate the precise influence of women to 
the urban economy. Concrete methods of applying this value include, among others: 
• Distribution and management of municipal services through collaborations with the private and 
local community sectors; 
• Encouragement of city subdivisions to discover creative methods of distributing public supplies and 
resources though administrative contracts; 
• Promotion of assimilated, inter-departmental organization and administration; 
• Eliminating needless inhibitors to instate occupancy and to the supply of finance; 
• Development  and employment nondiscriminatory and foreseeable legal and governing outlines that 
promote trade and investment, reduce transaction fees, and authenticate the informal division; 
• Implementation of obvious goals and objectives for the facility of public services, which make the 
best use of the contributions all community divisions can offer to urban economic development. 
1.5.1.5. Transparency and Accountability  
The accountability of local authorities to their people is an essential principle of good governance. 
Likewise, there should be no room for venality within the city. Venality can weaken the reliability of 
local authorities and can exacerbate urban poverty. Transparency and accountability are required for 
actors to comprehend the local administration and who draws advantages from decisions and doings. 
Availability of this information is essential for this comprehension and for good governance. Laws and 
strategic policies should be implemented in an obvious and foreseeable fashion. Nominated and selected 
officials and other public service administrators should exemplify a high standard of both professional 
and individual honor. The involvement of the people is a main factor in supporting transparency and 
accountability. Concrete methods of applying this value include, among others: 
• Frequent, systematized, and public meetings of the people on city economic subjects and other key 
topics, though such methods as the participatory budget; 
• Apparent proposal and obtainment processes and the use of veracity contracts and regulatory means 
during the procedure; 
• Internal separate audit abilities and yearly external audit reports that are publicly dispersed and 
discussed; 
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• Frequent, independently-operating programmers to assess public officials’ integrity reaction; 
• Eliminating executive and procedural inducements for venality, including abridging local taxation 
schemes and the decrease of executive decisions in permit processing; 
• Encouraging a value of service to the people among officials while implementing sufficient 
compensation for public workers; 
• Implementing behavioral principles and facility for intermittent declaration of revenue of public and 
elected officials; 
• Building virtually applicable standards of reliability and service distribution, such as ISO, that will 
surpass the terms of those in public office positions; 
• Constructing public feedback tools such as a supervisory body, designated telephone numbers, 
objection offices and procedures, citizen census and report cards, and strategies for public lobbying 
and/or public interest lawsuits; 
• Encouraging the people’s liberty to access municipal data; 
• Supplying availability of municipal data to build an equal platform for prospective stakeholders 
1.5.1.6. Civic Engagement and Citizenship 
Citizens are the most important variable in a city; they are both the entity and the facilitators of 
supportable sustainable human development. Civic involvement suggests that integrated living is not an 
effortless endeavor: within communities, citizens must dynamically add to the communal wellbeing. 
Citizens, particularly women, must be enabled to become successfully involved in municipal decision-
making. The public assets of the poor must be acknowledged and addressed. Concrete methods of 
applying this value include, among others: 
• Encouraging solid communal governments through free and nondiscriminatory city elections and 
involved decision-making processes; 
• Founding the legal authority for local community to become successfully involved through such 
methods such as development  assemblies and community consultative boards; 
• Encouraging a value of public accountability among the people.  
• Employing methods such as civic meetings and census, town hall assemblies, citizens’ meetings, 
municipal conferences and hands-on policy improvement, including issue-focused dynamic groups; 
• Commissioning municipal votes regarding vital urban development opportunities. 
1.5.1.7. Security  
Each person has the undeniable right to life, freedom, and the personal security. Insecurity has a 
disparate effect in worsening the relegation of poor communities. Municipalities must make an effort to 
prevent human conflicts and natural disasters by having all investors participate in crime and conflict 
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aversion and preparation for natural disasters. Security also infers liberty from persecution and 
compulsory evictions, and supplies security of tenure. Municipalities should also collaborate with social 
intervention and conflict resolution organizations and support the collaboration between prosecution 
organizations and other social service agencies (such as those for health, schooling, and shelter). 
Concrete methods of applying this value include, among others: 
• Building a philosophy of harmony and promoting acceptance of diversity through public awareness 
movements; 
• Supporting security of tenure, acknowledging several methods of legal tenure, and supplying 
advising and intercession for people facing compulsory evictions; 
• Supporting security of employment, especially for the city’s poor communities, through proper 
legislation and availability of work, credit, education, and training; 
• Applying environmental preparations and organization techniques grounded on investor 
participation; 
• Building safety and security through counseling procedures grounded on rule of law, unity and 
deterrence, and endorsing proper native organizations that encourage security. 
1.6. ASSESSMENT OF URBAN GOVERNANCE (THE URBAN GOVERNANCE INDEX) 
The Urban Governance Index (UGI) was one of the most important outcomes of the Global Campaign 
on Urban Governance which was launched by UN-HANBITAT in 1999. The campaign focused as a 
broad title on the concept of an “Inclusive City” where everyone comes together regardless of race, 
religion, gender and wealth, and take advantage of the city capabilities and opportunities. In this regard, 
UGI has been promoted as an analytical framework to evaluate the quality of good urban governance 
with two main objectives within two levels. At the global level, UGI shows the significant role of good 
urban governance in achieving broad development goals such as Habitat agenda strategies and MDGs. 
At the local level, UGI supposed to incentivize who is in charge to achieve the highest quality of urban 
governance. (UN-HABITAT, 2004a). 
In 2002, on the sidelines of the World Urban Forum, a meeting was held between a groups of experts to 
discuss and assess the development of Urban Governance Index (UGI). It was agreed that UN-
HABITAT, UNDP, World Bank, and Transparency International should participate in monitoring and 
developing the index. In this regard, two field tests was proceed in order to develop UGI indicators and 
evaluate their effectiveness on the reality (UN-HABITAT, 2004a). The first phase comprised 12, and 
second one 24 different cities worldwide (Douala, Yaounde, Louga, Dakar, Ibadan, Enugu, Amman, 
Tanta, Ismailia, Naga City, Colombo, Moratuwa, Negombo, Matale, Kandy, Kotte, Pristina, Montreal, 
Vancouver, Montevideo, Quito, Santo Andre, Bayamo, Guadalajara City). However. 66 indicators have 
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been set for the field test depending on the inclusiveness implications, and later shortlisted to 25 
indicators to measure the urban governance’s mechanisms and processes as well as the effective 
stakeholder involvement (Lange, 2009). Those 25 indicators will be further discussed in the case study. 
 UGI indicators basically based on the principles of urban governance which have identified in GCUG 
(sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency/accountability, civic engagement and 
security). And categorized in five principles including the indicators mentioned above as follow (UN-
HABITAT, 2004a): 
• Effectiveness 
“Effectiveness of governance measures the existing mechanisms and the socio-political 
environment for institutional efficiency (through subsidiarity and effective predictability) in 
financial management and planning, delivery of services and response to civil society concerns” 
• Equity 
“Equity implies inclusiveness with unbiased access (be it for economically weaker sections, 
women, children or elderly, religious or ethnic minorities or the physically disabled) to basic 
necessities (nutrition, education, employment and livelihood, health care, shelter, safe drinking 
water, sanitation and others) of urban life, with institutional priorities focusing on pro-poor 
policies and an established mechanism for responding to the basic services.” 
• Participation  
“Participation in governance implies mechanisms that promote strong local representative 
democracies through inclusive, free and fair municipal elections. It also includes participatory 
decision-making processes, where the civic capital, especially of the poor is recognized and 
there exist consensus orientation and citizenship”. 
• Accountability 
“Mechanisms are present and effective for transparency in the operational functions of the local 
government; responsiveness towards the higher level of the local government; local population 
and civic grievances; standards for professional and personal integrity and rule of law and 
public policies are applied in transparent and predictable manner”. 
• Security 
“Security of governance implies that there are adequate mechanisms/process/systems for 
citizens’ security, health, and environmental safety. It also signifies there are adequate conflict 
resolution mechanisms through the development and implementation of appropriate local 
policies on environment, health, and security for the urban areas.” 
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Figure 5: the Urban Governance Index Framework (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
. 
Assessment of urban governance through UGI has its limitations, whereas UGI encompasses set of 
indicators that constitute a systematic tool that results in a general and primary picture of the reality of 
governance in the targeted context, whether the municipality or the metropolitan area.. Etc. However, 
In this regard, this process is deficient as urban governance includes a network of actors who are 
connected through inter-relationships that vary in nature depending on the context in which they are 
conducted. Furthermore, to what extent UGI can measure the interaction between the key actors 
involved and the impact of this interaction on the efficiency of urban governance, this issue still unclear. 
Therefore, this study goes beyond the urban governance index and provides an analytical perspective 
on the role of key actors as a key factor in measuring the performance of urban governance. 
 
1.7. CONCLUSION  
Urban governance has occupied a significant position in the urban studies and social sciences agenda 
since 1980. However, there is no a specific definition of this concept, as it has been defined by many 
researchers and organizations depending on the context in which the urban governance are applied as 
well as the motives of this application. Despite that, there are common aspects between the definitions 
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in the literature, namely: urban governance as a broader concept than government, and urban governance 
as a set of processes, mechanisms and regulations that regulate and coordinate the relationship between 
multiple actors with different interests within a specific area. 
This chapter delivers multiple definitions of governance and urban governance. Indeed, the concept of 
urban governance derived from the ideology of governance. In most research literature there is no 
distinction between these two terms since they share many key points and principles as well as the same 
exact actors. However, some researchers have pointed out explicitly that urban governance is concerned 
with urban areas and territories. For instance, ( Avis , 2016) define the urban governance as “Urban 
governance is a process by which local, national governments and various actors determines how to 
plan and operate urban regions”. In addition, the definition which has stated by Habitat III as ““It is 
the software that enables the urban hardware to function”.  
Another key point which has been highlighted in this chapter is how the international bodies define the 
urban governance. Whereas, the strategies and visions of those bodies has their impact on the formation 
of this concept. In this context, the international organizations such as World Bank and IMF prioritize 
the economic and financial factors over other factors due to their function and policy. On the other hand 
UN organizations such as UNDP, UN-HABITAT and UNESCO consider all factors of urban 
governance based on the principles on democracy. This study adopts the UN form of urban governance, 
more specifically, the definition which has been delivered in the (Habitat III) conference which took 
place in Quito, Ecuador, from 17 – 20 October 2016 as “It is the software that enables the urban 
hardware to function, the enabling environment requiring the adequate legal frameworks, efficient 
political, managerial and administrative processes, as well as strong and capable local institutions able 
to respond to the citizen’s needs.” 
Furthermore, this study follows UN-Habitat norms of good urban governance “sustainability, 
subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement and citizenship, 
and security”, and adopts its methodology in the assessment of urban governance in Syria through the 
urban governance index (UGI ). Indeed, the assessment of urban governance through UGI has its 
limitations, whereas UGI encompasses set of indicators that constitute a systematic tool that results in a 
general and primary picture of the reality of governance in the targeted context, whether the municipality 
or the metropolitan area.. Etc. However, In this regard, this process is deficient as urban governance 
includes a network of actors who are connected through inter-relationships that vary in nature depending 
on the context in which they are conducted. Furthermore, to what extent UGI can measure the interaction 
between the key actors involved and the impact of this interaction on the efficiency of urban governance, 
this issue still unclear. Therefore, this study goes beyond the urban governance index and provides an 
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analytical perspective on the role of key actors (state, private sector, civil society) as a key factor in 
measuring the performance of urban governance. 
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3 
2. URBAN GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. PREFACE  
Conflict and hostility impact national- and local-level in terms of socio-economic development, as well 
as the lives and welfare of populations. Conflict relates to “situations where individuals and groups have 
incongruent interests that are contradictory and potentially mutually exclusive but contained”, and 
vehemence is a result of it (Moser & Rodgers , 2012). Urban and rural areas are naturally locations of 
conflict, but this is usually kept under control via social, economic, and political systems. When these 
systems begin to collapse, it results in eruptions of enduring violence. Hence, urban governance has a 
pivotal role in resolving conflict, reducing violence and accelerating recovery process. It isn’t only about 
laws and protocols; it also involves the way in which we live and how difficulties are overcome ( Avis 
, 2016). Moreover, urban governance enhances peace and stability through the participation in attempts 
to fill the rural and urban gap and to unite main actors from both sides. Badly organized national-level 
peace agreements can enhance the chances of civil conflict arising. Significant population 
demonstrations and socioeconomic breaches frequently result in pervasive conflict in cities following 
the civil war, ranging from crime and gang violence to ferocious protests and terrorism. However, while 
modern military specialists are intensely conscious of the significance of cities, there has been a 
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prominent neglect to the essential necessities of urban centers by development individuals and groups 
focused on humanitarian aids and relief. 
This collapse and loss of faith is at its lowest point in fragile and conflict-affected cities, where the 
collective impacts of risk may overpower local coping mechanisms. Some cities, especially those in 
poor or vulnerable states that have minimal institutional capacity, could be pushed to downfall by 
speeding up urban growth (Muggah & Savage, 2012). Cities turn into fragile when its institutions no 
longer able to meet their basic duties, such as guaranteeing security for the people, public and private 
facilities , and services, or accessibility to essential goods. This can result in populations questioning the 
reliability, power, and capability of local authority, and can sometimes lead to vehemence. This 
vehemence represents a breach in the social contract between local authority and those who challenge 
its legitimacy, and may be centered on city areas, infrastructure, and local populations. (Graham, 2009). 
Where governance shortcomings are enduring, violence can take an obvious or discrete manifestation 
of pressure and control, with different populations looking to satisfy the positions in which the 
institutional system falls short (Muggah, 2012 ). Such populations prosper in cities where there is a 
prepared group of followers, and as a consequence of conniving public institutions, support, panic, and 
anxiety, which collectively hinder the processes. Fragile and conflict-affected cities are particularly 
vulnerable to a swift decline of basic functions when faced with a mix of urban challenges ( Avis , 2016).  
Equipping cities to react effectively to vehemence and conflict is intricate. Accountability for public 
security frequently is not limited to the local level, as many urban areas and cities count on national 
governments to deliver the public goods (Muggah & Savage, 2012).  
2.2. CONFLICT TYPES IN THE URBAN AREAS  
Classifying modern conflicts relative to the spatial specifics of urban versus rural environments, 
examining the methods in which cities and urban governance are employed in violent conflict and its 
alleviation. At the most fundamental level, three sorts of conflict have been outlined: sovereign conflict, 
civil conflict, and civic conflict. 
3.2.1. SOVEREIGN CONFLICT involves circumstances in which international participants are openly 
engaged warfare. Regardless of whether this conflict is related to international territorial quarrels or 
explicit external intervention in civil wars, state sovereignty is tested in judicial process or political 
positions. Cities are impacted by sovereign conflicts to the extent that these conflicts consistently 
comprise efforts to seize and regulate capital cities, which are vital sovereignty hosts. Control of capital 
cities can remove the necessity to take hold of the entire territory since they are usually positions of 
executive power, places of economic riches, and hearts of political authority (Beall, et al., 2013). 
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3.2.2. CIVIL CONFLICT is related to violent conflict between at least two reasonably systematized groups 
within sovereign limits. There are significant deliberations in regards to how to define civil war. During 
civil conflicts, the groups involved are politically and militarily structured within sovereign limits and 
have declared political aims. The government or a group claiming to embody it is consistently a main 
warrior, and at least of the participating groups must be aiming to dominate part of the state territories, 
or to supersede or limit central tasks of the state in a certain area. In civil conflicts, the domination of 
violence previously held by the state is already in part overtaken by protestors, warlords, organized 
criminal populations, or militias (Beall, et al., 2013). 
Traditionally, civil conflicts have been closely related with urban areas, such as the juxtaposition of 
ethnic populations to homeland and the social and military characteristics of rural areas where military 
groups can more effortlessly occur out of state targets (Kalyvas, 2006). In recent times, going off of 
observations of civil conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, cities offer the social arrangement for 
persistent armed resistance to state authority (Staniland, 2010). The correlation between civil conflict 
and urban areas is intricate: cities occasionally function as areas of sanctuary or virtual asylum in times 
of conflict and can become economic centers in conflict economies, but they may also become areas of 
rebellion and battle, especially when civil conflict becomes intertwined with civic conflict. (Beall, et al., 
2013). 
3.3.3. CIVIC CONFLICT is viewed as the violent manifestation of complaints, which may be social, 
political, or economic, between state and/or opposing parties. The term denotes varied but repetitive 
means of violence between individuals and groups that could comprise organized violent crime, gang 
warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian revolutions, and extemporaneous insurgences or violent 
demonstrations over state shortcomings, such as insufficient (or a complete lack of) service provision. 
Civic conflicts can occasionally become intertwined with civil conflict, and they also can comprise 
intricate structure and intense economic or political interests. However, civic conflict contrasts with civil 
conflict in that it is, in the long run, a responsive procedure. Since civil conflict is fundamentally 
contributory, civic conflict is usually communicative, and although it can include efforts to rearrange 
authority affairs, this often fails to take hold of formal authoritative assemblies (Beall, et al., 2013). 
Civic conflict usually occurs in cities, which offer the physical, social, and demographic groundwork 
for substantial deployment against relegation or state neglect. Even though civic conflict may pass over 
city lines and there can be cohesions and connections between civil and civic conflicts, the latter is 
essentially characterized as urban and is frequently related to intrinsic urban features such as cohesion, 
variety, and disparity (Rodgers, 2010). 
The three-way paradigm of sovereign civil, and civic conflict offers a valuable and malleable 
investigative outline for studying the manners in which cities and conflict interconnect during a time in 
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which conflict is evolving, but there is limited agreement as to the basic nature of this alteration (Beall, 
et al., 2013). 
2.3. THE ROLE OF CITY DURING CONFLICT 
In sovereign conflicts, it is undeniable that capital cities play an imperative role, seeing as they are the 
locations in which sovereign authority lies. Even though these head cities have historically been a target 
in times of war (Bishop & Clancey, 2008), the manner in which they take part in sovereign conflicts has 
shifted. The use of mass media has amplified consciousness of fatalities on the attacking side, which 
has enforced the predilection for aerial assault of cities as the main path to triumph, especially when 
western governments are participating. Cities serve as provisionary and population-intensive areas, 
making them both targets for assault and areas of resistance. For instance, as a retort to the assault 
brought on by US and UK forces on Baghdad, Basra, and Kabul, delinquents in countries under 
offensive gradually more turned to methods of “asymmetric warfare” that are inclined to include 
capricious actions of terror in urban areas contrasting with more traditional military tactics (Hills, 2008). 
During low periods of war or during times of recovery, international policies have an effect on cities. 
For example, international participation in recovery efforts in Kabul resulted in the relegation of the 
city’s requirements as an urban center (Esser, 2013).  
The city has been an emblematic central point of state-structuring, a vital place of national rebuilding, 
and is still the main location of the country’s international manifestation (Beall, et al., 2013). . The city 
has burgeoned in magnitude, largely due to continuous conflict across the entire nation and also 
international administrators’ acting above those of the city level. That being said, “Alliances of national 
and international political and economic interests have challenged the legitimacy of local actors” 
(Esser, 2013). 
The capture of cities as confirmation of victory is also a goal in many civil conflicts. Contemporary 
sovereign wars often involve formidable air power that moves directly on cities to ensure a quick and 
decisive win (Landau-Wells , 2008). Conversely, in civil wars, the seizing of cities is usually the final 
stop after prolonged duration of guerrilla feuding or armed hostilities, usually taking place in rural areas. 
The fight to seize head cities can be the biggest obstacle in achieving peace and stability (Beall, et al., 
2013). 
Capitals and other main cities could be safe points in times of conflict, serving as locations of sanctuary 
and armistice during civil wars, which usually results in the flooding of rural or emigrant groups into 
urban areas, causing enormous urban expansion. For example, During the Syrian conflict the city of 
Damascus has witnessed the displacement of a large number of residents of rural Damascus (Rif 
Dimashq), which was the scene of violent conflict between the state and armed groups, including the 
armed opposition and terrorist groups. 
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Cities play an important part in wartime economies and as centers in related national and transnational 
systems, which may be endangered by open conflict. Furthermore, economic and political leaders 
frequently reside in cities and are opposed to contact with conflict, often exerting amalgamated, forcible 
authority to keep conflict from having too much of an effect on urban centers. It then appears that there 
are two main scenarios in which cities symbolize the ‘eye of the storm’ in civil conflict: (i) when 
mutinous groups have not been able to breach the city, or (ii) when there are planned tactics by battling 
groups or economic leaders with admission to the city to place urban security at top importance. 
Civic conflict is openly associated with the urban arena in that it usually occurs in cities and is connected 
with the socioeconomic and territorial specifics of cities. Civic conflict frequently embodies a sense of 
subjection among certain urban populations and their attempts to take part in methods of local warfare 
against the authorities, leaders positioned in cities, or other urban populations who they feel vulnerable. 
To an extent, it is possible to differentiate between civic conflict among various factors of urban society 
(such as gang violence, ethnic massacres, and violent crime) and civic conflict between the people and 
the state (such as riots, violent protests, terrorism, vehemence towards state workers or possessions, or 
vehemence towards the people by the state). Furthermore, systemic segregation and ignorance 
exemplified in state organizations at the city and supra-urban levels are the heart of nearly all civic 
conflicts (Beall, et al., 2013). 
Table 1: Forms of conflicts, their characteristics, and relationship with cities (Beall, et al., 2013) 
Conflict type    Characteristics City role 
Sovereign • Includes conflict exclusively 
between different nations 
• State sovereignty defied 
decreased since mid-20th 
century 
• Capital cities are viewed as hubs for 
sovereignty 
• Goal of overrunning authority is 
frequently to seize head cities quickly 
and with nominal fatalities (often via 
aerial assault) 
• Cities gradually more establish sites 
of “asymmetric” resistance 
• Cities are main locations for 
international interference 
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Civil • Groups to conflict are mainly 
arranged within one state’s 
borders 
• One or more of the opponents 
is (or declares themselves) the 
government 
• One or more groups intend to 
seize all or part of national 
terrain 
• Domination of vehemence by 
the state is already partly 
fragmented in decline since 
late 20th century 
• Cities are often final steps for battles 
mostly fought in rural areas 
• Cities can be virtual harbors of 
security or centers of conflict 
• Cities are often crucial centers in 
civil war economies, secured by 
contending leaders 
• Where urban areas are reasonably 
protected, this can result in 
exceptionally quick urban expansion 
• Civil conflict can overflow into urban 
areas, especially when it coincides 
with sovereign or civic conflict 
Civic • Entails hostile expression of 
complaints against the state or 
other urban performers 
• Mostly responsive in nature, 
rather than a tool to take 
control of state 
• Frequently motivated by 
neglect of the state for 
delivering safety, development, 
and prosperity in urban areas 
• Typically less structured than 
civil conflict 
• Increasing compared to other 
modes of conflict 
• Cities are the main locations 
• Urban exhibitions of conflict can be 
related to the situation of leaders 
and state establishments in urban 
areas 
• Also connected with (but not 
triggered by) the urban makings of 
density, diversity, and concentrated 
discrimination 
• May explode in cities in the 
changeover from civil or sovereign 
conflict 
• Can be seen in many urban areas 
that were harbors of virtual safety 
• Can be worsened by imprudent 
international rebuilding attempts 
concentrated in the city 
 
 
2.4. LOCAL ACTORS OF URBAN GOVERNANCE DURING THE CONFLICT  
2.4.1. STATE 
The fact that the majority of people in war-torn countries reside outside of the capital city and are 
involved with the government via local level organizations makes it seem the most reasonable to 
concentrate on the vital role of local government (LG) in handling conflict. This is even more imperative 
in modern times, since the majority of 21st century conflict and violence takes place within states rather 
than across them, which places LGs at a high place of importance when rectifying the effects 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005). 
It is often clear to national governments how and why their involvement on the local level is crucial: 
“the reach of government outside the main cities is weak or non-existent and post-conflict governments, 
understandably, are anxious to extend their reach to the entire country” ( Wang, et al., 2004) The role 
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of LGs is essential since they are the means for reinstating the government in state regions and 
demilitarizing politics in dividend societies all at the same time. Not only that, but LGs are a necessary 
aid during the conflict since they offer more available data on local circumstances and necessities, 
broader access to communicate with communities and customary powers, a directive for economic 
development and service provision, and the ability to make distributive and functional productivity come 
to fruition when confronted with a lack of public resources (Romeo, 2002). 
LG is crucial in rectifying conflict by enforcing good governance through proper representation. Local 
involvement with and acknowledgement of all communities, especially minority populations, is a 
significant starting point for the pacifying of ethnic tensions, and will go further to spread this ethic to 
the national political level during conflict. Moreover, the knowledge gained at the local level can supply 
vital insight to the issue of how to reform the national political system so that it can more appropriately 
cater to all of the different populations (Bigdone & Hettige, 2003). 
On 28-29 November 2007 in Oslo, Norway, the Workshop on “Local Government in Post-Conflict 
Situations: Challenges for Improving Local Decision Making and Service Delivery Capacities” was 
organized. In this workshop, the UNDP specified some benefits and hindrances of the LG’s part in post-
conflict scenarios, which is further explained below (Jackson & Scott, 2007): 
Effective Local Government role in mitigating conflict: 
• Offers a calm place for cross-ethnic group deliberation in regards to local problems and the 
distribution of resources; 
• Allows for the representation of minority populations, evading social omission that causes 
conflict. The guarantee of formal political authority provides groups with motivation to become 
involved with the state in peaceful ways. This also provides confidence that their main issues 
will not be ignored; 
• Offers developments in service provision, lessening complaints and discontent with the state, 
and evades inter-group conflict regarding service delivery; 
• Diminishes the people’s interest in prolonging the conflict or supporting its cause 
• Creates state legitimacy as populations see it efficiently operating locally, which in turn 
contributes to national political solidity; 
• Widens popular involvement, which also builds state legitimacy; 
• Widens political involvement through offering more facets of government, which lessens the 
probability of a situation where one group prevails over the others. Power is more evenly 
distributed across a variety of participants; 
• Assists in advancing conflict rectification means, e.g. community meetings, platforms for 
deliberation, etc.; 
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• Heads of LG can have a powerful influence in community pacification from their elected 
positions; 
• LG is a tool that can be utilized to officially deal with the local core reasons for conflict; 
• institutes state outreach and regulation in remote areas that are vulnerable to being overpowered 
by militias or non-state entities; 
• Creates inter-group trust with those groups that are involved in the same activities and with the 
same establishments; 
• More regulatory means are integrated into the political framework. This lessens situations of 
large-scale exploitation, which enhances the legitimacy of the state and lessens tension amongst 
distressed populations;  
• LG offers a “learning laboratory” for individuals to gain political and conflict recovery aptitudes 
that can be employed in various social situations. 
Ineffective Local Government role in exacerbating conflict: 
• Supremacy of LG organizations and positions by one community can enhance feelings of 
relegation and complaints by other communities; 
• Non-transparent or equal distribution of supplies across populations can result in aggravation 
that turns into aggression; 
• Fragile, incompetent LG damages state legitimacy. It is more likely for conflict to erupt in 
situations in which the state does not satisfy its duties and people view the government as not 
having legitimacy; 
• local elections in democratic systems can establish social segregation if political parties focus 
solely on the conflicting groups; 
• If the favorable candidate of relegated populations is not elected, these populations can feel 
under-represented during decision-making processes, which results in feelings of omission and 
aggravation. 
• Unidealistic involvement in LG decision-making turns a population in search of democratic 
solutions into one of contradictory necessities and problems. 
• Improper LG organization in ethnically diverse situations can promote ethnic segregation 
through emphasizing inter-group disparities and harnesses discrimination against local 
minorities; 
• If the locally prevalent group is different from that of the nationally prevalent group, local 
tensions can be enhanced; 
• Competition grows between local and national authority and could result in local populations 
trying to separate from the state; 
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• If inter-regional redistribution of supplies is viewed as unjust, the probability of conflict is 
enhanced. Areas that are plentiful in resources are especially probably to try to break away from 
the state; 
• States with more layers of government are viewed as being more corrupt, which can result in 
resentment and cynicism amongst the population; 
• Some studies connect decentralization to more inequality, which feeds conflict; 
• One group having control of LG organizations and positions can enhance feelings of relegation 
and complaints from other populations. 
3.4.2. THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
Following the conclusion of the Cold War, social, political, and economic aspects alike have held a 
strong influence in conflicts in which feuding over energy and resources have broken out in war. The 
illegal drug and weaponry market has only aggravated these conflicts, compelled by economic 
complaints among specific populations in the country or area and intensifying venality and breaking 
down state establishments. Globalization of technology, trade, and information exchange only enable 
these drifts, causing a more and more intricate network of local, regional, and global economic 
associations taking part in numerous conflict scenarios, as well as an intermingling of government and 
private sector roles with military or paramilitary powers (Peschka, et al., 2011). 
Conflict, violence, and persistent instability have an especially prevalent effect on the legitimate formal 
private sector. Overseas and local investors that could assist in evading the slope leading to full conflict 
through their continuing capital, abilities, employments, and technology take flight from the country, 
further discouraging local private sector sustaining establishments like chambers of commerce. 
Adversity is confronted by the businesspeople who remain, struggling to retrieve money and frequently 
antagonized or appointed by either militias or gradually more fraudulent government or military (or a 
combination), which can make it more difficult to ship in necessities or ship out their own goods. There 
is the temporary solution of doing business with armed groups or circumventing themselves against 
normal inflationary stresses and currency devaluation that come with conflict. The arms trade that 
progresses from establishments crumbling and conflicts amplifying increasingly interferes with usual 
private sector happenings. The international community’s answer is, regrettably, not generally 
productive; the usual response seldom assists in backing the government and legitimate private sector 
happenings, which further progresses conflict and enables illegal trade (Sweeney, 2009). 
Like other sections of society, even though conflict does not demolish the private sector, it is 
significantly distressed and harmed. Because of this, the steps taken directly following the conflict 
period are critical in reestablishing the private sector as the legitimate stimulation for economic activity 
that it has the potential to be and building up its future. 
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It is important to mention that not only does the private sector suffer direct effects of conflict, but is also 
confronted with elongated instability which usually goes hand-in-hand with violence. The interventions 
that can be employed during a time of extended vulnerability are similar to those that can be used to 
confront the private sector advancement restrictions during a conflict. 
3.4.3. CIVIL SOCIETY  
Democratic governance in non-violent societies in greatly facilitated by civil society. Even so, situations 
affected by conflict exhibit more profoundly the political importance of civil society, since they are 
distinguished by a more prominent level of politicization and not as much of an organized institutional 
circumstance. The creation of participants in civil society and consequent actions that can either 
exacerbate conflict, uphold social standards, or encourage passivity can be influenced by the various 
interpretations of the origins of conflict  (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009).  
The unclear distinction between civil society and the state become even more vague when a state is 
fragile, broken, deteriorating, or even does not exist altogether. In cases such as these, part of the normal 
role of the operational state is replaced by civil society. However, without proper governments with 
regulations and laws, civil society forms its own substitute mechanisms of self-assistance and 
community fairness, with unofficial modes of governance that both civil and uncivil societies create and 
are characterized by. In circumstances under which states are fragile or deteriorating, the way civil 
society acts and how it is characterized is more likely to be affected by exploitation and patronage  
(Belloni, 2001).  
Numerous participants comprise civil society, including those that are local, international, independent, 
and partially governmental. The nature of civil society organizations (CSOs) is often influenced by 
conflict. Conflict society encompasses all local civic establishments in settings of conflict, including 
third country, international, and transnational civic establishments entangled in the conflict  (Marchetti 
& Tocci, 2009).  
(Marchetti & Tocci, 2009) Claims that, according to Diamond and McDonald’s multitrack diplomacy 
model (Diamond & McDonald, 1996), both local and international organizations actively involved in 
the conflict are classified as Conflict Society Organizations (CoSOs). Included in these groups are 
conflict specialists, businesses, private citizens, research and education organizations, activists, religious 
groups, foundations, and the media. Even though these eight groups may share similar characteristics, 
in order to exactly recognize the various civil society conflict participants, they are actually adequately 
separated. The categorization of the different CoSOs provides for a proper delineation of the analyzed 
groups. 
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Figure 6: Conflict society organizations (CoSOs). (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009) 
Both in the midst of and following the conclusion of armed conflict, civil society is also supported. That 
being said, it must be kept in mind that every person affected by armed conflict at any level is drastically 
impacted in their lives. This impact can manifest in personal alterations in demeanor and behavior (i.e. 
trust and assurance) regarding economic and social changes, and also changes in authoritative relations 
within social groups, regions, and the entirety of society. The enabling environment in civil society is 
also affected in regards to security, the legal circumstances, and law enforcement, as well as fundamental 
issues and participants  (Orjuela, 2004). 
The enabling environment breaking down will largely result in a reduction in civil society doings and 
in turn make post-war rehabilitation less achievable. People are more hesitant to take part in the process 
when they are living in uncertainty and fear after being heavily impacted by long-term conflict. This 
can even be in terms of rebuilding and advancing local communities, since they tend to be more focused 
on and wary about the new authoritative and power relations. The fact that many participants in civil 
society become displaced also contributes to the reduction in activity, causing the deterioration in 
organizations’ capabilities; however, sometimes Diaspora communities keep active from a distance. 
The new authoritative relations and the tough circumstances are difficult to get used to for all people 
involved. When the state is fragile, it is particularly vulnerable to the impact of empowered uncivil, 
discriminatory, or crime syndicate groups, which substantially hinders the impact of civil society groups 
advocating for tolerance and empathy across cultures. The chances of civil society groups transforming 
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into uncivil groups is therefore heightened, as a result of conflict that is worsened by economic 
deterioration, social tension, omnipresent violence, and the demarcation of civil society in regards to 
ethnic groups. The inherent response of people in the midst of conflict to enforce the connections to 
their cultural and language communities as a defensive technique during times when the state is 
incapable of assuring security likely exacerbates these issues  (Paffenholz & Spurk , 2006).  
Great influx of assistance also impacts the social makeup and authoritative relations both during and 
following conflict. Mary Anderson studied the ways in which assistance can actually be detrimental, 
provoking conflict through numerous inadvertent repercussions  (Anderson, 1999), such as: 
• Preference for one end of the conflict over the other; 
• Enabling conflict across groups through offering different advantages; 
• Sponsoring war groups through not effectively thwarting the robbery of assistance items; 
• Providing funding for war through the provision of assistance; 
• Demolishing local markets through the provision of assistance; and 
• Empowering war groups through the provision of assistance. 
3.5. HYBRID URBAN GOVERNANCE BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL   
4. After an eruption of domestic conflict, the shortcomings of the state are remain a high point of 
attention around the world, most notably because of its consequences for cross-border relations 
(Kaldor, 2003).  States that have not proven to have adequate governance end up accommodating 
terrorism, which in turn endangers the lives and wellbeing of not only their own people, but those 
outside of their borders as well. Instability of states must be viewed as a sequence of intricate 
governance tactics formed by the comingling of domestic and cross-border aspects not only in the 
aftermath of conflict, but during the conflict itself. When conflict is active, governance gets shifted 
from the administration to other participants at the citizen level. The people are stimulated to take 
over the authority aspect through local assemblies, religious powers, and ethnic groups, but can 
also extend to militants and terrorist groups connected with local, provincial, and worldwide 
political, social, financial, or warfare organizations (Zoellick, 2008). On a global scale, the 
collapse of a state moves governance to global governance bodies including foreign 
administrations, international foundations, or private organizations. Neoliberal peace is the core 
of international governance, endorsing institution forming for the state and civil society alike in 
order to make a foundation for amity; however, this tactic has attracted much scrutiny. The 
approach has been viewed as untenably intended to construct a hierarchical neoliberal system and 
gain power and authority over states devastated by conflict and their citizens, irrespective of the 
people’s rights and humanity. Regardless of these criticisms, neoliberal peace is not flawless, since 
international procedures can be altered, sometimes through locals and their tactics, therefore 
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causing a composite governance scheme distinguished by interconnections between the state, the 
people, and the economy all functioning at different levels, i.e. local, provincial, or worldwide 
(MacGinty, 2011). 
MacGinty’s (2011) idea of hybridity concentrates on the dealings between the peace that is 
internationally advocated and local forces at work in the aftermath of conflict. It demonstrates that there 
are indeed flaws in the liberal peace agenda, being mired by its inconsistencies as well as by local 
authorities and standards. This study adopts this concept during the conflict period by examining the 
role of international and local actors. 
4.5.1. GOVERNANCE FROM THE TOP 
Globally, liberal governance intercessions have wide political, financial, social, and cultural 
consequences for local governance. These intercessions can change character, position, and interactions 
between the state, the people, and the market. 
The fixation on the institutions of the state appears to go along with (Paris, 2004) the idea of reinforcing 
“institutions” prior to altering the political scheme (MacGinty & Williams, 2009). Paris’ reasoning is to 
reestablish fundamental security through emphasizing the building or rebuilding institutions, which in 
his opinion is the biggest obstacle in reforming incompetent states. There are, however, some problems 
with this. To start, it is just as significant to focus on the type of institutions and the way of integrating 
them as it is to construct them in the first place. This is usually overlooked, with the procedure usually 
being determined from the top with a goal of reforming local standards into liberal ones (Roberts, 2011). 
Human rights may be put on the back burner in the midst of constructing institutions and be put as a 
second priority to proficiency and solidity (Jenkins & Plowden, 2006). Aside from this, the construction 
of the state can actually delay the rehabilitation of the state, and if not supplemented by altered political 
actions, can in turn become a cause of instability. Supporting fraudulent institutions for the sake of 
constructing the state only progresses corrupt power and feeds conflict (Call, 2008). These kinds of 
institutions do not adequately advocate the advancement of civil society and certainly are not an example 
of competent governance (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, et al., 2013)  
Civil society is another current significant point of emphasis in the field of international governance, 
which also brings up numerous concerns regarding its endorsement and how it is endorsed. Some 
mediators recognize the local civil society and advocate its particular motivations rather than their own, 
while others conversely try to steer the civil society to their partialities, which in turn hinders civil 
society’s varied demonstrations (MacGinty, 2011) This can still occur even in cases in which 
intercessions assert that they advocate for local tenure and involvement, since power reallocation is often 
peripheral and influenced as local participants are forced to adapt to specific standards and actions. 
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Disparagingly, international interventions can actually skew the equilibrium between the state and the 
people (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, et al., 2013). 
4.5.2. GOVERNANCE WITHIN 
On the community level, where there are no governmental bodies, the breaking down of infrastructure 
and the commotion or utter failure to provide fundamental amenities (such as healthcare, refuge, 
education, hygiene, electricity, etc.) leads to widespread disorder, uncertainty, enormous anguishes and 
restrictions of livelihoods. In this way, normal life is degraded to a scramble for basic necessities that 
people residing in stable areas do not experience. Even so, the local populations in conflict-affected 
areas do not stay stagnant, as can be seen in the examples of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Bosnia; they 
build their own networks of governance to better stabilize their situations and improve their lives. 
“Pockets of authority” are formed, in which various participants contend for authority and types of order 
(Edwards, 2010). 
Civil society that includes both civil and uncivil portions is a significant factor; however, so are 
militants, clans, weapon-bearing groups, international performers, and extremists, all of which battle, 
intersect, or cohabit until established standards are made between them. The three layers of 
effectiveness, security, and legitimacy can be used to assess their achievement or failure in this area 
Effectiveness refers to steady and reasonable delivery of essential requirements such as electricity, 
water, nutrition, work, etc., and can even extend to more long-term actions towards rebuilding or 
reinitiating the economy and livelihood prospects. Security encompasses securing the people’s lives in 
an organized rather than an impromptu way by means of organizing, upholding, and overseeing the 
police, legal system, and military. Security also reaches to the prevention of the pillaging and vandalism 
of infrastructure, housing, educational institutions, and essential factors of living such as pipelines and 
power lines. Legitimacy is defined as a “complex set of beliefs, values and institutions (endogenous and 
exogenous) about the social compact governing state-society relations”, and in the context of conflict 
has to do with the supplying of essential amenities and security means in a way that the people can count 
on (MacGinty, 2011) 
4.5.3. HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
It is clear that international mediation has a benefit in regards to organizing large-scale financial and 
cultural authority; however, there are parameters to this. The political and financial situations of 
international parties is an issue on its own, an even larger problem is the opposition they are confronted 
with from local participants who may delay, damage, and/or alter the characteristics of the interventions 
(MacGinty, 2011). This is particularly true since the ideas of governance and authority can be construed 
in different ways by local participants. 
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Figure 1. Demonstrates this schism and the hybrid area in the middle. In scenarios of conflict, native 
local governance is intricate, casual, and centers on endurance while being fueled by disparities in 
operational governance. It is incessantly altering, public, and available, is contingent on associations 
and valued customary or charming figures as legitimacy bases, and depends on local resources. All of 
these things contribute to its liability and lucidity in policymaking, and consequently, its legitimacy 
(Edwards, 2010) (MacGinty, 2011). Aside from this, the means of governance that international 
participants adhere to are frequently neoliberal, hierarchical, and technocratic in making arrangements 
in secret while corresponding with privileged national figures. Carrying out transactions and meeting 
targets is placed at a higher importance than forming relationships, and there is a dependence on external 
recruits, innovations, and material resources (MacGinty, 2011). In the midst of conflict, the locals view 
governance as a process, but the internationals handle it more as a sequence of events. This divergence 
is an enabling factor for uncivil actors who view both these kinds of authoritative structures and local 
structural concerns as an enablement to achieve their personal militant governance and/or state-building 
schemes. 
 
Figure 7: Hybrid Governance during conflict (MacGinty, 2011)  
The end product of all of this is that governance that is constructed in the midst of conflict is an 
amalgamation of customary and contemporary, local and international (MacGinty, 2011) and civil and 
uncivil, all of which clash, cohabitate, and collaborate across the realms of civil society, the market, and 
the state. 
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4.6. CONCLUSION  
The discussion in this chapter revolves around the dynamics of urban governance during the conflict. 
Three types of urban conflict have been categorized: the sovereign conflict, civic conflict and civil 
conflict. This classification was carried out according to the parties involved in the conflict and the urban 
environment in which it occurs. In examining urban governance during a conflict, considerable attention 
must be given to identifying the type of conflict and the key actors involved, since that would help to 
understand the behavior of urban areas and to anticipate the social and economic consequences of 
conflict. 
When conflict breaks out, the governance landscape changes dramatically due to several factors, 
including the changing social, economic and political map. Where the sharp division of society between 
the opposition and the pro-state as well as the withdrawal of entire areas from state control define this 
map. Consequently, the governance system of the State, the market and civil society collapses, , 
accompanied by the emergence of government gaps that are filled by internal parties supported by 
outside parties or by external parties who intervene directly on the ground. In other word, In other words, 
a hybrid governance mode is formed during the conflict and encompasses two types: 
• Local governance focuses is on survival, and the imposition of sovereignty and legitimacy. 
• International governance focuses on rebuilding institutions to suit their agendas and interests. 
This study adopts the concept of Hybrid Governance which presented by (MacGinty, 2011) in studying 
the key actors of decision making during the conflict and to analyze the interrelationships among them. 
MacGinty explained that hybrid governance can be assessed based on three principles:  
Effectiveness: means the provision of basic services to the population of electricity, water, education, 
health, etc., and the distribution of these services fairly and equitably. In addition to reactivating the 
economy in order to secure a decent standard of living. 
Security It means protecting citizens and securing their lives by creating security and judicial institutions 
such as police and security and organizing their work through fair laws and regulations. 
Legitimacy is the social contract that regulates the relationship of citizens with state institutions and the 
private sector. It is based on a set of beliefs, values and legislations that guarantee and protect the rights 
of citizens. Under this contract, public authorities are empowered to handle the affairs of citizens 
This study adopt these principles in the assessment of urban governance in Syria in addition to good 
urban governance principles and Urban Governance Index which mentioned in the previous chapter. 
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4 
5. GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA BEFORE AND DURING THE 
CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 4.1. GOVERNANCE BEFORE CONFLICT 
4.1.1. THE STATE  
Syria, officially known as the Syrian Arab Republic, is a Middle Eastern country in the east 
Mediterranean Sea in southwestern Asia. Its neighboring countries include Turkey to the north, Iraq to 
the east, Jordan to the south, and Palestine and Lebanon to the west. Syria has a geographical area of 
185,200 km2 and a yearly population growth rate of 2.37%, with a population of 21.02 million as of 
2010. There are fourteen provinces in Syria, with its capital city being Damascus, which is also the 
largest city in the nation, having a population of 1,552,000 (MAM, 2008). 
Urban Governance in War-Torn Countries 
 
50 
 
 
Figure 8: Syria and its governorates. (UN, 2008) 
In 1930, the Syrian constitution was first put into effect, being altered and amended for the first time in 
1973 and once more in 2000. The constitution states that Syria grants the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party 
governmental roles at both the state and societal level, with the country itself being defined as a 
“democratic socialist” republic (Parliament, 2000). The prevalent party in Syria is known for its “pan-
Arab ideals” that accompany its “distinctly socialist tendencies”. 
There are three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The president sits at the 
forefront of the executive branch, and is appointed by democratic vote every seven years and is 
recognized as the leader of the state. According to the Constitution, the president has the authority to 
assign all vice presidents, the prime minister, and the council of ministers, which is comprised of 
individuals from various political parties, including the Ba’ath (LOC, 2005). 
The face of the legislative branch of government is the Syrian Parliament, or Majlis Al-Shaab, which 
consists of 250 people that are also elected by popular vote every four years, with the most recent 
elections in 2016. There are also numerous political parties embodied in the parliament, the most 
prevalent being those from the National Progressive Front (NPF), which consists mainly of Ba’ath 
members (Parliament, 2000). The parliament plays an important role in the economic landscape and has 
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a notable influence on the country’s lawmaking, although the parliament itself does not have direct 
executive power. 
The high judicial council leads the judicial branch. Syria’s judicial network comprises a mixture of 
Ottoman, French, and Islamic laws, and three court levels. These three levels include courts of the first 
instance, the court of appeals, and the constitutional court, which is the highest committee. Aside from 
these, there are also religious courts that manage issues having to do with domestic law (Hasan, 2012). 
Initially instated in 1956 and modified in 1971 (GOD, 2006), the country’s administrative sector has a 
pyramid-like form that, although originally it was planned to embody a decentralized government, 
operates dominantly from top to bottom (Fig12), Syria is consequently sectioned into fourteen 
provinces: Al Hasakah, Al Ladhiqiyah (Lattakia), Al Qunaytirah, AL Raqqah, As Suwayda', Dar'a, Dayr 
Al Zawr, Dimashq (Damascus), Halab (Aleppo), Hamah, Hims, Idlib, Rif Dimashq, and Tartous (CIA, 
2011). Each province has its own governor, recommended by the Minister of the Interior, accepted by 
the Council of Ministers, and proclaimed by executive declaration. Each governor is accompanied by 
an appointed provincial council, of which 60% of the appointed chairs are legislatures of prevalent 
community groups in the associated city or province (GOD, 2006). These local governmental offices 
generally operate in accordance with the purposes and goals that are relayed by the main government, 
and therefore have quite restricted authority. 
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Figure 9: the national government structure with the urban planning institutions (Hasan ،2012) 
 
The central state is viewed to have strict power over Syria’s national government, which is especially 
apparent in situations pertaining to urban development in which the central government has authority 
over all areas of developmental policy-making, from the tactical to the local level. Through the 
employment of decentralization regulations stressed in the recent FYP (2006-2010)1, this is intended to 
be reduced by reapportioning duties and resource accountability amongst the central and local 
administrations in order to localize developmental decision-making (Hasan, 2012).  
                                                          
1
 Syria adopted its reform agenda in May 2006, the tenth five-year plan (FYP 2006-2010), which set the 
priorities and targets for moving from a planned economy towards a social market economy. 
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An evaluation of the Syrian administrative system was done by the United Nations (UN), in which it 
discussed the country’s long-standing tendency toward centralism, combined with inherent concerns 
related to inadequacy and disorganization accompanied by insufficient aptitude and exploitation. The 
analysis explained that these issues have resulted in numerous roadblocks and difficulties which have 
inhibited the country’s efforts to decentralize (UNDP, 2005). The merging of the legislative and 
executive authorities, which is normally embodied in the central government (“head” in Figure 12), has 
caused not only gaps between the top and bottom levels of the administrative pyramid (Figure 13), but 
also inadequate service provision and a governmental development procedure that has become obsolete 
(UNDP, 2005). 
 
Figure 10: UN criticism of Syrian government hierarchy (UNDP, 2005) 
 
As a result, numerous developmental strategies to enhance the ability and scope of the local 
administrations’ impact  on developmental decision-making are presently underway, with the direction 
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and help from numerous international organizations (such as the UNDP being assisted by the UN and 
the MAM project helped by the EU) to provide more supportable local services. 
The following figure (fig 14) illustrates the dates that marked an important milestone in the history of 
the Syrian state. 
 
Figure 11: the main historical dates until the beginning of the Syrian conflict (World Bank, 2017b) 
 
4.1.2. THE MARKET 
The United Nation developmental gauges indicate that Syria, by most social measurements, is at an 
average level of lower-middle income states. As of 2010, its GDP is estimated to be at USD 60,405 
(UN, 2017). 
An intermediate plan to switch from a centralized command economy to the social market economy is 
that of the 10th Five Year Plan (FYP 2006-10). A centralized command economy is not sufficient to 
support Syria economically into the future in the competition of the current global market landscape as 
a result of the public sector’s shortcomings as an influential source of capital accrual that could fund the 
country’s obligations (Hasan, 2012).  This plan offered substitute settings to aid in Syria’s economic 
development with a specific plan of reform. The main goal of this plan is to create reasonably 
competitive markets in which goods, services and factors of production are exchanged without the 
interference of the state, contingent on conditions of supply and demand. This tactic puts the state in an 
accompanying position rather than a contending one with the private sector. Although the government 
has provided a “supervised” liberty to private sector participation, there is emphasis by the state in the 
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10th FYP on the need for its intervention in regards to dealing with market shortcomings or carrying out 
actions associated with the supply of public services or services that are not generally covered by private 
investments. (Dostal & Zorob, 2009). 
Faced with an absence of efficient productivity to deal with market demand, the government will 
increasingly limit its activities in order to build structural conditions and an advantageous business 
environment. Making the industrial sector the center of economic development  is the focal point of this 
agenda, reducing the input of the oil and gas sector and offering prospects for the service sector, e.g. 
banking, insurance, trade, etc., in order to accomplish the greatest potential development  (JICA & , 
2009). 
Between 2005 and 2007, the private sector greatly facilitated escalated development in the national 
accrual of capital, from 11.8% to 54% (WB, 2007). The new investment legislative decree no. 8 (2008), 
which modified investment law no. 10 (1991), enabled this, as well as fortified the rights of both 
domestic and foreign investors. Furthermore, in order to advance the investment climate even more, 
Syria joined the International Centre for Settlement Disputes and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) (Al-Dardari, 2008)2.  Nevertheless, foreign direct investments are still at a low level, seemingly 
connected to the view that Syria is a high-risk country (JICA & , 2009). 
Syria is making an effort to encourage persistent deregulation and amendments in this reform process 
in order to stimulate private investment. The goal of this is to set economic development on a path aimed 
towards a non-oil economy, upgrading of agriculture, and employment of domestic and international 
tourism for self-sustainable economic development, which also guaranteeing social stability with social 
safeguards. In this way, the Syrian government policy is set on a path towards prudently taking on the 
market economy while also making sure that social value and steadiness would not be weakened (JICA 
&  ،2009). 
Even so, the journey towards an open market economy is still in the planning stages with very little 
action actually taken thus far, attributed to the fact that Syria is still missing the correct resources in 
order to achieve an open market economy, “which the main ones are government expenditure, tax 
system, VAT and M change (monetary change and money supply)”. The state is still the main 
authoritative power in regards to the national economy as a result, chiefly through public-private 
partnerships that the state utilizes as a tool to maintain control of the economy, as well as to analyze the 
concentration of selected projects. That being said, a developmental agenda should add to enhancing 
human development gauges defined by the UNDP (for example, such a project should supply 
                                                          
2
 Abdallah Al Dardari is the Deputy Executive Secretary of ESCWA, and was Deputy Prime Minister for 
Economic Affairs from 2005 to 2011 and Minister of Planning and Chairperson of the State Planning 
Commission from 2003 to 2005. (ESCWA, 2014) 
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employment opportunities, education, or social benefits) to guarantee that the selected investments 
properly satisfy the people’s needs. The central state then virtually maintains control of the national 
economy, and is therefore making an effort to remain in a position of power regarding the supervision 
of infrastructure supplies while sharing others, by forcing a variety of what one can refer to as social 
restrictions. 
The service sector is the only area that is progressively advancing, which puts other large economic 
areas, such as industry and agriculture, in a steady drop. The augmented costs of products combined 
with the shortage of public output over the past few years has also caused a devaluation of the national 
currency while also lessening buying power of median individual incomes (Al-Dardari, 2008). The 
result has been social discrimination and even a social trauma and intense degeneration for many of the 
social classes’ living standards (Syrian News, 2009). It is for this reason that it can be said that growth 
is a definite requirement, but has not manifested strongly enough in order to supersede the state’s 
financial deficits and encourage a fair allocation of capital. This is why politicians and other 
authoritative bodies should prudently reflect on the social repercussions of any reform lengths in the 
incredibly difficult process of economic restructuring. 
As of 2009, there is an estimated number of 5,382 million participants in the Syrian labor market, with 
the official unemployment rate being 8.5%. In 2005, the occurrence of new members in the labor force 
reached 98.1%. These new members have various educational and training backgrounds and endure the 
deficient labor market organization and the discordancy of training and education programs with 
practical elements. Even so, the state has made some efforts to initiate some method of social welfare 
assistance tools. A social survey was conducted on the topic by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor 
from December 2008-April 2009 in order to confront the circumstances of families and individuals 
living in poverty, 11.9% of which, according to a 2006 calculation, live below the poverty level (CIA, 
2011). 
Minister of Social Affairs and Labor has stated that rather than simply beginning a welfare fund for 
impoverished families, the Ministry intends to create a dependable platform when making decisions on 
which areas to focus on when implementing social development programs (Syrian News, 2009). 
Moreover, the Minister announced that the planned financial assistance is to be administered via the 
supply of new employment, projects for constructing capacity, and social services agendas instead of 
via direct payments to the underprivileged population. This is an development  in the direction of the 
state’s goal of creating more stable development of the national territory through organized regional 
development  for poverty relief (JICA & , 2009). The state views this method of dynamic economic 
governance as useful for emphasizing and reinforcing the potential of the public sector without causing 
in intense drop in human development. In relation to this, the new 11th FYP (2011-2015) is going along 
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with the same main phases denoted in the 10th FYP in regards to growing investments while 
simultaneously enhancing the living standards by founding the groundwork for a competitive economy 
on which to base the progression of economic development. 
4.1.3. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Syria has an incredibly varied population, both ethnically and religiously: “Arabs 90.3%, Kurds, 
Armenians, and other 9.7% (about 9 percent are Kurds. Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans make 
up the remaining 1% of the population) (CIA ،2011). Major religions in Syria are Sunni Islam (74%of 
total population), other Islamic denominations (including Alawite, Druze 16% of population), 
Christianity (various denominations 10%), Judaism (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and 
Aleppo) Yazidis (a small religious group whose religion contains elements of Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity)” (Stanton, et al., 2012). Not only that, but there are also various languages spoken in 
addition to the most common Arabic, which in itself have many dialects across the country’s different 
regions. Even more cultural variation was introduced into the country from adjacent lands such as 
Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. Even though these immigrants do not have the right to vote in elections or 
take part in Syrian politics, they are offered parallel rights regarding schooling, healthcare, tenure, and 
economic doings. The urbanization rate in Syria greatly escalated with the introduction of refugees from 
adjacent lands combined with domestic relocation to large cities, most notably Damascus. This can be 
partially attributed to the unequal regional development and the main centers of significant activities, 
such as higher education, employment, and specialized healthcare, in the biggest cities in the nation 
(Hasan, 2012). 
The 4th chapter of the Syrian Constitution on Freedoms, Rights, and General Duties, under Article 39, 
states that Syrian citizens have the prerogative to gather and make peaceful demonstrations as long as it 
stays in accordance with the law. Furthermore, Article 48 of Chapter 4 states that the people have a right 
to form unions, social or professional organizations, and production or services associations that 
function within the law’s delineations. This right is applicable to all sectors and councils of society, but 
is in fact monitored to promote the Arab socialist movement and maintain its structure, as well as 
organize and direct the socialist economy, improve public security, health, culture, and other concerns 
of the people’s wellbeing, creating educational and technical potential, and enhancing methods of 
production, while also supplying the means to regulate state organizations (Parliament, 2000).  
Political Parties, Unions and Professional Associations, Job Creators Groups, Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry, and Social Organizations construct the formal makeup of civil society (Decision, 2011). 
Syrian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are quite different in their level of demonstration, technical 
proficiency, capacity building, service provision, and social utilities (World Bank, 2017b). This is 
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greatly attributable to the magnitude, official aptitude, and amount of acknowledgement that the 
organization receives by law with other social areas, the state, and the private sector. 
As stated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the amount of associations in Syria has 
significantly escalated, from 540 in 2001 to 1,500 at the present day, particularly with the help of UNDP 
and its impact on the 10th FYP (2006-2010) focusing on facilitating civil society. Many organizations 
have been relabeled as NGOs as a result, and even more notably, new organizations focused on 
development have been founded, such as the Syria Trust for Development. Founded in 2007, this 
establishment is recognized as one of the most operational NGOs at the national level, and directly 
works with the UNDP. Even so, Syria still has a limited amount of operational NGOs, which are rather 
marginalized when likened to governmental and for-profit sectors (UNDP, 2011). 
There are two kinds of difficulties that Syrian NGOs are confronted with. The first of these two are 
“internal” challenges, which are, in the first instance, in regards to their incapability to proficiently 
operate because of a shortage of establishments or organizations that could be of beneficial and hands-
on provision, and in the second instance, their deficiencies regarding their organizational administrative, 
structural, and functional abilities. “External” challenges, on the other hand, present themselves in 
numerous ways, the most notable being the legal environment that they operate within. Syrian NGOs 
legally function in accordance with conditions stated in the Associations and Private Societies Law no. 
93 of 1958, which centralizes the doings of all NGOs through the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. 
It is a requirement for all NGOs to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and function 
under its regulation. Aside from this, it is mandatory for all interactions with international organizations, 
such as receiving funds or working with international participants, to be approved by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which has presented an obstacle to the dynamic participation of international actors 
with NGOs (UNDP, 2011). 
A substantial portion of Syrian civil society is informal, which chiefly comprises sociocultural activities 
constructed using social relations of association and features founded on the community in regards to 
location, derivation, or culture. These features have powerful connections with formal establishments, 
although they are not formally recognized themselves. This association typically builds upon accepted 
authoritarianism (such as the chief, local administration, and neighborhood board) or negotiated 
patronage (such as public authorities or executives or members of the private sector), as opposed to 
nominated representation such as with formal civil society bodies (Jenkins & Wilkinson, 2002). This 
connection allows the informal sector of civil society admission to services. 
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4.2. GOVERNANCE DURING SYRIAN CONFLICT 
The afflicted economy and society due to the war resulting from the letdown of the state is a reflection 
of the shift to a new governance discrepancy in the midst of the Syrian conflict. 
4.2.1. STATE FAILURE  
Across Syria, the people’s faith in state institutions has significantly decreased as result of the state 
falling short throughout the conflict, causing the citizens to put their trust in other casual, customary 
institutions including family, tribes, communities, or cultural or religious connections for a sense of 
security and comfort (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2013). Consequently, several governance 
institutions have been established, many in the hope of filling in where the government is lacking. Many 
of them are unstable and very strained, but the Local Councils and Sharia Courts have made strides to 
improve the situation through offering essential public services, including charitable help and garbage 
pickup. They also aim to settle local conflicts, carry out legal tasks, and rebuild structure (Baczko, et 
al., 2013), in addition to implementing their own regulations and guidelines. 
Local Councils  
With a main objective of collaborating with the civilians and militants, back in 2011, the first Local 
Council was established in Zabadani, which transformed into a model for local governance that was 
redone throughout regions in Syria not under governmental control. Young, ambitious people started 
the Local Councils, a majority from the local organization commissions that were once very influential 
but progressively decreased in power as the number of armed opposition rose. A large number of these 
individuals have since been arrest or killed or have fled the nation and have been replaced by less 
competent leaders with less technical and business abilities. However, this isn’t the only weakness of 
the Local Councils, as they are also lacking in monetary resources, and these two factors combined 
hinder their capacity to tactically plan outside of the impromptu services that are being supplied, which 
impedes them from being successful and autonomous from the influence of military, tribes, family units, 
or foreign bodies. Councils are certainly not deep-rooted and, contingent on their security circumstances, 
accessibility to border zones, how long they have been in action, and other contending establishments, 
vary in their stages of progress ( (Khalaf, 2013). Even so, they have still been successful in reinstating 
at least a small amount of social services in their regions. Combined with their local characteristics and 
groundbreaking history during the revolution, this achievement has confirmed that they are largely 
appreciated by local populations and are highly esteemed.. 
Sharia Courts 
Sharia Courts first came about with the goal of dealing with conflicts between armed assemblies; 
however, since then, they have increasingly began meddling with the entire livelihoods of the citizens 
since they have been taken over by groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Nusra, and other jihadi 
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assemblies. Sharia courts presently reflect the biggest point of controversy in the fight for governance 
across the regions in Syria that are not under governmental control. Courts are diverse (although the 
majority is led by Islamic groups) and are not headed by one particular individual, and participants can 
be spontaneously altered with fluctuations in power aspects at the base. There was a wide variety of 
Sharia Court leaders by May 2014, such as the jihadi group ISIS in Al-Raqqa, local armed assemblies 
such as Jaish Al Mujahedeen in Aleppo (which has a respected reputation in its area), and allied groups 
such as Al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda, not to mention elderly clan chiefs, anarchists, youth, and sheiks, such 
as in Deir Ez-zor. Sharia Courts have a doctrine of a combination of Islam and conventionality when 
allocating power among assemblies, while the Courts led by fanatical groups such as ISIS and Al-Nusra 
levy more extremist understandings of Islam. The agendas of Sharia Courts varies from place to place, 
ranging from settling confrontations and upholding order to succeeding Local Councils in offering 
charitable help and services or completely  ruling over every factor of the people’s lives. Since they are 
susceptible to being overrun by militants and radicals, Sharia Courts can sometimes be utilized as a 
means of tyrannical authority. When the Courts first appeared, they were embraced by the people since 
there were no better options in the midst of state failure or absence, but after some time they were 
transformed into a means of vehement subjugation. After having achieved local respect and more 
authority due their success in providing social services, Sharia Courts outlawed civil society, replaced 
traditional regulations with strict Sharia law implementation, and attempted to relegate elders, 
community leaders, and businesspeople in order to safeguard that they would not be held responsible 
for future conflict and failures. 
In this light, it should be noted that Local Councils and Sharia Courts do not function across the same 
areas, but rather in particular zones. Similarly to Somalia, the governance that has manifested across 
Syria has become a non-cohesive collection of city-states and communities, disconnected by rustic 
statelessness while a concentrated web of people are bargaining or fighting for supplies and authority. 
Frequently under political military organizations with connections to foreign intercessors, this 
physically divided governance will only counteract any exertions to construct integrated, contemporary, 
effective, transparent, and dependable state institutions (Khalaf, 2013). 
4.2.2. CONFLICT ECONOMY 
As a result of the instability, violence, and collapse of the economy caused by the conflict in Syria, there 
has been a huge volume of unemployment and job loss of over 50% (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 
2013). In addition to this, there has also been a harsh drop in the purchasing power of fixed salaries, 
with the Syrian pound having depreciated by over 300% and the prices of food inflating by 100% 
(Yazigi, 2014).  The bulk of the citizens have lost their means of support, resulting in 50% of the 
population being below poverty level. Farmers, shepherds, and petty traders are being pushed into other 
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means of making a living due to the factories being vandalized, raided, or shut down, trade being 
weakened, and agricultural yields becoming scarce (ACAPS, 2013). Some people who have been forced 
to change industries have switched to customary hand-labor jobs such as repairing appliances, but others 
have resorted to more extreme lines of work, such as fighting or selling humanitarian services. In the 
midst of all of this, illegal activity has become more prevalent (Khalaf, 2013), including bribery, 
blackmail and holding ransom, human trafficking, producing and distributing drugs, pillaging, and 
illegally trading oil and weapons (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2013) (ACAPS, 2013). 
Beyond the control of the state, new (and for the most part illegal) informal ambitions and power groups 
have developed, and in the process disintegrated the customary business class. The people in these 
groups are not at all concerned with rebuilding central governance in Syria, thriving on the chaos and 
procuring great amounts of material wealth and authority (Yazigi, 2014). Some examples include that 
of Tel Abyad, where marijuana is being grown to be trafficked to Turkey and Iraq (Danish institute for 
international studies, 2012) (ReliefWeb, 2013) (ACAPS, 2013), and in the northeast of Syria, a whole 
microeconomic system centered on the illegal oil trade has been created. As a result of this informal 
conflict economy, a new class of clannish, insurgent, and radical populations has been cultivated and 
strengthened, with its members violently feuding for resources in order to gain further authority. The oil 
fields make up one of the most significant resources due to its enormous profit potential, with other 
major resources in demand are those of gas, electricity, water, and basic food ingredients. Other main 
sources of revenue include that from border fees, checkpoints, and ransacking banks and factories 
(Yazigi, 2014). 
Specifically, radical jihadi organizations have proven the most efficacious at gaining access to and 
control of these resources and abusing them to gain more authority. The reason for this is their previous 
experience in taking full advantage of war economies in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Yaziji (2014) 
explains that they began funding their military maneuvers and management of the city by raiding billions 
from the Al-Raqqa bank, and from there they extended to taking over other major resources, such as the 
oil fields. For example, ISIS took hold of and exploited flourmills supplies a million people per day and 
used them to accrue revenue and operative humanitarian aid resources in order to gain respect. Another 
example is Al-Nusra, which made the most of its command of the transportation routes of oil pipelines 
in order to charge government-run refineries for access to the oil. In some cases, these organizations 
have made financial arrangements with the regime, such as the “water-for-electricity” agreement in 
Aleppo between the Sharia Court and the regime. Another such arrangement was in Deir Ez-zor, where 
Al-Nusra came to terms with the regime on sharing oil revenues in order to guarantee that both sides 
had steady oil access. 
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In the middle of armed conflict and a war economy, although financial collaboration does occur, the 
goal is not to reinstate state or formal market management. This cooperation is rather based on the 
personal ambitions of the authoritative financial and military participants, which are more expected to 
destabilize local exertions aimed towards decreasing illegal activity and reestablishing order. Radical 
and guerilla groups have a habit of subjugating invigorated exertions from civil society that could 
possibly make them liable, with many of these groups actually aiming to propagate vehemence and 
thwart any attempts at peace in order to sustain the financial and political victories they have achieved 
due to the state falling short and the ensuing pandemonium. Even so, problem is not unequivocal: 
although these groups may not aim towards reinstating central governance that has been rapacious at 
their cost, new businessmen could be geared towards achieving a stable governance system that offers 
more constancy, security, and certainty. 
4.2.3. CONFLICT SOCIETY 
Conflict drives society apart and rescinds social solidity, extinguishing trust, faith, and individuality and 
hosting extremist changes in the political nature and standards of behavior for people who have lived 
through pandemic violence (Pouligny, 2005). Even more significantly, societies go become jolted in 
such a way that they are willing to settle for ad hoc government substitutes that under normal 
circumstances would never have gained the people’s approval (Klein, 2010). Aside from this, however, 
conflict also invigorates civil society in response to essential limitations imposed by the violence 
(Kaldor, 2003), inspiring social action and producing new leaders, as well as stimulates the people to 
rethink their customary authoritative foundations. In Syria, when the people exploded in revolt, civil 
society was invigorated, evident in youth communities, proletarian agendas, local collaboration 
assemblies, leaders, activists, religious organizations, civil and religious courts, Local Councils, 
charitable organizations, media clusters, and more. With the wholehearted ambition of rising above a 
calamitous humanitarian disaster with assistance efforts, supply, building awareness, and (although to a 
smaller degree) advocating for human rights, the people’s goals and efforts cover several ranges. Some 
of the areas that are affected include health and medical care, education, civil insubordination, political, 
social, and economic strengthening, solving conflict, creating amity, human advancement, psychosocial 
aid, and the rebuilding of the state and institutions (Khalaf, et al., 2014). 
In this way, civil society is still present in Syria, even in the midst of conflict, although it must be 
recognized that the way it is characterized and how it works is undergoing constant alterations that are 
contingent on the circumstances surrounding it (Marchettia & Toccib, 2009). The general meaning that 
this study assigns to civil society as the area between the market and the state confirms that it is not 
strictly its western interpretation in harmonious states as simply non-governmental assemblies. 
Conversely, it comprises the communal, more informal proletarian campaigns at the base, the 
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motivations of which summon the people into action and the political importance of which is much 
greater in times of conflict. Regardless, while civil society, the market economy, and the state begin to 
interlace with the war economy and the collapsing state and thus begin to amalgamate, what occurs is 
that what may normally be referred to as “uncivil” forces actually in a way become civil in the setting 
of a “conflict society”. This poses confusion in identifying who actually compose the civil society in the 
conflict setting of Syria. For this reason, the principle that this study uses to identify civil society is that 
of function: as long as the participants are not assuming a dominating role and exploiting violence or 
the militants’ war economy, people and groups will be viewed as contributing to civil society, even if 
under normal circumstances they may indeed be viewed as uncivil. Armed groups, traditional groups, 
and state-like organizations are the three main assemblies in the Syrian conflict that generally seem to 
always be contributing to civil society while at the same time opposing it. (Khalaf, et al., 2014), in an 
analysis of the different civil society assemblies in the areas of Syria not under governmental control, 
showed that the rate at which these groups increase in size is relative to the movement of their regions 
out of the government’s control. This growth would not have been feasible if it weren’t for the assistance 
of paramilitaries who fought back against a dictatorial system; however, these armed groups also impede 
the civil groups’ expansion rates due to the augmented command of armed forces running state-like 
organizations. These organizations can be less radical and relatively approved by the people, such as 
Janish Al-Mujahedeen militias, or more extremist organizations like ISIS, which are still working on 
gaining the people’s respect Traditional groups, on the other hand, which include tribal, cultural, and 
religious organizations, have been the most effective in contending with ISIS, as well as the most 
organized in implementing much of the humanitarian aid and other civil society operations in the Syrian 
conflict. For example, some of the clans in Deir Ez-zor have been able to repel ISIS from overtaking 
their terrain, and some Islamic humanitarian organizations have been able to supply nutrition and 
lodging to those domestically exiled in Aleppo. Conversely, there was one tribe in particular, Al-
Baryedje, who played a major role in subsidizing ISIS with its human resources, and several religious 
establishments have been the source of animosity, amplified disunions, and misconduct. 
That being said, the query is again raised as to who does and does not make up civil society in Syria, 
since it the lines are still very blurred. A number of factors contribute to this classification, including 
the role and authority of an individual, but also their own nature, whether that is inclusive or exclusive. 
In a field study by (Khalaf, et al., 2014) in which the civil society in non-government controlled areas 
in Syria was charted out for a survey of civil society communities as to their individuality, and the results 
were clearly quite obscure across the board. Even though several of the organizations claimed to not be 
politically ambitious, many of their activities were of a political nature. In other organizations, nearly 
all of them claimed that they stood for democracy, egalitarianism, and liberties, but their own definitions 
of these aspects were quite diverse, varying between the international standard interpretations to the 
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Islamic notion of “shura”, or consultation. Moreover, although the majority agreed that there should be 
a separation between church and state, quite a lot also affirmed that moderate Islam was the answer to 
their governance issues. One reason for this is that when radical organizations have a hold on the 
population, it makes the people nervous to claim any type of non-spiritual attitudes. Even so, there was 
still a trend of support for Islam in the general sense that is very present in the politics of non-
government-controlled areas in Syria, even those who were passionately liberal and advocated for unity, 
involvement, and equal human rights for all citizens. Gellner and Kaldor actually opposed the general 
embrace of Islam in politics since Islam itself still has a communalist agenda and has not “generated the 
kind of protestant individualism that provided the beginnings of civil society in Christianity” (Kaldor, 
2003). In Syria, there is indeed much optimistic talk about the various types of Islam and how they 
should progress, but there are also many influential political parties have been quick to incorporate Islam 
into their political campaigns to their benefit.  One aspect of Islam, for example, called “Moubayaa”, is 
a social arrangement in which the people declare allegiance to their ruler (Kaldor, 2003). This concept 
has been practiced by Al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, in order to gain mass disciples in Syria and expand 
his reputation across the nation, establishing ISIS as the authority figure and opposing social assemblies. 
Many radical organizations who are considered “uncivil” have grown in authority against civil society 
in a similar fashion as the war economy and shadow state establishments, but civil society nonetheless 
keeps growing outside of their confines as a counteraction. Civil society has gained influence through 
their basic observational tactics and raising awareness with protests, pacts, and consultations, and has 
been able to stimulate pseudo-governmental establishments to come through for the people and accept 
responsibility. Despite a fragile infrastructure, a lack of backing, and diminished technical and financial 
resources to counteract the war economy and the forcefulness of a shadow state, one thing that civil 
society does have in its advantage is the determination of the people. 
Even though having the state and market resources under control could greatly facilitate the safety and 
stability of governance, civil society has the advantage of validity, something that has been true before 
the conflict and is still true in the midst of it. Once more, as the disparities between old and new 
governance converge, the main query is whether civil society in Syria and build and sustain civility even 
from its uncivil state due to the collapse of the state and the war economy during the conflict. Regardless, 
since there is still the factor of international influence during the conflict in Syria, it is not only civility 
and uncivility that are merging, but also international and local governance. 
4.3. GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE LOCAL ACTORS 
Handling the different international participants the same is not effective. These participants include 
NGOs, opposing governments, the private sector, multilateral establishments, philanthropic 
establishments, the media, human rights assemblies, international networks, think tanks, governmental 
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commissioned private firms, the diaspora, and more. The collection is so varied in both their natures and 
their ambitions that could either cooperate or clash with both each other and the local participants in 
Syria. 
In Syria in general, the main objective of the main international mediators with regard to governance is 
that of state-building and civil society, which highlights constructing the required political and financial 
establishments as a basis for neoliberal amity. 
4.3.1. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
State Building 
Two examples of this concept include the hierarchical construction and campaigning for the National 
Coalition of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (the Coalition) and the augmented backing 
for the building of and advocating for Local Councils in Syria. 
The National Coalition of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
The Coalition was established to be an acknowledgeable boundary of the Syrian resistance that outside 
participants could address. Regardless, the locals view it as negligibly demonstrating the people’s 
inherent motivations, as well as being very reliant on international monetary resources that gives it 
strength and for which they are liable. Many others view it as an oppressive power of no use other than 
to dominate the people and gain foreign assistance to be allocated amongst its own members who have 
influential networks. The Coalition holds a minimal reputation with the locals as a result of the Secretary 
General in Qatar, Sabagh, who was greatly backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Oweis, 2013). 
In an effort to gain more legitimacy with the people, the Coalition has begun establishing Local Councils 
with technical and monetary aid through its Assistance Coordinating Unit (ACU) and Local Assistance 
Coordination Unit (LACU). The ACU as its main objective was to provide assistance to local councils, 
while the LACU was meant to construct state institutions through offering local councils with 
consultancy and the essential factors of the electoral procedures. However, because of their political 
lobbying and support from contending authorities, the two establishments ended up coinciding. 
Additionally, even though the councils enjoyed its advantages, the support of the Coalition was 
accompanied by the burden of planning and even regional legislative bodies was placed on the Local 
Councils, which resulted in the Local Councils being of the idea that their affiliation with the Coalition 
went no further than financial matters. The international intercessors have been well aware of this, but 
regardless, the building of an essential state system still takes precedence as opposed to progressing the 
communal ambitions of the people of Syria. 
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Local Councils 
Foreign financial assistance is directed towards Local Councils through governments’ commissioned 
private companies (also called “implementers”), that is when it is not all being put into the Coalition. 
The implementers are based in Gaziantep, Turkey, and have built a reputation for fulfilling the 
institution-building objectives for the neoliberal peace the most successfully. They answer mainly to 
their means of financial supply, since they are private establishments. The implementers tend to be the 
most effective in gaining funds through offering to complete and being offered more projects, which is 
the main factor contributing to their achievements. There have been grievances that there is hardly any 
collaboration or discussion between them regarding knowledge acquired relating to the Local Councils. 
Moreover, they are not per se preoccupied with charities’ effects on Local Councils. In other areas, 
political abuse by private state-funded establishments has been evident, reported to be able to influence 
alterations to the political agenda in the target areas of their funders (Fischer, 2006). Then again, when 
implementers express suspicions of possibly detrimental effects, the threats have already been carried 
out by the time their cases reach the legislators in Western capital cities. 
In the meantime, foreign governments, through their monetary assistance to project funds and training 
for Local Councils, are still contending for control. This can be clearly seen both in the training 
curriculum and its implementation. “Good governance” has become a household name in Local 
Councils as a course offered by the Coalition and several implementers for achieving neoliberal peace. 
Because it is a rather non-political and technical tactic for governance, it leaves room for social power 
associations to be weakened and structural political concerns to be written off, and democracy could 
possibly diminish it to rare occasions focused on the privileged people of society (e.g. elections) instead 
of focusing on the community in a unified and involved manner. All of these factors could strengthen 
state institutions, but to the disadvantage of the people. 
The programs of the implementers are of main concern. A Syrian scholar, for example, claimed that one 
of the NGOs proposed five completely non-related training courses on institutional management to the 
five different Local Councils (Khalaf, et al., 2014). Because these councils have training backgrounds 
in more independent than cooperative performance, they will support decentralized governance even if 
there is insufficient collaboration between jurisdictions. Although decentralization isn’t inherently 
troublesome, its implementation with no base or infrastructure is. These tactics evidently benefit the 
motivations of the intercessors and the division and animosity of the states for the sake of 
decentralization, such as with the “Arab Spring” in Yemen and Libya. 
Civil Society Engineering 
There is also a form of institutionalization having to do with civil society. It has been cited in literature 
about liberal amity that post-conflict action plans largely prioritize urban, metropolitan, and upper-class 
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and English-speaking populations (MacGinty & Williams, 2009), or on pacifying the native movements, 
namely their efforts to join the worldwide governance community of institutionalized, proficient NGOs 
(Kaldor, 2003). The former presents the risk of restricted access to the real, local civil society, while the 
latter holds the risk of progressing the schemes of northern suppliers even if not in the interest of the 
people, seeing as this can lead to them being fully reliant on external donors (Kaldor, 2003) (MacGinty 
& Williams, 2009). These scenarios also apply to Syria. 
Many Syrian activities, scholars, and development workers have expressed that a good portion of the 
funds put into the cause for rebuilding civil society during the conflict in Syria don’t really produce the 
anticipated result. It has been attributed to numerous factors, the most prevalent being outreach. Since 
most of the money initially goes to international NGOs and implementers and then secondarily to large, 
English-speaking, institutionalized Syrian NGOs, there is a lot of time and money wasted. These latter 
NGOs external to Syria (mainly in Gaziantep or Lebanon) are not per se directly associated with the 
local population, and in the case that they are, very little of the money gets forwarded to the local society. 
Another problem is the “projectization” of civil society, in which many of the local social organizations 
are required to be registered as NGOs in order to receive funding and foreign technical assistance. 
Although this can give them more credibility when communicating with their donors and sometimes 
occupying their priorities, the local movements are becoming more money-motivated “civil society 
projects”. This has proven to set them further from their identities as independent movements founded 
on social doctrines and associations, aiming to hold power abusers accountable. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that many citizens view NGOs, civil society, and activists as parts of an elected body working 
on their groundbreaking social ambitions. This is one source of society’s opposition to Universalist 
introductions, such as democracy, while offering other methods that locals may feel more comfortable 
with. 
4.3.2. LOCAL – INTERNATIONAL HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
The majority of the international intercessors in Syria have governance tactics that actually appear to be 
weakening the state and civil society, making it easier for radical organizations to come into power. 
Even though many international intercessors have positive ambitions to repair Syria’s civil society, they 
often cannot provide fortitude where there is weakness. This is mainly due to the fact that governance 
has a different definition among populations, which can be explained by hybrid governance elements: 
Effectiveness 
Many international mediators view efficiency as mainly connected to achievement when executing their 
own tactics and projects through their own institutions or institutionalized organizations. Since 
international assistance is assembled and executed according to foreign regulations established in the 
capitals of their countries of origin (Edwards, 2010), it many times is unsuccessful in swiftly and steadily 
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amending the dynamics in the field. Moreover, seeing as different donors have different objectives, it is 
often difficult to reach consensus between them, which causes disparity and ultimately ineptitude. For 
example, some interventions collaborate with the Coalition, while others go straight to working with the 
Local Councils and civil society groups depending on their goals and ideals. Furthermore, local activists 
and recipients of aid in refugee communities are of the view that donors are set in their own ways of 
action, even if it means taking longer and not being as effective. It appears that to the donors, finishing 
the project takes priority over actually reaching the people and making a real difference. 
(Khalaf, et al., 2014) have stated that — whether it be because of cultural ignorance or a clash of interests 
— this varying, unproductive, and restricted outreach and effect of assistance has had an impact both 
on the implementation of the assistance itself and the supplying establishments. The disparate support 
from international NGOs to civil society populations has proven to break faith between them. Moreover, 
the fact that the majority of international donors tend to concentrate on relief aid (and that a great portion 
of support goes towards this) has displaced civil society’s political role. For example, many civil society 
organizations in non-government controlled regions have refocused their political efforts on supplying 
aid, whether that be in whole or in part (Khalaf, et al., 2014). On the other hand, the fact that donor 
schemes incorporate political elements into their aid has had damaging effects on local civil society 
groups concentrated on inclusive governance policies with less means. A current example is the religious 
conceptual schemes of the donors with plentiful supply from the Gulf States that are the exact opposite 
of liberal and democratic. 
In the meantime, international organizations are the ones that are influencing the decisions in Local 
Councils, the Coalition, and across the globe to be more transparent and all-encompassing. The 
humanitarian necessities and thoughts and opinions from the Syrians would have been much less noticed 
around the world if it weren’t for some international civil society and humanitarian establishments. 
Security 
International powers generally are their own sources of security. They aim to strengthen solidity in a 
collapsed state through constructing state institutions with the intention of shielding themselves from 
terrorism and civil armed conflict abroad. There are a “core five” organizations that they turn to in any 
case of a collapsed state, including the military, the police, civil services, the justice system, and 
management (Call, 2008). Even so, because so much focus is put onto creating a state that is secure, the 
nature and role of these organizations is often neglected, such as whether they are rapacious, fraudulent, 
and/or dictatorial, as well as if they are attentive to the circumstantial requirements in the midst of severe 
conflict and if their security measures are sufficient and maintainable (Call, 2008). 
This is somewhat evident in the case of Syria. The international network, in their support of the 
Coalition, has actually encouraged another pseudo-governmental establishment that is both fraudulent 
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and widely unaccepted by the locals, as well as run by an amalgamation of opposing local exclusive and 
international governance motivations. At present, regarding security, the Coalition appears more 
involved in contributing to the conflict than achieving consensus that would enforce security for the 
people. Even the fact that it endorses the military to protect the people has actually been diminishing a 
sense of security. The Coalition’s military organization in Aleppo is said to be the most active in 
pillaging, and as a result has almost completely lost its legitimacy. In the meantime, in earlier stages in 
the conflict in Al-Raqqa prior to it’s overtaking by Al-Nusra and then ISIS, local strategies were 
proposed to international donors to install a police force in the area. Unfortunately, as local activists 
have stated, the petition has been halted since the international donors have not gotten the sign-off from 
the Coalition to proceed. The Coalition has expressed more interest in furthering its police agenda under 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Doroa militias, which the local activists claim are associated with 
each other.. 
Legitimacy 
In vulnerable states, international mediators are more concentrated on international legitimacy based on 
their own schemes or international origins of rational-legal types of legitimacy having to do with the 
security of the state, the supplying of public goods, etc., rather than basing legitimacy off of local morals, 
beliefs, and associations ( (Roberts, 2011) (Edwards, 2010). Most common in Western states, this mode 
of legitimacy is only one of several types evident in conflict-affected states. Local legitimacy originates 
from intricate power configurations, accountability, and duty, since it also depends on local principles 
(e.g. tribal, communal, spiritual, or traditional) that allows communities to receive what they need and 
sustain their lives. Without comprehending these qualities, the result is intense opposition between 
internal and external legitimacy sources and could write off the legitimacy of current local 
establishments, ultimately making the state even weaker (Edwards, 2010). 
One example demonstrating the different internal sources of legitimacy (both civil and uncivil) in 
different regions of Syria is that of the rural community in Deir Ez-zor, a tribal region that still exhibits 
a combination of networks of closeness and support resulting from a war economy and is not probable 
to imitate an exclusively rational-legal system such as that in Western states. The associations founded 
on friendship, support, and/or shared history and ideas was just as significant as the successful provision 
of services in elections in the Local Council in Deir Ez-zor. If international donors only concentrate on 
the legal-rational form of legitimacy and overlook the aspect of association and other modes of appealing 
or customary authority resulting from them, they will not likely gain cooperation from the council. Aside 
from this, in circumstances of conflict, some privileged entities could keep directing their motivations 
towards international legitimacy instead of local legitimacy in order to establish their place of power 
and sustained availability of resources (MacGinty, 2011). Two instances of this are institutionalized 
state-like establishments such as the Coalition and other civil society groups that have established 
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respected associations with donors. Members of the local civil society view this as exploiting their 
resources and forcing urgencies and ideas through project-motivated funding that they do not per se 
agree with (Khalaf, et al., 2014). This has proven to broaden the rift in legitimacy in local areas, making 
it easier for jihadi groups to gain prevalence. These groups are achieving more legitimacy with religious 
campaigns that assembles entire communities, along with an enormous monetary ability to achieve 
legitimacy through supplying the people with provisions and security. 
4.4. CONCLUSION  
This chapter addresses the mechanisms of urban governance in Syria before and during the conflict by 
clarifying the role of the key actors involved in decision-making and the dynamic relationship between 
them. 
Before the conflict  
Following the year 2000, Syria has undergone significant shifts within its governance setting. This 
occurred in collaboration with UNDP, which has prompted the Syrian government to make governance 
changes in the country. This was evident in the Syrian 10th FYP (2006-2010), putting an emphasis on 
the decentralization of government, increasing the activities and investment of the market, and lastly 
enabling the participation of civil society in the process of development.  
Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the Syrian government is still perceived to be centralized to a large 
extent before the conflict and it continued with the same approach during it, with centralization being 
the prevailing characteristic of development governance in the country still. This is exhibited at the local 
level in the capital Damascus, as the GoD is still expected to act conforming with the MoLA’s will, 
regardless of the greater freedom it had been given in handling local resources and decisions. Moreover, 
despite the increase of investments in the services and market activities in favor of the private sector, 
they are still greatly dominated by the state and nowhere near attending to local demands, notably of 
those with a lower economic status. Therefore, informal market activities have taken place in the cities, 
having a substantial input into the national income and strongly associating with the state’s bodies and 
formal market, although not being legally recognized. On the other hand, the parliament along with a 
number of organizations of principally cultural and environmental functions are considered to be the 
representatives of the civil society. However, they have a limited freedom of action as they are controlled 
by the central government, which prevents them from having access to all social groups. This also 
hinders debating fundamental developmental needs with the development authorities, as these are not 
incorporated in their agenda of actions. A more active and broader form of civil society has consequently 
occurred, which is not formally represented or acknowledged, but is well organized and strongly 
associated with private, formal, and governmental CSOs. This civil society form is based upon kinship 
and is thought to be highly competent on societal, financial, and cultural levels. 
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During the conflict  
Syria has been serving as a host for the most ferocious conflicts in recent history, being a breeding 
ground for various governance modes of both disparaging and constructive. The reason for this is the 
fundamentally unstable governance over the ten years before the conflict. This governance has shifted 
from the state -market- society manipulation to the state failing, a conflicted economy, and a torn-
society. These circumstances have cultivated different governance configurations, including local, and 
international actors that have risen to fill in where the state has fallen short. These groups comprise civil 
society assemblies, Local Councils, Extremist Groups, Sharia Courts, and warlords, the National 
Coalition of the Syrian Revolution, international bodies and private stockholders. 
A “hybrid governance” is being constructed as civil society and state-building assemblies are making 
an effort to rebuild and/ or develop governance whether including these elements or not. Regardless, 
this hybridity procedure appears to lean more towards international reconstruction ideals that center on 
hierarchical technocratic-institutionalization and actually worsen the weakness and division of civil 
society in Syria, given its civil society’s already fragile configuration. This results in the enablement of 
radical groups to fill in as a mode of governance, and even the international intercessors who mean well 
often fail to be productive in this regard. 
Moreover, to be able to reinstate a more stable mode of governance more effectively in states affected 
by conflict, we need to reconsider the inconsistencies and restrictions in our comprehension of and 
efforts to counteract the conflict and rebuild the state and civil society. In the midst of conflict, 
hybridization not only changes the characteristics and position of the state- market- civil society, but 
also impact the interrelationships between them. Therefore, the concentration should not be put on 
governance actors separated from each other. Furthermore, an accurate evaluation must encompass 
intensive historical analysis and circumstantial comprehension of local ambitions and efforts as opposed 
to international ones. As evidenced by the situation in Syria, the historical backgrounds of conflict are 
indeed prevalent, as well as the local circumstances and how the international actors cooperate with 
them. In the meantime, the opposition of the locals has displayed that amity cannot be achieved without 
fairness, and that security cannot be achieved without genuine modifications in all social, financial, and 
political aspects. However, irrespective of the mode of governance that may be seen in Syria later on, 
whether that is inclusive, exclusive, integrated, divided, centralized, decentralized, or an amalgamation 
of the two, whole generation and populations in Syria are disappearing that will have consequences for 
years to come both domestically and internationally. Therefore, it is needed that we begin to consider 
the state- market- civil society, amity and fairness, and security and amendment as unified elements, but 
most importantly, the population and their rights. 
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5 
5. ASSESSMENT OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN 
DAMASCUS DURING THE CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. PREFACE 
The Case study addresses the urban governance in the capital city of Syria -Damascus, which is 
considered one of the most significant strongholds of the government during the conflict. Where much 
effort has been focused on protecting this city and neutralizing it from conflict as a form of proving 
sovereignty and maintaining power. This policy has largely succeeded over seven years of war, as the 
capital city still outside the conflict, with the exception of some peripheral areas, which constitute a 
small percentage of the total area of Damascus. As a result of the stable situation in Damascus, many 
people moved to it from neighboring cities, particularly from Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq). This 
demographic change have had a profound impact on the city and put a lot of pressure on the city's 
institutions to respond effectively in a proper way in order to meet needs and provide services to those 
newcomers. On the one hand, many people from Damascus fled the country, especially the well-off 
people because of the deteriorating social and economic conditions. . So, Damascus has played the eye 
of the storm during the conflict as mentioned in chapter 3.  In a related context, the conflict that erupted 
in Damascus could generally be categorized as a civil conflict between the state and opposition groups, 
where the main objective of the opposition forces and its armed groups fighting in Damascus was to 
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seize the capital as the center of political and economic power, and thus to completely topple the Current 
Government.  
The reason for targeting Damascus as a case study is that it is the political and economic capital of Syria, 
and as mentioned above, Damascus has been protected by the regime since the outbreak of the conflict ,
and thus still has the pre-conflict institutional structure, as well as the proper environment for interaction 
between the key players in the governance process. These factors facilitate the collection of data, and 
thus the possibility of evaluating urban governance of Damascus with the least number of limitations. 
On the contrary, areas of conflict characterized by the absence of state institutions, as well as the lack 
of economic and social activities, even in areas that have been fully controlled by the opposition and not 
a battlefield, there is no clear structure of institutions but only a group of entities whose interest is limited 
to political and military affairs without focus On economic and social development. 
In this context, this chapter deliver an assessment of the urban governance in Damascus through 
applying the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index, as well as studying and analyzing the sphere of key 
actors involved the city governance. 
5.2. URBAN GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT IN DAMASCUS THROUGH (UN-UGI) 
5.2.1. EVALUATION APPROACH AND DATA COLLECTION 
Two main alternatives are used in the selection of indicators, depending on their importance on the one 
hand and the availability of statistical data on the other (UN-HABITAT, 2004a).  
• The first alternative includes high ranking indicators 
• The first alternative includes in addition to high ranking indicators, some moderate ranking 
indicators.  
The following table shows those two alternatives: 
Table 2: Selected indicators for the two alternatives (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
Principle Alternative 1: Only High ranking Alternative 2: High and selected moderate 
ranking 
Effectiveness 
sub-index 
1. Local government revenue per capita 
2. Local Government transfers 
3. Ration of mandates to actual tax 
collection 
4. Published performance standards 
1. Local government revenue per capita 
2. Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget 
3. Local Government transfers 
4. Ratio of mandates to actual tax collection 
5. Predictability of transfers 
6. Published performance standards 
7. Customer satisfaction survey 
8. Vision statement 
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Equity 
sub-index 
5. Citizens charter 
6. Proportion of women councilors 
7. Proportion of women in key positions 
8. Pro-poor pricing policy 
9. Citizens charter 
10. Proportion of women councilors 
11. Proportion of women in key positions 
12. Pro-poor pricing policy 
13. Street Vending 
Participation 
sub-index 
9. Elected council 
10. Election of Mayor 
11. Voter turnout 
12. People’s forum 
13. Civic Associations (per 10,000) 
14. Elected council 
15. Election of Mayor 
16. Voter turnout 
17. People’s forum 
18. Civic Associations (per 10,000) 
Accountability 
sub-index 
14. Formal publication of contracts, 
tenders, budget and accounts 
15. Control by higher levels of 
government 
16. Anti-corruption commission 
17. Disclosure of personal income and 
assets 
18. Regular independent audit 
19. Formal publication of contracts, tenders, 
budget and accounts 
20. Control by higher levels of government 
21. Codes of conduct 
22. Facility to receive complaints 
23. Anti-corruption commission 
24. Disclosure of personal income and assets 
25. Regular independent audit 
Alternative two is adopted in this study in order to cover as many issues as possible, due to the 
complexity that face urban governance in Syria. This alternative includes 25 indicators that divided into 
9 quantitative indicators and 17 qualitative indicators. All indicators are evaluated and given a weight 
(scores) according to their rank, their importance to the main objective and distribution of weight.  The 
following table demonstrates the calculation of each sub-Index which are classified in the four main 
indicators: Effectiveness, Equity, Participation and Accountability (see table 2). “The indicator score is 
expressed as values ranging from “0” to “1”, where “1” means excellent performance and “0” means 
poor performance. In addition, there is a significant number of indicators were binary in nature. Binary 
response in Yes or No were transformed to ‘0’ or ‘1’” (UN-HABITAT, 2004a).   
Table 3: Suggested investigational formulae for the Urban Governance Index, Alternative 2 (UN-HABITAT, 
2004a) 
Sub-Indices 
 
Formula  
 
Effectiveness  
 
0.25*LG Revenue per capita + 0.10*Ratio of recurrent to capital budget + 0.10*LG 
revenue in transfer + 0.10*Tax collection + 0.10*Predictability of transfer + 
0.15*Published performance standards + 0.10*Consumer satisfaction survey + 
0.10*Vision Statement = 1  
Equity  
 
0.20*Citizens Charter + 0.20*Women councilors + 0.10*Women in key positions + 0.15* 
household water connection + 0.10*Pro-poor policy + 0.10* Water price + 0.15*Street 
vending restrictions = 1  
Participation  0.15*Elected Council + 0.15* Mayor Selection + 0.25*Voter Participation + 
0.20*Peoples Forum + 0.25*Civic associations = 1  
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Accountability  
 
0.20*Formal publication: contracts, tenders budget and accounts + 0.15*Control by 
higher levels of government + 0.10*Codes of Conduct + 0.10*Facilities to receive 
complaints + 0.15*Anti-corruption commission + 0.15*Disclosure of personal/family 
income and assets + 0.15*Independent audit =1  
Urban Governance 
Index  
(Effectiveness sub-index + Equity sub-index + Participation sub-index + Accountability 
sub-index = 4)  
 
The data collection process has been conducted among number of government bodies at the local and 
national levels. In doing so, the researcher collected data from Central Bureau of Statistics (CDS), the 
parliament, Damascus governorate, and Ministry of Local Administration MLA…etc. In addition to the 
official websites of these bodies.  
5.2.2. UGI indicators  
A. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness measures the instruments and the socio-political atmosphere for institutional proficiency 
(through subsidiarity and predictability) in financial aspects and planning, services providing and 
meeting local community needs.  
Local government revenue per capita  
The published monetary and economic data published by the Central Bank, which is responsible for 
financing the Governorate of Damascus, indicates that the total revenues of the local government 
amounted respectively in the years 2014-2015-2016 to the following values in dollars (4,856,245 - 
3,256,589 - 1,836,855) (Central Bank , 2016). 
Table 4: Local government revenue per capita 
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Indicator 1: 
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Local government revenue per capita  
Effectiveness; Accountability 
The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
• Total local government revenue (R): This includes the income annually 
collected, both capital and recurrent for the metropolitan area, in US 
dollars). A 3 years average of the values is undertaken. Please make sure to 
specify whether the information is for the municipal area or the 
metropolitan region. 
• Total population (P). Please make sure that he spatial unit 
(municipality/metropolitan) is standard for the local government revenue 
and the population size. 
•  Local government revenue per capita (LGR) = R/P 
R=  4,856,245+ 3,256,589+ 1,836,855=  3,316,563$ 
                                       3 
P = 2,350,000 
(LGR) = R/P  
3,316,563/ 2,350,000 = $ 1.4 
 
 
Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget 
The published monetary and economic data published by the Central Bank, which is responsible for 
financing the Governorate of Damascus, indicates that the total local government recurrent budget (R)  
amounted 48,543,689 $, and The total local government capital budget: 35,922,330 $ (Central Bank , 
2016). 
Table 5: Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget 
Indicator 2:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget 
Effectiveness; Accountability 
The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
• The total local government recurrent budget (R) : Recurrent includes 
income derived on a regular basis (e.g. taxes and user charges) 
• The total local government capital budget (C): Capital includes fixed 
income that is derived after allocation of funds from internal or external 
sources (E.g. higher levels of government, private sector, and donor 
agencies). 
• Ratio of actual recurrent and capital budget (RRC) = R/C 
R / C 
R (2015-2016) = 25,000,000,000 SYP = 48,543,689 $ 
C (2015- 2016) = 18,500,000,000 SYP = 35,922,330 $ 
48,543,689  / 35,922,330 = 1.35 
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Local government revenue transfers 
The published monetary and economic data published by the Central Bank, which is responsible for 
financing the Governorate of Damascus, indicates that the Local government revenue (R)  amounted 
84,470,000 $, and Transfers in local government revenue (T): 13,008,380 $ (Central Bank , 2016). 
Table 6: Local government revenue transfers 
Indicator 3:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Local government revenue transfers 
Effectiveness; Accountability, Participation 
The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
• Local government revenue (R) = Total local government revenue 
(transfers and non-transfers) 
• Transfers in local government revenue (T): Income originating from 
higher levels of government, which include formula driven payments 
(such as repatriation of income tax), other grant donations from 
higher government levels including national or state governments and 
other types of transfers 
• Percentage of local government transfer (LGT) =( T / R )*100 
• Scoring on the percentage of transfers: 0-25% = 1.0; 25-50% = 0.75; 
50-75% = 0.50 and 75-100%= 0.25 
Transfers in local government revenue (T) = 13,008,380 $ 
Local government revenue (R) = 84,470,000 $ 
Local government revenue transfers = (T/R)*100 (13,008,380 / 
84,470,000)*100 = %15.4 
As scoring on the percentage of transfers: 1.00 
 
Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection 
According to the Syrian Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2015), the actual value of taxes amounted to 
28,862,325 $ of the $ 49,600,689, which is the value of the Mandated (planned) tax to be collected. 
Thus, the rate of tax evasion is almost 50%. 
Table 7: Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection 
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Indicator 4:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Ratio of mandated to actual tax collection 
Effectiveness; Accountability, Participation 
The indicator is measured by identifying the following data: 
• Actual tax collected (C) 
• Mandated (planned) tax to be collected (M) 
• Ratio of mandated to actual tax collected (TC): C/M 
Taxes: municipal rates and levies, any local taxes on the transfer of property 
and any other taxes such as entertainment or hotel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, 
taxes on business which do not reflect the direct provision of services 
(C) = 28,862,325 $ until DEC. 2016 
(M) = 49,600,689 $ planned for 2015-2016  
28,862,325 / 49,600,689 *100 = % 58  
 
Predictability of transfers in local government budget 
Table 8: Predictability of transfers in local government budget 
Indicator 5:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Predictability of transfers in local government budget 
Effectiveness 
1. The effort is to measure whether the local authority knows well in advance 
(2-3 years) about the amount of budget and level of consistency/regularity in 
receiving transfer from higher government. 
The following queries need to be addressed: 
- Is the amount of fund transfers from higher level of govt. (national/state 
known in advance (approx. 2-3 years) of the local budgeting process? 
(Yes/No) 
2. The second important aspect to measure the “basis” of transfers. For 
example, the population in 1999 was 1 million and the transfer was $1 million. 
In 2000, the population was 1.1 million, but the amount of transfers was 
$900,000. In the absence of a strong correlation between the basis and the 
transfer amount, the transfers may not be predictable. 
- Is there a basis to determine the transfer amount? (Yes/No) 
The transfers include the formula driven payments (such as repatriation of 
income tax) and other grant donations from higher government levels 
including national or state governments. (UN-HABITAT, 2004a)  
. 
The answer of this issue is “NO”. 
 
Published performance delivery standards 
There is no formal publication of performance standards for key services delivered by the local authority in 
Damascus 
Table 9: Published performance delivery standards 
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Indicator 6:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Published performance delivery standards 
Effectiveness, accountability 
 The following queries need to be addressed. 
· Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key 
services delivered by the local authority? (PPS) (Yes/No) 
· If yes, what is the number of key services for which the PPS is present (S) 
· What is the total number of key services for which PPDS should be present 
(T) 
· Published performance delivery standards (PPDS) : PPS x S/T 
Key services include: Water supply, electricity, sanitation, solid waste 
management, health, education and others. (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key services 
delivered by the local authority in Damascus? (PPS) NO 
  
 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey 
There is no mechanism to address the Consumer Satisfaction in Damascus governorate.   
Table 10: Consumer Satisfaction Survey 
Indicator 7:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey 
Effectiveness, accountability 
 The following queries need to be addressed. 
· Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key 
services delivered by the local authority? (PPS) (Yes/No) 
· If yes, what is the number of key services for which the PPS is present (S) 
· What is the total number of key services for which PPDS should be present 
(T) 
· Published performance delivery standards (PPDS) : PPS x S/T 
· At what institutional level does the publication of performance standard takes 
place? (Municipality/District/State/Province) 
Key services include: Water supply, electricity, sanitation, solid waste 
management, health, education and others. (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Is there currently a formal publication of performance standards for key 
services delivered by the local authority? No 
 
Existence of vision statement 
Damascus Governorate announced its vision for the next ten years (Damascus 2020) in 2010, and 
includes a comprehensive plan for economic and social development (Damas.Gov ،2012). But this plan 
did not come into force because of the outbreak of a conflict in the beginning of 2011. 
Table 11: Existence of a vision statement 
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Indicator 8:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Existence of a vision statement 
Effectiveness, accountability 
The following queries need to be answered: 
· Is there a vision statement developed for the cities’ future by the local 
government (VS)? (Yes/no) 
· If Yes, has the vision statement been drafted through a participatory process 
(involving local government, civil society and the private sector (PP)? 
(Yes/No) 
· Vision statement (VSE) = 0.5 (VS + PP) 
 If yes, has the vision statement been drafted through a participatory process 
(involving local government, civil society and the private sector (PP)? NO=0  
 Vision statement (VSE) = 0.5 (VS + PP)= 0.5 ( 1+0)= 0.5 (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Is there a vision statement developed for the Damascus future by the local 
government (VS)? Yes= 1  
If yes, has the vision statement been drafted through a participatory process 
(involving local government, civil society and the private sector (PP)? NO=0  
Vision statement (VSE) = 0.5 (VS + PP)= 0.5 ( 1+0)= 0.5 
 
B. Equity 
This indicator focuses on the principle of inclusiveness, which guarantees the right of all members and 
groups of society, especially the economically poor, women, children, religious and ethnic minorities, 
etc., to access basic services in addition to emphasizing the existence of support policies by institutions 
responsible for providing services. 
Citizens’ Charter: right of access to basic services 
There is no published statement (charter) from the local authority which acknowledges citizens’ right 
of access to basic services. 
Table 12: Citizens’ Charter: right of access to basic services 
Indicator 9:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Citizens’ Charter: right of access to basic services 
Equity, accountability 
The Citizen’' Charter may have been drafted by the local authority or 
representative people’s associations. The following queries need to be 
addressed: 
· Is there a signed, published statement (charter) from the local authority 
which acknowledges citizens’ right of access to basic services (CC)? (Yes/No) 
· If yes, what is the number of key services for which the CC is present (S)? 
· What is the total number of key services for which CC should be present (T)? 
· Citizen charter for basic services (CCS) = CC x S/T (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Is there a signed, published statement (charter) from the local authority which 
acknowledges citizens’ right of access to basic services (CC)? NO 
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Women councilors  
This indicator measures the extent to which the principle of gender equality is applied through the 
participation of women in decision-making processes. In the last elections of the Damascus Governorate 
Council, which was held in 2012, the number of women elected was 20 out of 85 elected members of 
the Governorate Council. Ten of the 85 elected members were elected to form the executive office, and 
women had two seats. The membership in executive council considered as a key position (Damas.Gov, 
2012).  
Table 13: Women councilors 
Indicator 10 & 
11:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Women councilors 
Equity 
The following queries need to be addressed: 
- What is the Number of women councilors, both elected and nominated (in the 
last election), as a percentage of the total number of councilors in the local 
authority? 
This can be answered by applying the simple equation: 
X = (We + Wn) x 100  / T 
Where X=Percentage of women councilors; We= No. of women councilors 
elected; Wn= No. of women councilors nominated; T= Total no. of councilors 
in the last elections, Wk- = No. of women in key positions (Mayor, Deputy 
Mayor etc.), Y = Percentage of women in key positions 
· Percentage of women councilors in key positions, can be addressed by: 
Y = Wk x 100 / T 
Additional information: 
· In what year was the most recent election held (e.g. 2001)? 
· What is the frequency of local elections? (e.g. every 3, 4, or 5 years) 
· What is the breakup of women councilors’ position? (Mayor, Deputy Mayor 
etc.) 
We =0         Wn= 20              T= 85 
X = (We + Wn) x 100/T                      20 x 100 / 85= 23.53 % 
Y = Wk x 100 /T              2 x 100 / 85 = 2.35 % 
 
 
Pro-poor pricing policies for water 
This indicator addresses the existence or absence of a pricing policy for water that supports poor areas 
comparing with business and industrial areas. According to the Water Legislation Act No. 31 of 2005 
issued by the Ministry of Water Resources, the pricing of water fees is issued by the central government, 
which is a uniform price in all residential areas regardless of standard of living. The rich are treated like 
the poor, thus, there is no pro-poor pricing policy for water (MOWR, 2014). 
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Table 14: Pro-poor pricing policies for water 
Indicator 12:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Pro-poor pricing policies for water 
Equity 
The pro-poor policy can be evaluated in terms of its content and the actions 
undertaken through the policy. The following queries need to be addressed: 
Is there a pro-poor pricing policy for water? (Yes/No) 
Percentage households with access to water supply (within 200m) 
Median price of water (supplied by the local authority): 
- Informal settlements (poor households) (Wi) 
- Other residents (Wr) 
- Difference in the median water price = Wr-Wi 
In the absence of no data on water price the following information will be 
useful: Is the water price in informal settlements, same or cheaper than the 
other residential areas? (Yes/No) (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Is there a pro-poor pricing policy for water? NO 
Percentage households with access to water supply (within 200m)? 80%  
Is the water price in informal settlements, same or cheaper than the other residential 
areas? NO 
 
Incentives for informal businesses 
This indicator examines whether the government's policy toward informal business is stimulating or 
discouraging. According to Trade Law No. 33 of 2007, there are particular areas in the central retail 
areas of Damascus where small scale (informal) street vending is not allowed particularly in the old city, 
but specific areas are allocated in the city's general plan to do this kind of business under specific 
conditions. The law also includes incentives for informal markets and seasonal exhibitions with a 
cultural and entertaining character (Parliament, 2007).  
Table 15: Incentives for informal businesses 
Indicator 13:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Incentives for informal businesses 
Equity 
The informal nature of this activity would render it difficult to quantify in 
absolute terms. 
However, the following simple queries will determine the local government's 
effort to support 
the informal sector, thus signifying principles of equity: 
- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where 
small scale (informal) street vending is not allowed? (Yes/No) 
- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of the city where 
small scale street vending is submitted to particular restrictions? (Yes/ No) 
- Are there any other incentives like information pubic markets, municipal 
fairs? (Yes/No) (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
The indicator addressed as follow:  
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- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of Damascus where 
small scale (informal) street vending is not allowed? Yes  
- Are there any particular areas in the central retail areas of Damascus where 
small scale street vending is submitted to particular restrictions? Yes  
Are there any other incentives like information pubic markets, municipal fairs? Yes 
 
 
C. Participation 
The participation index consists of five indicators that address the public participation in the selection 
of their representatives on a democratic basis, as well as examine the presence of institutions 
representing civil society and ensure their rights in the decision-making processes in the city. 
Elected council  
The number of members of local councils shall be determined in accordance with Article 13 of the Local 
Administration Law as follows (MOLA, 2014): 
• Governorate Council: A representative of every 10,000 citizens with at least 50 members and 
not more than 100 members. 
The governorate council is elected by the population through a democratic process. The elected members 
are distributed to committees that follow the work of the governorate council. Ten members representing 
the executive office are appointed and each member is responsible for a major sector in the governorate 
(education, tourism, trade, transport, etc.). 
Table 16: Elected Council 
Indicator 14:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Elected Council 
Participation; Effectiveness  
The indicator is measured by a simple ‘yes/no’ questions that should however 
be verified 
- Are councilors locally elected? (Yes/No) 
- If the councilors are both elected as well as appointed, please provide the 
distribution (% appointed and % elected) (UN-HABITAT, 2004a). 
Are Members of the Damascus Governorate Council locally elected? Yes 
 
 
Selection of mayor 
Article 39 of the Local Administration Law provides that: In each governorate, the Mayor is appointed 
and dismissed from office by presidential decree and is considered a member of the executive branch 
(MOLA, 2014). 
Table 17: Selection of Mayor 
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Indicator 15:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Selection of Mayor 
Participation; Effectiveness, Accountability 
The indicator is measured by providing a simple Yes/No: 
- What is the process of selecting the Mayor? 
- Directly elected 
- Elected amongst councilors 
- Appointed 
Intermediate scores have been applied towards this indicator, directly elected 
(1.0), elected amongst councilors (0.75) and appointed (0.50). (UN-
HABITAT, 2004a) 
The mayor of Damascus is appointed by the President. 
Score: 0.5 
 
Voter turnout 
This indicator addresses the participation of citizen (male and female) in the last election. Elections of 
the Damascus Governorate Council are usually held every four years (MOLA, 2014), and the last 
elections were in 2012 and no elections were held after because of the current conflict. According to the 
Ministry of Interior, the number of voters 595980 out of 1386000 people who are entitled to vote legally 
(MOI, 2012). 
Table 18: Voter turnout 
Indicator 16:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Voter turnout 
Participation, Equity, Accountability, Effectiveness  
Voter turnout (both male and female) in percentage is simple indicator that measures voter 
participation. 
Additional information: 
- What is the frequency of elections? 
- Which year was the last election held?  
 
595980 = Voter 1386, 000= Constituent population  
595980 /  1386, 000 x 100= 0.43% 
- What is the frequency of elections? four years  
- Which year was the last election held? 2012 
 
  
 
Public forum 
This indicator examines the existence of any form of public gathering that brings citizens together with 
their representatives in local governments at the neighboring, regional or city levels to ensure deeper 
involvement in the decision-making process. In Damascus, there is no public forum, but the 
representation of the people is limited to the elected members of the Governorate Council. 
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Table 19: Public forum 
Indicator 17:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Public forum 
Participation  
The indicator is measured by a simple ‘yes/no’ question with additional open-
ended information on the type of public forum. 
- Is there any public forum for the citizens to express their views? (Yes/No) 
- If yes, please provide information on the type of public forum, frequency 
(how many times in a month or year) of such forums. (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
- Is there any public forum for the citizens to express their views? No 
 
Civic Association per 10,000 population  
The indicator examines the vitality of civic life in the city. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
there are 126 organizations in Damascus governorate Distributed between civil society organizations 
CSOs and non-governmental organizations NGOs (MSA, 2014). The comparison between the 
population of Damascus and the number of civil society organizations shows the inefficiency of these 
organizations to meet the requirements of civic life. 
Table 20: Civic Associations per 10,000 population 
Indicator 18:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Civic Associations per 10,000 population 
Participation, Equity, Accountability, Effectiveness, Security 
The total city population is divided into clusters of 10,000. Divide the city’s population 
first by 
10,000 and then by the number of civic associations registered with the local authority.  
C= 10,000 x N/Y 
C is the Civic association per thousand populations; N is the number of Civic Associations 
and Y is the Total Urban Population. 
 
The indicator assessed by following formula: C= 10,000 x N/Y which C is the Civic 
association per thousand populations; N is the number of Civic Associations and Y is 
the Total Urban Population.  
N= 126 Y= 2.350.000 …10,000 x 126 / 2350, 000 = 0.54 per 10,000 
 
 
D. Accountability 
Accountability guarantees that the key decisions and actions that conducted by public and private actors 
and government officials are subject to review and evaluation. In doing so, government policies and 
private sector practices must meet the needs of the civil society. In other word, creating robust 
interrelationships based on trust between the key stockholders involved good governance. 
Formal Publication of contracts/tenders budgets and accounts 
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The Contracts Law 51 includes the methods of securing the needs of the public bodies and establishes 
a framework a framework for tenders and contracts within them. This system applies to all public bodies 
in the State, be it administrative, economic or construction, except for the Ministry of Defense and its 
non-construction institutions and subsidiaries. Law 51 was approved by the Syrian Parliament on 24 
November 2004 and is still ongoing.  
Article 10 of Law 51 of the Contracts Act provides that (Damascus University, 2011): 
A- Tender Announcement must be published in official advertisement bulletin and in a daily 
newspapers, copies of these advertisements must be posted in the public sector bulletin board 
as well. In addition, the tender may be advertised on radio, television and other media. The 
parties concerned may also be notified of the tender and notified to the accredited Syrian Arab 
foreign trade missions and missions and foreign missions accredited in Syria. 
B- The announcement of the tender shall include at least the following data: 
- The subject of the tender. 
- Place and time to submit bids and the tender session. 
- The required temporary and final deposit. 
- The entity where the tender file can be purchased 
- The price of the file. 
- Duration of undertaking. 
- The period during which the bidder will remain attached to the offer. 
This law provides some kind of financial transparency that allows the general public to understand the 
mechanism of financing and contracting within the Damascus governance in general and the urban 
administration in particular. 
Table 21: Formal Publication of contracts/tenders, budgets & accounts 
Indicator 19:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Formal Publication of contracts/tenders, budgets & accounts 
Accountability (Transparency), Participation, Equity, Effectiveness 
A formal publication process may be assessed through regular mass 
publication of contracts, tenders, budgets and accounts of the local 
government's activities. 
- Is there a formal publication of: 
- Contracts and tenders? (Yes/No) 
- Budgets and accounts? (Yes/No) 
- What is the medium of publication of the standards? (E.g. Newspaper, radio, 
Internet, notice board etc.) 
- Is there a formal publication of:  
-Contracts and tenders? Yes  
-Budgets and accounts? Yes  
What is the medium of publication of the standards? Newspaper , National TV 
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Control by higher levels of Government This indicator measures the extent to which the central 
government controls the policy and decisions of the local government 
Decentralization is at the forefront of the LAL (Local Administration Law) objectives. Article 2 of the 
Legislative Decree No. 107 of 2011, which includes the LAL, provides for the following (MOLA, 2014): 
1. Decentralize powers and responsibilities and concentrate them in the hands of the people in 
accordance with the principle of democracy, which makes the people the source of every 
authority through the expansion and clear identification of the powers of the Local 
administrative unit’s councils, in order to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities in the 
economic, social, cultural and urban development. 
2. Creating local administrative units capable of planning, implementing and setting development 
plans for the local community and executing their own projects efficiently and effectively by 
modifying the levels of administrative units and determining their local structure in line with 
their basic function, adding a number of specific functions and making administrative units at 
all levels directly responsible for Services, economy, culture and all matters of interest to 
citizens in these units. In this regard, the role of the central authorities is limited to planning, 
legislation, organization, the introduction of modern technology and the implementation of 
major projects that cannot implement the Administrative units. 
3. Enhancing the financial revenues of the administrative units to enable them to exercise the 
developmental role in the local community and to make this society responsible for maintaining 
its resources and developing them to improve the living standards of citizens, in addition to 
provide better services and development of economic and development opportunities within the 
administrative units which helps in providing job opportunities and creating a state of 
integration between the service role and the developmental role. 
Although the idea of decentralization has been adopted in LAL, the central government still taking 
control on many local decisions. For example, according to Article 122 of LAL, the president has right 
to close the local government and remove councilors from their offices. In addition, according to the 
Legislative Decree No. 54 of 2006 including the Basic Financial Law, the set of local taxes and service 
charges is limited to the central government, specifically the Ministry of Finance (Syrian Finance, 2007). 
Article 139 provides that the local government has the right to borrow funds in the following manner 
(MOLA, 2014): 
1. LG shall have the right to obtain advances and credit facilities by a decision of the Council in 
accordance with the laws and regulations in force and in light of its budget. 
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2. LG shall borrow loans from banks and funds for the execution of its various projects in 
accordance with the provisions applied in the lenders and in light of its budget. 
1. The Council may not grant loans or advances to others except by a legislative text. 
2. Loans may be obtained from foreign parties in coordination with the concerned authorities in 
accordance with the laws and regulations in force.  
Table 22: Control by higher levels of Government 
Indicator 20:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Control by higher levels of Government 
Accountability(Responsiveness), Effectiveness, Participation 
The indicator is measured by a simple “yes” or “no” to the following 
questions: 
- Can higher levels of government (National, State /provincial): 
- Close the local government? (Yes/No) 
- Remove councilors from office? (Yes/No) 
- If the higher level of government can remove the councilors, what is the 
process? 
- Can the local government, without permission from higher governments: 
- Set local tax levels? 
- Set user charges for services? 
- Borrow funds? 
- Choose contractors for projects? (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
1.Can higher levels of government (National, State /provincial):  
 Close the local government? (Yes)  
 Remove councilors from office? (Yes)  
2.Can the local government, without permission from higher governments:  
- Set local tax levels? NO  
- Set user charges for services? NO  
- Borrow funds? NO  
- Choose contractors for projects? No 
 
 
Codes of conduct This Code is based on the principles of justice, equality of opportunity, transparency, 
accountability and professional integrity. It aims to establish an ethical standards, basic rules and 
principles for public morality, values and a high professional culture among elected officials and local 
government staff and Civil society, promoting compliance with these standards, norms and values, and 
establishing good governance through sensitizing civil servants and directing them towards proper 
functional ethics and self-discipline frameworks governing the conduct Working in the civil service and 
in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, as well as through a statement of their duties and 
responsibilities their role in improving services and enhancing public service credibility. In addition, it 
seeks to enhance the confidence of citizens and recipients of the public service in the work of 
governmental institutions, and increase respect and appreciation for their role in providing Services in 
the best way possible (UN-HABITAT, 2004a).  
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In Damascus, there is no a signed, published statement of standards of conduct citizens are entitled to 
from their elected officials and local government staff. 
Table 23: Codes of conduct 
Indicator 21:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Codes of conduct 
Accountability(Responsiveness), Effectiveness, Participation 
The following queries need to be addressed: 
- Is there a signed, published statement of standards of conduct citizens are 
entitled to from their elected officials and local government staff? (Yes/No) 
- At what institutional level are these codes of conduct prescribed? 
(Municipality, 
State/Province) 
- If the codes of conduct are prescribed at the District/State/Province level are 
they applied to local councilors? (Yes/No) 
- Please submit a copy of the published code of conduct. (UN-HABITAT, 
2004a) 
 
- Is there a signed, published statement of standards of conduct citizens are 
entitled to from their elected officials and local government staff? NO 
 
Facility for citizen complaints.  This indicator examines if there is a facility that receives complaints 
from citizens regarding services and public affairs in addition to corruption information.  
There is a specialized office in the Damascus Governorate to receive complaints from citizens 
(Damas.gov, 2006). In addition to the complaints service through the website of the Ministry 
of Local Administration and Environment (MOLA, 2017).   
Despite the existence of a party responsible for citizens’ complaints, there is no transparency in 
dealing with them, because of the lack of statistics for the number of complaints and 
mechanisms to follow them. 
Table 24: cility for citizen complaints 
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Indicator 22:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Facility for citizen complaints 
Accountability (Integrity, Corruption: Disincentives & Protection), 
Participation, Effectiveness 
A simple “yes” or “no” measures the existence of the facility while 
“percentage of complaints addressed” measures the level of responsiveness. 
The following questions are elaborated: 
1. Are there any facilities or mechanisms to receive complaints or grievances 
from citizens? (Yes/No) 
2. Is there any official appointed to receive and respond to complaints against 
public authorities (Yes/No) 
3. Percentage of complaints addressed (Pc) 
Pc = (Ta/Tc) x 100 
Tc= Total number of registered complaints (last 1 year) and 
Ta = Total number of cases addressed (UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
Are there any facilities or mechanisms to receive complaints or grievances 
from citizens? Yes  
Is there any official appointed to receive and respond to complaints against 
public authorities? Yes  
 
Anti-Corruption Commission This indicator explores the existence of a body that takes on 
accountability and investigation of corruption cases. There is a Directorate within the Damascus 
governorate specializes in internal monitoring (Damas.gov., 2006). This Directorate monitors the 
services and assesses the performance of the administrative units in addition to submitting corruption 
reports to the Central Authority for the Supervision and Inspection (CASI) which is an independent 
regulatory body linked to the Prime Minister and aims to achieve effective control over the work of the 
various departments and institutions of the State in order to develop administrative work, protect public 
funds and achieve efficiency in production. (CASI, 2015). 
Table 25: Anti-corruption Commission 
Indicator 23:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Anti-corruption Commission  
 
Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection), Participation, Equity 
 
A simple “yes” or “no” can measure the indicator. 
- Is there a local agency to investigate and report cases of corruption? (Yes/No) (UN-
HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
- Is there a local agency to investigate and report cases of corruption? Yes 
(Damascus branch of the Central Authority for the Supervision and Inspection) 
(CASI, 2015) 
 
Disclosure of income/assets this indicator examines the income of elected officials and the source of 
their funds and property.  In Damascus, there is no mechanism that forces officials to disclose their 
salaries and source of income.  
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Table 26: Disclosure of income/ assets 
Indicator 24:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Disclosure of income/ assets 
 
Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection) 
- Prior to taking office, are locally elected officials required by law to publicly 
disclose: 
Personal income (Yes/No) 
Personal assets (Yes/No) 
Immediate family income (Yes/No) 
Immediate family assets (Yes/No) 
- Are local office bearers' incomes and assets regularly monitored? (Yes/No) 
(UN-HABITAT, 2004a) 
 
- Prior to taking office, are locally elected officials required by law to publicly 
disclose:  
Personal income  (No) 
Personal assets (No) 
Immediate family income (No)  
Immediate family assets (No) 
- Are local office bearers' incomes and assets regularly monitored? (No) 
 
Independent audit this indicator addresses the existence of regular independent audit of municipal 
accounts. This process is conducted internally in Damascus municipality by Internal Monitoring 
Directorate (Damas.gov., 2006), and externally by Central Authority for the Supervision and Inspection 
(CASI, 2015). 
Table 27: Independent audit 
Indicator 25:  
Principle(s): 
Methodology: 
Independent audit 
 
Accountability (Corruption: Disincentives & Protection) 
 
A simple “yes” or “no” can measure this indicator. 
Is there a regular independent audit of municipal accounts? (Yes/ No) 
Is the audit external or internal? 
Additional information: Which entity is responsible for the regular 
independent audit of municipal accounts? 
 
Is there a regular independent audit of municipal accounts? Yes 
Is the audit external or internal? Both external and internal  
Which entity is responsible for the regular independent audit of municipal 
accounts? Internal Monitoring Directorate. 
 
 
 
5.2.3. URBAN GOVERNANCE INDEX CALCULATION 
Effectiveness sub-index 
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Table 28: Effectiveness sub-index 
No. Indicator Data 
(X) 
Formula Result Weigh
t 
Total 
1 Local Government revenue 
per capita (LGR) 
$ 1.4 LGR = (log X - log min)/ (log 
max - log min) min=2.3 
max=1340  
(0.146 – 0.361) / (3.127 – 0.361) 
= -0.215 / 2.766= -0.08 
-0.08 0.25 -0.02 
2 Ratio of recurrent and capital 
budget (RRC)= R/C 
 Recurrent budget = R, 
Capita Budget = C 
1.35 RRC = (log X - log min)/(log 
max - log min) min= 0.09 
max=8.37  
RRC= (0.13 - -1.04) / (0.92- -
1.04) = (1.17 / 1.96) = 0.59 
0.59 0.10 0.059 
3 Ratio of mandated to actual 
tax collected (TC) 
 TC = 58/100 0.58 0.10 0.058 
 
a. Mandated tax to be collected 100% 
    
 
b. Actual tax collected 58% 
    
4 Local government revenue 
transfer (LGT) 
%15.4 LGT = 1 (0 – 25%=1, 25 
50%=0.75, 50-75%=0.50, 75-
100%=0.25) 
1.00 0.10 0.10 
5  Predictability of transfers in 
local government budget 
(PoT) 
No = 0 PoT = X 0.00 0.10 0.00 
6 Published performance 
delivery standards (PPDS) 
 PPDS = PPS x S/T= 1 x 1 / 5= 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.03 
 
a. Published performance 
delivery standards (PPS) 
NO=0 PPS   
 
 
b. No. of key services for 
which the PPDS is present 
(S); c. Total no. of key 
services for which PPDS 
should be present (T) i 
 -   
 
7 Consumer satisfaction 
survey (CSS) 
No = 0 CSS = 0 0  0.10 0 
8 Vision statement effective 
(VSE) 
 VSE = 0.5 (VS + PP)= 0.5 ( 
1+0)= 0.5 
0.50  0.10 0.05 
 
a. Vision statement (VS) 3 Yes = 1 VS = X 1.00  
 
 
b. Vision statement drafted 
through a participatory 
process (PP) 
No = 0 PP = X 
 
0.00  
 
 
 
 Effectiveness sub-index    0.277 
 
Equity sub-index 
 
Table 29: Equity sub-index 
 
No. Indicator Data 
(X) 
Formula Result Weight Total 
1 Citizens charter for basic 
services (CCS) 
 CCS = CC * S/T 0.00 0.25 0.00 
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a. Citizens’ charter (CC) No = 0 CC = 0    
 
b. No. of key services for 
which the CC is present (S) 
 c. Total no. of key services 
for which CC should be 
present (T) 
S=0 
T=5 
    
2 Percentage of women 
councilors (WC) 
23.53 % WC = 23.53 x 2/100 0.47 0.20 0.094 
3 Percentage women in key 
positions (WK) 
2.35 % WK = 2.35 x 2/100 0.047 0.10 0.0047 
4 Percentage households 
with water connection (HH 
wat) 
80%  HH wat.= 80/100 0.80 0.15 0.12 
5  Existence of pro-poor 
policy (PPC) 
No = 0  PPC = X 0.00 0.10 0.00 
6 Is water price cheaper for 
poor settlements? (WP) 
No = 0 WP = X 0.00 0.10 0.00 
7 Incentives for informal 
market (IM) 
 IM = 1 (any one of a, b or c) 1.00 0.15 0.15 
 
a. Street vending not 
allowed 
Yes = 1  1.00   
 
b. Street vending with 
restrictions 
Yes = 1  1.00   
 
c. Public fairs, municipal 
market 
Yes = 1  1.00   
 
 
 Equity sub-index    0.369 
 
 Participation sub-index 
 
Table 30:  Participation sub-index 
No. Indicator Data (X) Formula Result Weight Total 
1 Elected council (EC) Yes = 1 EC = X 1.00 0.15 0.15 
2 Locally elected Mayor 
(LEM) 
Appointed  LEM = 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.075 
3 Voter turnout (VT) 43% VT = x/100 0.43 0.10 0.043 
4 Peoples’ forum (PC) No= 0 PF = X 0.00 0.15 0.00 
5  Civic associations per 
10,000 pop (CA) 
X = 0.54 
per 10000 
CA = (Log 0.54 – Log 
0.49)/(Log 72.79 – Log 0.49) 
min= 0.49; max= 72.79  
(-0.267- -0.309)/( 1.862 - -
0.309) =0.042/2.171 
0.02 0.25 0.005 
 
  Participation sub-index    0.273 
 
Accountability sub-index 
 
Table 31: Accountability sub-index 
No. Indicator Data 
(X) 
Formula Result Weight Total 
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1 Formal Publication (FP)  CTBA = Average (CT + BA) 1.00 0.20 0.20 
 
a. Formal publication: 
contracts and tenders (CT) 
Yes = 1 CLG = 1 1.00   
 
b. Formal publication: 
budget and accounts (BA) 
Yes = 1 BA = 1 1.00   
2.1 Control by higher Govt. (CG)  CG = Average (CLG+RC) 0.00 0.07 0.00 
 
a. Control by higher Govt.: 
close local government (CLG) 
Yes = 0 1 CLG = X 0.00   
 
b. Control by higher Govt: 
removal of councilors (RC) 
Yes = 0 RC = X 0.00   
2.2 Local government authorities (LGA) 
 LGA = Average 
(SLT+SYC+BF+CP) 
0.50 0.08 0.04 
 
c. Local government: set local 
tax levels (SLT) 
No = 0 SLT = X 0.00   
 
d. Local government: set user 
charges for services (SUC) 
No =0 SUC = X 0.00   
 
e. Local government: borrow 
funds (BF) 
Yes =1 BF = X 1.00   
 
f. Local government: choose 
contractors for projects (CP) 
Yes = 1 CP = X 1.00   
3 Codes of conduct (CoC) No = 0 CoC= X 0.00 0.10 0.00 
4 Facilities to receive 
complaints (FRC) 
 FRC = Average (OA + EF) 1.00 0.10 0.10 
 
b. Official appointed to receive 
complaints on public 
authorities (OA) 
Yes = 1  1.00   
 
c. Exclusive facility to receive 
complaints on corruption (EF) 
Yes = 1  1.00   
5 Anti-corruption commission (ACC) 
Yes = 1 ACC = X 1.00 0.15 0.15 
6 Personal Income and assets (PIA) 
NA PIA = (0.75* Average PIA + FIA) + 
0.25* IAM 
0.00 0.15 0.00 
 
a. Disclosure of personal 
income and assets (PIA) 
No= 0 PIA = X 0.00   
 
b. Disclosure of family’s 
income and assets (FIA) 
No= 0 FIA = X 0.00   
7 Regular independent audit (RIA) 
Yes=1 IAM = X 1.00 0.15 0.225 
 
  Accountability sub-index    0.715 
 
Average of Urban Governance Index = (Effectiveness sub-index + Equity sub-index + Participation 
sub-index + Accountability sub-index) = (0.277 + 0.369 + 0.273 + 0.715) / 4 = 0. 4085 
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Figure 12: Urban Governance Index in Damascus (author) 
5.3. URBAN GOVERNANCE ACTORS IN DAMASCUS  
5.3.1. STATE AUTHORITIES OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Governmental institutions in Syria descend in a hierarchical manner from head authorities to 
governorates or junior management (Figure 13). Development plans of five years, related to social, 
economic, and environmental issues, are often prepared by the state planning commission (SPC) in 
cooperation with related government organization.  Plans related to urban development and land-use 
involve the ministry of local administration, which is considered the most important one, the ministry 
of religious endowments, which is the largest landholder, the ministry of tourism, the ministry of state 
for environmental affairs, the ministry of housing and construction, and the ministry of culture. 
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Before the legislative decree No. 64 was issued in 2004, the ministry of Housing and Construction 
carried the policy making while the ministry of Local administration carried the implementation of the 
urban planning policy. The decree assigned the urban planning activity to the ministry of Local 
Administration affairs in cooperation with the ministry of Housing and Construction through the general 
company of engineering studies and consulting established in 1980 to administrate the studying, 
designing, and supervising the regional and local projects. The general company also provides input and 
advices to the local government and other organization and ministries consulting designing plans. 
According to law No.15 in 1971, cities, towns, villages, and farms’ urban development is administered 
by governorates. Governorates are local administrative forms, headed by a governor, and have councils 
made of elected members. A few of these members form an executive office that works with the 
governorate’s directorates on local issues according to its specialty in coordination with other ministries 
(Hasan, 2012).  
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Figure 14: The organizational structure of local administration Source: (Hasan, 2012) 
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The governorate of Damascus consists of two bodies (figure15). The first one is the council which 
includes elected members with a ratio of one representative per 10,000 citizens. This council form an 
executive office of 10 members, and a regional executive committee of 12 members. second a total of 
18 directorates each responsible for different activities ranging from health, education, and civil security, 
to local urban development issues and land use, which are later operated by the urban planning 
directorate (relating to areas in Damascus outside the old city), in addition to Damascus old city 
directorate (relating to the areas inside the old city wall). Both directorates control the master planning 
and its instalment and application in Damascus city. Although the governorate of Damascus owns a 
great power in the local administration of urban development and the ability of modifying urban 
planning regulation, it still functions under the plans presented by the ministry of legal affairs. (Haddad, 
2009). 
The directorate of executive service department, which is at the bottom of the urban development 
organizational hierarchy, is responsible for monitoring urban development and providing services on a 
neighborhood scale. This department contains 11 executive service departments, monitoring 62 
neighborhoods according to (Haddad, 2009) where each one of the executive department covers between 
1-12 neighborhoods according to the number of the neighborhood’s population, the ESD keeps direct 
contact with the residence to provide local services, maintenance works and administrate the 
implementation of major development and works to prevent illegal activities from spreading within the 
area. In addition to all the responsibility of the ESD, it is the governorate local body who has direct 
contact with the communities from the neighborhood though monthly meeting discussing the local 
development and services with local mayors of the neighborhood, which is considered the representer 
of the residence to convey their views through their committee to the authorities. The neighborhood’s 
committee is formed by members of major families with members chosen by the governorate along with 
elected preventives of the local, but the rapid urban development of the cities caused the absence of 
local committee from the development operation, due to that in recent meeting the local committee were 
not invited in order to have faster decision and avoid the potential objection of those committees, and 
with the social changes and the reside of new groups constantly in Damascus, those committees were 
less involved in the meetings, and the member elected for the consul could not be part of the committee 
and on the other hand the allocated member by the gubernator are not interested with the concern of a 
neighborhood because they are not necessarily from that neighborhood. 
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Figure 15: The organisational structure of the Governorate of Damascus focussing on urban development related 
responsible departments. Source: (Hasan, 2012) 
Under the law No.15 from 1971, the council has two section relating local urban development, first one, 
governorate executive office and the second is the regional executive committee, the GEO is operating 
the local development plans preparation, while REC is the master of decision making in development 
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plans and the application of them, which gives the council big impact on decision-making and public 
participation in local urban development. While in the case of Damascus city center the final call in 
decision making of urban development is to the ministry of legal affairs, and that include the other cities 
centers in Syria. 
The main form charged of the development issue in the local social services, public construction studies 
and the preparation of master plan is the governorate executive office consisting of 10 members chosen 
by the central government. Those tasks are in cooperation with related sectors in the governorate, or 
directly with the ministries if the plan concern bigger areas. 
However the regional executive committee member is composed by the governor, a part of GEO, the 
executive services director, the administrator of urban planning from DESD, the head and the director 
of the executive affairs of the related municipality (the director doesn’t vote), the monuments director 
in the governorate of the area, two urban planners and one expert in urban planning legislation, a member 
from the union of the related association (elected democratically) and a representative of the related 
ministry (allocated). The legalizing of the urban development plans and issuing planning permission is 
the regional executive council REC responsibility, but this work is under the supervision of the ministry 
of legal affairs, especially in the case of the city center plans. Other areas in Damascus planning 
permission for detailed master plan are directly issued by the REC without consulting the ministry of 
Local administration. In the case of the REC didn’t have decision due to inefficient votes, then the 
application is under the revision of the ministry for final decision (Hasan, 2012). (See figure) 
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Figure 16: Urban development decision making process Source (Hasan ،2012) 
 
  
In the end, the main role of Damascus local government is carried by: UPD, DOD (old city) and DESD 
in relating the urban development of the aspect of land-use. UPD and DOD control the preparation for 
planning and the application of the process, while DESD through its ESD is responsible of the managing 
and providing local services, and monitoring the instalment of the regulations of the planning in the 
neighborhood level, in some cases the DESD supervision the development of the project implementation 
with its area. Since the GEO is the main entity to suggest development plan strategies and designs, it 
verified the governorates authorities. Those strategies and designs are revised and amended by REC. 
But the control of approving master plan development is the ministry of Local administration 
responsibility, however the detailed plans on neighborhood level is approved by the governorate council 
(Hasan, 2012). 
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5.3.2. DAMASCUS ECONOMY 
According to (JICA, 2009), the economy of Damascus gains its strength from the fact that Damascus 
plays the role of the capital administratively, legislatively, touristically and financially with a large size 
of investment and labor force. 
The industrial sector in the city is mostly run by the state and includes various activities like chemical 
industries, textile, conservative foods and construction materials like cement. However, due to the 
liberalization policies in the early 2000s, a privatization process on a small scale started to happen and 
some industries had been led by the private sector, while the traditional handicraft industries were 
located in the heart of the old city (John F. Devlin, 2016). 
The public and the private sectors are both involved and run the economic activities in Damascus. 
Despite the control of the state over the large economic activities, when it comes to the Services sector 
like finance, communications, trade and education, there is a fierce competition from the private sector. 
Due to that and the fact that many medium and small sized enterprises are run by the private sector, it is 
becoming a major employer in the city.  
According to (Lorka K., 2009), many factors led to the growth of the private sector to become an 
essential employer in the city, which are: 
 The growing freedom given to the private sector 
 The state’s failure to restructure the public sector which led to a privatization movement. 
 The failure of the public sector in competing internationally. 
 The lack of new graduates provided by the state. 
The informal settlements located on the edges of the city also play a role in the economic equation in 
the city of Damascus. These settlements held several informal economic activities that are growing as 
fast as these settlements and their effect on the economic situation in Damascus is significant. Most of 
these economic activities are the real estate, trading and small manufactures. However, the location or 
the effect of these informal activities is not only within the informal settlements but exceeds it to the 
urban areas of the city.  
 
According to (Abdin, 2008) (Jenkins, 2002), despite that these activities are not formal, there is a locally-
based social network on a high level of organization and includes some important members in the public 
sector who will make sure of the tolerance of the local authorities with these activities. Many regulations 
regarding the market restructure and the economic situation were issued but none of them affected the 
informal economic activities truly, because it has a very strong position in the market. However, these 
activities are all happening on a small scale which does not have a significant effect. 
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Due to the existence of the majority of the administrative and executive bodies of the economic activities 
of the public sector in Damascus besides the biggest private formal activities, the city has the best 
employment rate in the country. However, Damascus’s charm was not only because of its economic 
growth and job opportunities but for being the largest educational center in the country. This made 
Damascus the city number one for internal emigration for work purposes or education. This led to a 
significant growth of the city since 1990s till now.  
According to (CBoS, 2007), the labor force in Damascus has a higher skill level than other labor forces 
in other cities. The reason for that is due to the educational achievements done in the last years. In 
addition, the recent competition between the private and the public sector to attract a highly skilled labor 
force. Therefore, it is expected that the formal employment rates will decline and the informal 
employment will grow.  
To sum up, Damascus has one of the largest and strongest economies in the country which is reflected 
on the employment rates too. The formal economic activities were mostly controlled by the public sector 
until the private sector started to dominate the market due to many factors like the low productivity of 
the public sector and the freedom given to the private sector. In addition, the desire of both public and 
private sectors to hire highly skilled labor force led to a significant growth of the informal economic 
activities supported by a wide and well developed social networks that has relation to the public sector 
in order to provide protection for these activities. 
A strong state-market relationship was established in terms of formal and informal activities due to the 
unique and diverse market environment that has been created as a result of the nature of the economy 
Damascus has.  It is undoubtable that this relationship exists in the area of planning governance. 
5.3.3. DAMASCUS CIVIL SOCIETY 
The population of Damascus is made of a diverse combination of various ethnicities and 
religions (Fakoush, 2009). The structure of the formal civil society in Damascus is well-
organized, but its function space is limited to a few economic, social, and environmental 
matters, and has a tight supervision from relevant ministries. In the GoD, formal CSOs represent 
various civil society interests, but the effectiveness and extent of this representation vary from 
one CSO to another according to its size, activeness, and organizational structure (Anon., 2015).  
After 2001, most economic CSOs were founded. The number of these CSOs is still small and 
they are mainly in the form of professional and business non-profit organizations that advocate 
market opportunities and cooperation with international parties. It is worth mentioning that 
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CSOs with an economic function are established under the guidance of and with the consent of 
the MoET (Anon., 2015) 
Social CSOs are those that are mainly involved with capacity building, provision of services, 
and cultural functions. The majority of socially-based CSOs are in the form of charities that 
provide assistance with the costs of health services, food, and clothing, in addition to orphan 
support. Religion CSOs in Damascus are active, but their activities mainly consist of praying, 
preaching, and charity fundraising. There is a small number of development CSOs in 
Damascus. However, most of them work in evaluating public awareness regarding matters 
associated with the environment and built-heritage. These CSOs could have an impact on 
development decision-making in case a representative is called out to attend the GoD 
workshops or REC meetings on related developments. Nevertheless, development-based 
organizations established after 2007 are currently concentrating on capacity-building and 
awareness of the significance of attitude-changing as a way to promote learning and cultural, 
heritage, and rural development. These function via effective partnerships with governmental, 
international, and private organizations. All social SCOs work under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL). 
Although formal CSOs are well-organized and a number of them being effective in their areas 
of function, wider community groups are still not included in them, in terms of representation 
and delivery of services. This is coupled with the inability of local authorities to cope with the 
significant demographic changes in the city over the preceding 60 years and the private-sector 
only being involved in providing service to societal groups of medium and high economic 
status, which do not represent much of the population of Damascus. 
Consequently, informal, grassroots, and community organizations have developed in the shape 
of economic, social, and cultural practices. These are basically based on rural traditions, 
considering that a large portion of Damascus' inhabitants have emigrated from rural areas, but 
are widely altered by the urban setting. These informal CSOs are very effective when it comes 
to the delivery of services, and are normally represented through family elders or members of 
the community that are well-connected with the private sector and local authorities by kin 
relationships. This delivers services to those who are not represented via formal CSOs or those 
who are financially disadvantaged and cannot fulfill their needs by the formal ways of 
representation or market (Hasan, 2012). 
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To sum up, the civil society in Damascus have a religious and ethnic diversity. There are two 
kinds of organizational structure that define the relationship between the city’s community and 
the private and the state sectors. The first one is the formal civil society structure which is 
reflected in various CSOs; mostly social, economic, or environment-based. These CSOs range 
in their representation and effectiveness level in regards to service delivery. Nevertheless, the 
poor autonomy of these CSOs, along with the government’s incompetence in covering the 
service needs of the society, and the lack of interest of the private sector in investing in social 
services, has resulted in the occurrence of the second type of civil society. This type is informal 
and based on kin relationship. However, it has shown to be more effective in the delivery of 
services and more representative of the needs of the locals. That is established via its strong 
connection with the local authorities, the private-sector, and formal CSOs. 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
The results of the analysis show that “accountability” takes the lead in the city’s ratings for the various 
elements, with “participation” coming in last. For Damascus, the urban governance rating based on the 
UGI is 0.4085. Regarding the four elements that make up the UGI, Damascus is at the top of the list for 
“accountability” with a rating of 0.715, and also has prevalent scores in “equity” at 0.369, 
“effectiveness” at 0.277, and “participation” at 0.273 (Figure 12). The leading accountability rating can 
be attributed to the recent advancements in improving accountability and transparency tools in relation 
to their composition and execution by the Central Authority for the Supervision and Inspection. The low 
result for participation could be attributed to the fact that there was no openly elected mayor, a lack of 
voter patronage in the last election, and a somewhat low amount of civic relations in Damascus. 
The analysis of good urban governance, as previously visited in chapter 2, requires not only the exact 
indicators, but also the standards by which the proportions are to be gauged. This analysis referred to 
the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Index’s standards to create an index of Damascus’ city governance, 
which revealed the most fragile element in Damascus urban governance to be participation. There are a 
strategic collection of indicators within the UGI approach that can be used as an initial observational 
mechanism with the objective of organizing data and information related to Damascus urban 
governance. A basis for and overall image of current governance is provided by the analysis and 
accommodates an evaluation of the results. However, there are some flaws in exercising the UGI 
approach, and there were some serious difficulties presented in the analysis of urban governance 
concerns in Damascus. Urban governance can be described as the outcome of interrelations, 
associations, and networks connecting various actors involved in city governance. The concern is that 
of the UGI’s ability to comprehensively gauge these exchanges for the whole collection of actors who 
Urban Governance in War-Torn Countries 
 
107 
 
are meant to partake in urban governance in Damascus. This study confronts this concern by offering 
an acute observation of the actors in the urban governance in Damascus and their communications. 
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, the UN-Index is fully founded on employing only Data 
is derived from the statistics, documents and laws of government agencies that may suffer from lack of 
transparency. This can be a precarious method for analysis and may not be entirely efficient in accurately 
articulating the performance of urban governance in Damascus.  
 
The local government revenue has gradually declined from 2014 to 2016, reflecting the economic impact 
of the conflict, which is getting worse over time. Moreover, the rate of tax evasion is 58%, which is 
relatively large; in fact, this indicates a decline in state authority over a large segment of individuals and 
groups who have exploited the conflict. Another contributing factor is the government’s preoccupation 
with maintaining security and expanding military operations to maintain the capital’s borders, and as a 
result, they evade their responsibilities in the belief that no one will hold them accountable. 
As for the financial aspects of the Effectiveness Index, an important issue must be taken into 
consideration in times of war, which is the involvement of international actors in the process of financing 
their allies in order to protect their interests and expand their political agendas. Damascus, which is 
under government control, has received funding from its allies since the outbreak of the armed conflict, 
but this funding goes mostly to the military sector. 
With regard to the Equity Index, Indicators 10 and 11 demonstrate a significant decrease in the level of 
gender equality in terms of women’s representation in decision-making positions, which is something 
common in the Global South in general, and in the Middle East in particular. In the Damascus 
Governorate Council, the percentage of women councilors is 23.53%, and the percentage of women in 
key positions is 2.35%. Indicators 9 and 12 show a neglect of the citizens’ entitlement to know and 
understand the rights and duties resulting from access to basic services, as well as a disregard for the 
population’s standard of living and the areas in which they reside when charging these services and 
treating the rich as poor. 
Participation achieved the lowest rating because of the absence of a mechanism for a mayoral election, 
since the mayor is directly appointed by the President. In addition to the low turnout of voters in the 
recent elections (due to the division of civil society between supporters and opponents of the 
government during conflict), the oppositional citizen does not consider the government legitimate and 
refuses to participate in the election of any party or institution that represents it. It can also be said that 
poor participation is due to the absence of public platforms that bring together all citizens and give them 
the right to express their issues and concerns, which would facilitate effective participation in decision-
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making processes. This is evidenced by Indicator 17 (with the absence of a forum for citizens to express 
their views) and Indicator 18 (“civil associations per 10,000 population”), which is 0.54 per 10,000 
inhabitants — a very small and incompetent number. 
During conflict, a large number of people flee the country, either to seek better living conditions due to 
the deterioration of the economic situation or to save their lives because of insecurity in the areas where 
they live. However, the Syrian diaspora is a critical issue for the participation and decision-making 
processes that relate to the present and future of Syria, and should thus be taken into consideration when 
assessing the participation indicator regarding UGI. Moreover, effective mechanisms must be created 
to involve the people in decision-making processes, regardless of their political, religious, or ethnic 
orientations. 
With regard to the accountability index, its relatively high value does not reflect its performance on the 
ground. For example, Indicator 23 deals only with the presence or absence of an anti-corruption 
committee, but does not measure its performance. Reports and investigations conducted by the 
Damascus Branch of the Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection are not accessible and 
transparent, which weakens the credibility of this commission to carry out the task of accountability. In 
addition, there is a clear dominance by state institutions at the expense of civil society participation in 
the calculation of sub-indicators of accountability, and this gap must be bridged in order to achieve a 
high level of accountability. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
6.1. MAIN CONCLUSION  
The main conclusions of this research are summarized by discussing the main objectives mentioned in 
chapter 1. 
Objectives of the Theoretical Discussion 
Objective 1: To shed light on the urban governance concept and its implication in the literature and the 
international development context. 
Chapter 2 delivered multiple definitions of governance and urban governance from different 
perspectives of international bodies, whereas, the strategies and visions of those bodies has their impact 
on the formation of this concept. In this context, the international organizations such as World Bank and 
IMF prioritize the economic and financial factors over other factors due to their function and policy. On 
the other hand UN organizations such as UNDP, UN-HABITAT and UNESCO consider all factors of 
urban governance based on the principles on democracy. This study adopts the UN form of urban 
governance, more specifically, the definition which has been delivered in the (Habitat III) conference 
which took place in Quito, Ecuador, from 17 – 20 October 2016 as “It is the software that enables the 
urban hardware to function, the enabling environment requiring the adequate legal frameworks, 
efficient political, managerial and administrative processes, as well as strong and capable local 
institutions able to respond to the citizen’s needs.”. In addition, this chapter presented the sphere of the 
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governance key actors (State, Civil Society, and Private sector), in terms of the role of each actor within 
the governance system and the interrelations between them. 
Objective 2: To identify the norms and indicators of good urban governance that followed to measure 
its performance. 
Chapter 2 explained that this research adopts the Un-Habitat norms of Good Urban Governance which 
have presented in the Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance in 2001. These norms are 
“sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement 
and citizenship, and security”.  In addition, it presented the Urban Governance Index (UGI) as a 
methodology for evaluating the performance of urban governance in Syria and pointed out the 
limitations of UGI in addressing the interaction between the key actors involved. Therefore, this study 
included an analytical framework for key actors besides the application of UGI.  
Objective 3: To examine the characteristics of urban governance during conflict, and the main shifts of 
the role of decision making actors, in addition to the norms followed in assessing urban governance in 
wartime.  
Chapter 3 discussed the dynamics of urban governance during the conflict. Starting with the 
characterization of conflict types, namely the sovereign conflict, civic conflict and civil conflict, 
stressing that the understanding of the type of conflict identifying the type of conflict and the key actors 
involved, would help to understand the behavior of urban areas and to anticipate the social and economic 
consequences of conflict. In addition, this chapter presents the change in urban governance during the 
conflict, which is accompanied by new actors at the local and international levels, as a result of the 
governance gaps caused by the failure of the state and the division of civil society. This mode of urban 
governance which combined local and international presented by (MacGinty, 2011) as Hybrid 
Governance, and he suggested three principles for evaluating urban governance during conflict as 
follows: 
• Effectiveness: means the provision of basic services to the population of electricity, water, 
education, health, etc., and the distribution of these services fairly and equitably. In addition to 
reactivating the economy in order to secure a decent standard of living. 
• Security: It means protecting citizens and securing their lives by creating security and judicial 
institutions such as police and security and organizing their work through fair laws and 
regulations. 
• Legitimacy: is the social contract that regulates the relationship of citizens with state institutions 
and the private sector. It is based on a set of beliefs, values and legislations that guarantee and 
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protect the rights of citizens. Under this contract, public authorities are empowered to handle 
the affairs of citizens.  
Objectives of the Case Study  
Objective 4 TO explore the urban governance reality in Syria, and identify its key actors of action, 
currently and before the conflict. 
Chapter 4 meets this objective through analyzing the role of key actors in Syrian governance before and 
during the conflict.  
Before the conflict  
Following the year 2000, Syria has undergone significant shifts within its governance setting. This was 
evident in the Syrian 10th FYP (2006-2010), putting an emphasis on the decentralization of government, 
increasing the activities and investment of the market, and lastly enabling the participation of civil 
society in the process of development. However, it can be assumed that the Syrian government is still 
perceived to be centralized to a large extent before the conflict and it continued with the same approach 
during it, in other world, Syria has not achieved the transition from government to governance yet.  
Moreover, despite the increase of investments in the services and market activities in favor of the private 
sector, they are still greatly dominated by the state and nowhere near attending to local demands, notably 
of those with a lower economic status. On the other hand, the parliament along with a number of 
organizations of principally cultural and environmental functions are considered to be the 
representatives of the civil society. However, they have a limited freedom of action as they are controlled 
by the central government, which prevents them from having access to all social groups. This also 
hinders debating fundamental developmental needs with the development authorities, as these are not 
incorporated in their agenda of actions. A more active and broader form of civil society has consequently 
occurred, which is not formally represented or acknowledged, but is well organized and strongly 
associated with private, formal, and governmental CSOs. This civil society form is based upon kinship 
and is thought to be highly competent on societal, financial, and cultural levels. 
During the conflict  
The governance during conflict has shifted from the state -market- society manipulation to the state 
failing, a conflicted economy, and a torn-society. These circumstances have cultivated different 
governance configurations, including local, and international actors that have risen to fill in where the 
state has fallen short. These groups comprise civil society assemblies, Local Councils, Extremist 
Groups, Sharia Courts, and warlords, the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolution, international 
bodies and private stockholders. A “hybrid governance” is being constructed as civil society and state-
building assemblies are making an effort to rebuild and/ or develop governance whether including these 
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elements or not. Regardless, this hybridity procedure appears to lean more towards international 
reconstruction ideals that center on hierarchical technocratic-institutionalization and actually worsen the 
weakness and division of civil society in Syria, given its civil society’s already fragile configuration. 
This results in the enablement of radical groups to fill in as a mode of governance, and even the 
international intercessors who mean well often fail to be productive in this regard. 
Objective 5 Assessment of urban governance performance in the Damascus 
Chapter 5 delivers the results of the application of urban governance index in Damascus. The analysis 
show that “accountability” takes the lead in the city’s ratings for the various elements, with 
“participation” coming in last. For Damascus, the urban governance rating based on the UGI is 0.4085. 
Regarding the four elements that make up the UGI, Damascus is at the top of the list for “accountability” 
with a rating of 0.715, and also has prevalent scores in “equity” at 0.369, “effectiveness” at 0.277, and 
“participation” at 0.273.  
The result dissection showed that Participation achieved the lowest rating because of the absence of a 
mechanism for a mayoral election, since the mayor is directly appointed by the President. In addition to 
the low turnout of voters in the recent elections (due to the division of civil society between supporters 
and opponents of the government during conflict), the oppositional citizen does not consider the 
government legitimate and refuses to participate in the election of any party or institution that represents 
it. It can also be said that poor participation is due to the absence of public platforms that bring together 
all citizens and give them the right to express their issues and concerns, which would facilitate effective 
participation in decision-making processes. Another critical issue highlighted regarding participation 
which is the Syrian diaspora and their role in participation and decision-making processes. Whereas 
Syria now and in the future cannot be shaped without their voice.  
Regarding the accountability indicator which achieved the high score, the discussion pointed out that 
high value does not reflect its performance on the ground, and there is a gap must be bridged in order to 
have realistic score of accountability.  
Equity indicator showed that there is a lack in service delivery to the citizen by the local government in 
addition to absence of the laws and the regulations that protect citizen’s rights. In addition to the 
significant weakness of women's representation in decision-making positions. 
The low score of Effectiveness indicator which is related to financial aspects reflects the conflict impact 
on economy.   
This study has shown that it is necessary to adapt the general concepts of urban governance to conflict 
or post-conflict situations, that there are some specific issues in that adaptation in need to be addressed. 
These issues can be summarized in the following points : 
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- The conflict coincides with the emergence of a number of local and international actors, each 
with its own interests and agendas. This complexity needs to be thoroughly studied and analyzed 
in order to understand the points of convergence and difference between these actors and their 
impact on the performance of governance during the conflict. 
-  The diaspora community, which is fleeing the country due to deteriorating economic and 
security conditions, must be considered an integral part of the local community and should have 
a presence when making decisions. This point should be taken into account when talking about 
urban governance in the wartime, and also the internally displaced people must be integrated 
and promoted in the participation process.  
- In evaluating urban governance during conflict through the UN approach, indicators must be 
adapted to changes in the new governance landscape that presupposes the conflict. For example, 
the participation index must take into account the voice of the diaspora, and the effectiveness 
indicator should take into account the financial support of the international actors of their allies. 
To extend their political and economic agendas. 
As for the Syrian conflict, predicting future mode of governance is as complex as the complexity of 
local and international actors involved in the conflict. The political and economic power that will follow 
the war will broadly determine what urban governance will be, perhaps it will follow the neoliberal 
agendas or socialist social ideology. However, there is a set of issues that must be taken into account in 
present and in the future: 
- Adopting the concept of governance in Syria and taking serious steps to move from government 
to governance. 
- To enhance the principle of transparency and accountability and to develop mechanisms and 
tools that guarantee effective performance without the interference of any authority. 
- Empower women and find instruments and means to ensure their right to equality and 
participation in decision-making. 
- To achieve the principle of equity through providing the services such as nutrition, education, 
work, housing, healthcare, water, hygiene, and other basic services to all citizens, including the 
poor, the young, the old, the handicapped, and religious and ethnic minorities. 
- Create mechanisms and means to involve the Syrian diaspora in making present and future Syria 
and delivering their voice to Syria 
 
6.2. FUTURE STUDIES 
The discourse about urban governance and conflict have recently emerged prominently in the literature 
of the social sciences and urban politics. However, there are relatively few studies that address the 
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relationship between these two concepts, and the mutual influence between them, and thus there is a 
research gap that needs to be filled. This study delivered an initial idea about the urban governance 
during the conflict in terms of the role of key actors involved in the decision-making process, and the 
assessment of urban governance in wartime. This issue needs further research and investigation, firstly 
exploring the role of key actors in urban governance during the conflict, the identification of these actors, 
and the nature of interactive relations between them. Secondly, the adoption of urban governance 
assessment mechanisms that take into account conflict as a key factor, for example adapting the urban 
governance index to fit the changes in governance during conflict.   
Another crucial issue that needs to be investigated is that most data are used to calculate the index of 
urban governance, is derived from the statistics, documents and laws of government agencies that may 
suffer from lack of transparency and the Data issued by it is not in accordance with reality. This brings 
up an important idea for discussion "The Urban Governance Index between Theory and Practice".  
With regard to the Syrian context, each of the key actors involved in the urban governance could be 
studied separately in depth, for instance, more study could be directed to address the role of international 
actors during Syrian conflict in peacebuilding and reconciliation process. In addition, this study could 
be extended to address critical issues regarding the urban governance in a post-conflict phase. 
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